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Prohibition without Protection?: Marriageable Age Law Reforms 
and Adolescent Fertility in Mexico 
In this study, we exploit the differential timing in minimum marriageable age laws 
in Mexico to estimate the impact of these civil law reforms on child marriage, 
adolescent fertility, girls’ school attendance and the likelihood of engaging in a 
consensual union. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, the results show 
that states adopting minimum marriageable age laws exhibited a 49% and 44% 
decrease in child marriage rates and the likelihood of girls being in consensual 
unions respectively. Contrary to what was expected however, the law had no impact 
on total teenage birth rates and girls’ school attendance. Additional findings reveal 
that the fall in child marriage rates was mainly driven by 16-17-year-old girls, and 
states where child marriage was less rampant prior to the law. We also find evidence 
of a decrease in teenage birth rates among girls living in rural areas by 
approximately 14% as a result of the law.  
 
Keywords: Adolescent Fertility; Child Marriage; Minimum Marriageable Age 
Laws; Consensual Unions 
JEL-Codes: J12, J13, J18, K15 
 
Male Employment and Female Intra-Household Decision-Making: 
A Mexican Gold Mining Case Study 
This study explores the effect of economic booms in male-dominated industries like 
mining on female intra-household decision-making power. Using the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis as an exogenous event which led to a gold mining boom in 
Mexico, I find that women living in gold endowed municipalities experienced 
higher decision-making power contrary to some theoretical predictions. These 
results appear to be consistent with unitary household bargaining models which 
assume income pooling, as female decision-making power increased despite no 
changes in female labour force participation and an observed increase in male 
employment. Findings from a separate survey additionally show that while women 
residing in gold endowed states had higher decision-making power, they were also 
more likely to suffer from intimate partner violence (IPV). This suggests that a 
woman’s intra-household decision-making authority is not necessarily negatively 
correlated with her risk of IPV as posited in feminist theory.  
 
Keywords: Gold mining; Intra-household decision making; Global income shocks; 
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How Violence Dis-Empowers Women: Evidence from the Mexican 
Drug War 
This paper examines the effect of violent living conditions on various forms of 
female empowerment in Mexico. Exploiting the exogenous rise in homicides 
between 2007 and 2011 as a source of variation and proxy for unsafe surroundings, 
the findings suggest that violence hampers women’s intra-household bargaining 
power, employment, mobility and emotional and mental well-being. Higher 
2 
homicide rates also appear to have a weaker impact on poorer women’s labor supply 
even though these women remain fearful amidst increasingly homicidal 
surroundings, indicating a trade-off between income and emotional stability among 
those who are financially constrained. The negative effects of the drug war are also 
more salient among women who live in relatively more dangerous municipalities 
that face a higher risk of violence, and those who had previously experienced 
assault.  
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  Gender equality begins at a micro-level of society: in the home. 
Understanding the determinants of intra-household female well-being and 
empowerment, is therefore crucial in expediting societies’ progress towards 
achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 on gender equality. 
Specifically, SDG 5 identifies the need to ‘enhance women’s ability to participate 
in intra-household decision making processes as one of the necessary factors 
required to achieve gender equality by 2030. Because a woman’s household 
bargaining power also has the potential to influence children’s long-term welfare 
and household production, a good understanding of the determinants of household 
decision-making has potentially important implications for poverty alleviation, and 
both social and economic development (Duflo, 2003; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 
2003; Gitter and Barham, 2008). 
  Non-unitary household bargaining models in economics scholarship 
predict that external shift parameters such as the conditions of a woman’s living 
environment are key determinants of her bargaining power. These external 
environmental factors termed as ‘outside options’ affect the threat point in a 
marriage or domestic partnership, and are a function of an individual’s decision-
making authority (Lommerud 2003; Lundberg and Pollak 1994, McElroy and 
Horney 1981). Subsequently, the theory suggests that a change in a woman’s 
outside option is sufficient to alter her bargaining power within the household, 
which could in turn influence her risk of intimate partner violence (IPV). This is in 
line with feminist theory which predicts that wife abuse is a consequence of weak 
intra-household decision-making authority (Goode, 1971; Jewkes, 2002). Unitary 
household bargaining models on the other hand, while widely rejected across more 
recent economic literature, have been found to be relevant in traditional societies 
like India (Neff et al., 2012; Klasen and Pieters, 2015). Unitary bargaining models 
assume income pooling where ultimately a woman’s intra-household decision-
making power is dependent on changes in the total household wealth, rather than 
on changes in her absolute or relative income prospects. Under these premises, 
extra-household factors that benefit males but not females for instance, could still 
generate an improvement in female decision-making outcomes at home.  
  Drawing from both unitary and non-unitary household bargaining models 
as well as two exogenous events: the 2007 Mexican drug war and the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis, two of the dissertation chapters endeavour to uncover the 
effect of violence and booms in male-dominated sectors on inter alia, female 
decision-making power and IPV risk. Given that Mexico has undergone major 
societal and economic changes over the last two decades, this thesis uses Mexico 
as a case study to examine the changes in women’s intra-household welfare over 
this time period. In particular, between 2007 and 2011, the country experienced a 
sharp spike in violence as a result of the Mexican Drug War initiated by the newly 
elected President, Felipe Calderón. Concurrently, the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis which led to rising prices of precious metals like gold contributed to Mexico’s 
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gold mining boom. Shortly after in 2014, in accordance with the United Nations 
2014 agenda on the rights of girls, boys and adolescents, Mexico implemented laws 
that prohibited marriage below the age of 18 without exceptions. Subsequently, in 
light of Mexico’s high child marriage and teenage pregnancy rate where 1 in 4 girls 
were married before the age of 18, and 71 out of every 1,000 adolescent girls aged 
between 15 and 19 were teenage mothers in 2018, the third dissertation chapter 
accesses the impact of age-of-marriage reforms on additional factors of female 
well-being like early unions, adolescent fertility and schooling outcomes. Among 
various other legal reforms and socio-economic shifts that had happened over the 
last two decades, Mexico therefore provides an ideal country-specific setting to 
answer the research questions of this dissertation: a). Are minimum marriageable 
age laws truly effective in decreasing teenage birth rates? b). How does violence 
disempower women?, and c). How do economic booms in male-dominated sectors 
like mining affect women’s intra-household decision-making power and risk of 
IPV? 
  Accordingly, Chapter One: “Prohibition without Protection?: 
Minimum Marriageable Age Law Reforms and Adolescent Fertility in 
Mexico” (joint with Helmut Rainer), examines the effect of the banning of 
marriages below the age of 18 on child marriage rates (CMRs) and teenage birth 
rates (TBRs) in Mexico. The findings from this study are useful in shedding light 
on the relationship between early marriage and early childbearing in the country, 
and the generalizability of international guidelines and policies to local contexts. 
This is especially important due to Mexico’s high teenage birth rate, and the 
subsequent need to abate this issue. Yet, the relationship between minimum 
marriageable age laws and teenage pregnancy is not as straightforward in the 
Mexican context considering declining popularity of marriages and associated 
fertility over time. Using a staggered difference-in-differences approach which 
exploits the temporal and geographical variation in law implementation, we observe 
some interesting results. The findings show that as expected, CMRs decreased by 
about 49%, but we also find positive spill over effects of the law on curbing 
informal unions characterized by consensual unions, with the likelihood of girls 
being in consensual unions decreasing by a similar magnitude (44%) to CMRs. 
Contrary to what was postulated in theory, we do not observe any impact of age-of-
marriage laws on total TBRs and girls’ school attendance. To explain these findings, 
we present a formal model based on Rasul (2006, 2008), in which couples bargain 
over fertility without commitment. Additional results from our empirical findings 
show that the fall in CMRs was mainly driven by 16-17 year old girls, and states 
where child marriage was not as rampant prior to the introduction of the law. This 
indicates that legal reforms to the age of marriage are not sufficient for ending child 
marriage in places where this practice may be more common and socially accepted. 
Lastly, we find that the minimum marriageable age laws decreased TBRs by 
approximately 14% among rural girls, suggesting that age-of-marriage laws have 
the potential to mitigate teenage pregnancies in destitute areas, where girls may be 
more vulnerable to becoming teenage mothers. Altogether, this study demonstrates 
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that global policies and guidelines may not be a one-size-fits-all solution to local 
societal issues. In particular, taking into consideration local cultures and contexts 
in policy-making, and implementing complementary policies aimed at discouraging 
early unions are imperative to fully protect girls from the consequences of child 
marriage.  
  Chapter Two: “Male Employment and Female Intra Household 
Decision-Making: A Mexican Gold Mining Case Study”, explores the impact of 
economic booms in male-dominated industries like gold mining on women’s 
decision-making authority and risk of intimate partner violence (IPV). 
Notwithstanding efforts to increase female labour force participation in the mining 
sector, the proportion of Mexican women engaged in mining-related work has 
remained low (between 6% to 13%). Using the 2007-2008 global financial crisis as 
an exogenous event which led to rising gold prices and subsequently a gold mining 
boom in Mexico, I estimate a difference-in-differences model of the relationship 
between the gold mining boom and the two determinants of intra-household female 
well-being aforementioned. Four main results are obtained from the analysis. First, 
women in gold endowed municipalities experienced increases in their decision-
making power index by about 0.02%, with a two standard deviation increase in the 
price of gold. This is the first study to my knowledge to have established a positive 
relationship between mining and women’s bargaining power within the household. 
Previous papers by Kotsadam et al. (2016) and Tolonen (2018) have found no 
impact of mining on female bargaining power in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Subsequently, I demonstrate that the observed increase in women’s decision-
making authority was likely to have been driven by an improvement in male 
employment probabilities during the gold mining boom. This result is consistent 
with unitary rather than non-unitary models of the household which assume income 
pooling, since only male employment prospects increased but not females’, and 
women may have therefore experienced higher bargaining power at home through 
an increase in their partners’ employment opportunities. Third, the study presents 
some striking evidence of a positive relationship between a woman’s probability of 
IPV and her intra-household bargaining power, against feminist theory predicting 
that wife abuse decreases with higher intra-household decision-making authority 
(Goode, 1971; Jewkes, 2002). The findings from the analysis show that women in 
gold endowed states experienced approximately 3.0%, 3.4%, 3.8% and 5.5% more 
emotional abuse, threats of violence, physical abuse and sexual abuse respectively, 
despite having greater decision-making power. Lastly, the empirical results suggest 
that poorer women are more likely to suffer from hard forms of IPV like physical 
abuse, while their wealthier counterparts are subject to softer types of IPV like 
threats of violence. To explain these findings, I draw from theories on stresses 
related to male trepidation and fear, differences in reporting domestic abuse 
between poorer and wealthier women, and the male-backlash effect. Taken 
together, this study highlights the importance of balancing male psychological and 
emotional shifts along with female empowerment. For instance, it calls for more 
efforts in cushioning the fall in male socio-economic status (through counselling 
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services or community-based gender awareness campaigns for example), such that 
an increase in a woman’s household decision-making power would not be 
accompanied by higher IPV risk as demonstrated in the study. 
  Lastly, Chapter Three: “How Violence Dis-empowers Women: 
Evidence from the Mexican Drug War” examines the effect of violent living 
conditions characterized by homicide rates on spousal intra-household decision-
making power. Although there is a considerable amount of literature studying the 
relationship between the Mexican Drug War and human capital accumulation, 
health, and political outcomes, much less attention has been paid to its effect on 
female welfare, specifically a woman’s decision-making power within the 
household. Drawing from non-unitary cooperative household bargaining models, I 
postulate that changes in a woman’s outside option through an increasingly 
dangerous milieu lowers a woman’s bargaining power at home. Similar to chapter 
two, I use three waves of a panel data set (the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS)) to track changes in a woman’s decision-making power over time through 
a difference-in-differences model, utilizing the 2007 Mexican Drug War as an 
exogenous event. I obtain four main insights from the analysis. First, higher 
homicide rates decreased women’s relative bargaining power by about 30%, 
particularly over children’s goods and services. This finding can be juxtaposed 
against a body of household bargaining literature documenting gender differences 
in preferences towards the allocation of income resources to children’s 
consumption (Duflo 2003; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Gitter and Barham 
2008). Second, I observe changes in female psychological and physical behaviour, 
where women were respectively 8.7%, 5.3% and 11.1% more likely to fear assault, 
change transportation routes as a security measure, and distrust neighbours in the 
midst of violent living conditions. Third, I find that a percentage point increase in 
the homicide rate lowered women’s employment probability and hours worked in 
a week by 4.8% and 2.6 hours respectively. These findings suggest that women’s 
reduced work effort potentially as a result of fear, weaker social capital and 
decreased mobility led to a fall in their relative bargaining power over their 
children’s goods and services. Finally, the results reveal that poorer and more 
vulnerable women, as well as those living in high-risk areas are disproportionately 
affected by violence. Specifically, economically disadvantaged women appear to 
face a trade-off between emotional stability and income earnings, likely due to their 
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In this study, we exploit the differential timing in minimum marriageable age laws 
in Mexico to estimate the impact of these civil law reforms on child marriage, 
adolescent fertility, girls’ school attendance and the likelihood of engaging in a 
consensual union. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, the results show 
that states adopting minimum marriageable age laws exhibited a 49% and 44% 
decrease in child marriage rates and the likelihood of girls being in consensual 
unions respectively. Contrary to what was expected however, the law had no impact 
on total teenage birth rates and girls’ school attendance. Additional findings reveal 
that the fall in child marriage rates was mainly driven by 16-17-year-old girls, and 
states where child marriage was less rampant prior to the law. We also find evidence 
of a decrease in teenage birth rates among girls living in rural areas by 
approximately 14% as a result of the law.  
 
Keywords: Adolescent Fertility; Child Marriage; Minimum Marriageable Age 
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Child marriage is defined as a formally or informally recognized union in 
which either or both parties involved are below the age of 18.1 The United Nations 
(UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child condemns child marriage as it 
prematurely ends girls’ childhood, which is a fundamental violation of human 
rights, and aims to eradicate child marriage by 2030 as part of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). In correspondence with international guidelines to 
eliminate this practice, the 2014 General Law on the Rights of Children and 
Adolescents (‘Ley General de los Derechos de Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes’) was 
introduced in Mexico to raise the minimum marriageable age to 18 without 
exceptions.2 Since then, all 32 Mexican states were advised to harmonize family 
and civil law codes that previously allowed marriages below 18 with federal law.  
Prohibiting early marriages is important as it has been linked to early 
childbearing. In a cross-sectional study on 12 Sub-Saharan African countries, 
Maswikwa et al. (2015) found that women who married younger than 18 were more 
likely than their counterparts to be teenage mothers. In Arceo-Gomez and Campos-
Vasquez’s (2014) study on Mexico, the authors confirmed a positive relationship 
between teenage pregnancy and early marriage, and a negative association between 
early childbearing and educational and labour market outcomes. Across literature, 
adolescent fertility has additionally been linked to weaker intra-household decision 
making power and poorer health outcomes like malnutrition, intimate partner 
violence, psychological distress, sexually transmitted diseases as well as infant and 
maternal mortality (Jensen and Thornton, 2003; Field and Ambrus, 2008; Heath and 
Mobarak, 2015). Because of these negative impacts of early parenthood, girls face 
a high likelihood of being trapped in the poverty cycle which could in turn have 
severe implications for their children. Children of teenage mothers for instance, 
have been found to have lower educational attainment and more behavioural issues. 
Research also shows that daughters of teenage mothers are more likely to become 
teenage mothers themselves, which further perpetuates the cycle of 
intergenerational poverty (Meade et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 2011).  
Adolescent fertility is a serious concern in Mexico. According to 2018 
UNICEF data, 71 out of every 1,000 adolescent girls aged between 15 and 19 were 
teenage mothers in Mexico. While the situation is direst in West and Central Africa, 
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries still have relatively high adolescent 
fertility rates compared to other regions in the world with an average of 63 per 1,000 
teenage mothers, above the global mean rate of 44 per 1,000 adolescents. 
Comparatively, Mexico lies above the average in terms of the number of teenage 
1 The National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI) defines informal unions (‘union libre’) 
as both common law marriages (‘concubinatos’) and non-common law marriages in which couples 
are involved in a consensual union or domestic partnership. In this study, we refer to informal unions 
as consensual unions, domestic partnerships and cohabitation interchangeably, which carry the same 
meaning. 
2 For official documentation of the policy, see: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/3 
39082/LGDNNA__Con_ltimas_reformas_2018__hasta_la_del_20_de_junio_.pdf. 
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births (71 out of 1,000 girls) in the LAC region, and has much higher adolescent 
fertility rates than developed countries like Germany for instance, where 8 out of 
1,000 adolescents have children. Based on household survey data, UNFPA 
estimates additionally show that LAC has been the only region to have experienced 
a growing trend in birth rates for the under-15 age group, with 2% of women of 
reproductive age in LAC countries having their first child before the age of 15 
(UNFPA, 2017).  
  Figure A displays trends in teenage births disaggregated by girls’ marital 
status from 1985 to 2017, and shows a steady decline in the share of births among 
married girls. On the other hand, the proportion of births to single girls and girls in 
consensual unions have increased over the same time period. Specifically, the 
percentage of births to married teenage mothers decreased from approximately 58% 
in 1985 to 4% in 2017, while the share of births to single and consensual union 
mothers increased from 11% to 21% and 28% to 68% respectively.  
  
 
Figure A. Trends in teenage births among girls below 18 (1985 – 2017). Notes: This figure plots the 
share of births to girls below 18 according to marital status (consensual union, married and single) 
from 1985 to 2017. Data come from Birth administrative records provided by the National Institute 
for Statistics and Geography’s (INEGI) Vital Statistics edition. 1985 is the earliest year for which 
micro-level data is available. 
 
An examination of the trends in marriages among girls below 18 explains this 
phenomenon. Figure B plots the share of married girls below 18 from 1993 to 2017, 
and demonstrates a decline in the proportion of married girls in this age group over 
time. Over the entire period, the share of married girls below 18 fell significantly 
from 17% in 1993 to 0.4% in 2017, amounting to a reduction in the number of 
underaged married girls by a factor of approximately 39. Given these evolving 
patterns in adolescent fertility and marriage in Mexico, it is unclear whether raising 
the minimum age of marriage would be effective in mitigating teenage pregnancies, 
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especially since the number of births to married teenage mothers has been falling 
as a result of decreasing marriage rates among this age group.  
 
 
Figure B. Trends in marriages among girls between 12-18 years of age (1993 – 2017). Notes: This 
figure plots the share of girls who were married before age 18 from 1993 to 2017. Data on marriages 
come from the Nuptiality administrative records provided by the National Institute for Statistics and 
Geography’s (INEGI) Vital Statistics edition. 1993 is the earliest year for which micro-level data is 
available. 
 
Literature abounds about the potential benefits of marriageable age law 
reforms in reducing the incidence of child marriage and associated adolescent 
fertility, yet very few studies have explicitly examined the relationship between 
these factors. A majority of the papers that have specifically examined this 
relationship, however, conduct cross-country analyses with data at the aggregate 
level and fail to provide local insight into the mechanisms that underlie the 
correlation (Kim et al., 2013; Maswikwa et al., 2015). The general finding across 
these cross-country studies is that civil law reforms to the marriageable age have 
been effective in abating child marriage and teenage pregnancy. A study by 
Bharadwaj (2015) which relates closely to this paper, examined the impact of the 
1957 marriage law amendment which raised the marriageable age to 18 in 
Mississippi, U.S, on child marriage rates and crude birth rates. Similar to the cross-
country studies, the author found that both child marriage rates and crude birth rates 
decreased by 75% and 2-6% respectively. In developing countries like Indonesia, 
marriageable age law changes have been shown to be less effective in mitigating 
child marriage rates. Cammack, Young and Heaton (1996) demonstrated that while 
there was a steady decline in the number of girls marrying below the age of 16 as a 
result of Indonesia’s 1974 National Marriage Act, the law did not have an 
appreciable effect on the trend. 
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In this study, we challenge the notion that minimum marriageable age laws 
are useful in reducing adolescent fertility through the support of two formalized 
models based on Rasul (2006, 2008), in which couples bargain over fertility without 
commitment. The evolving socio-cultural trends and underlying economic 
conditions in Mexico suggest that the relationship between child marriage and 
teenage motherhood is not as straightforward and predictable. Unlike regions like 
Africa, consensual unions have thrived in Latin America due to growing acceptance 
towards this practice over time. Across various African countries, cohabitation 
before marriage is typically socially unacceptable due to strong traditional values 
and beliefs. A recent study by Duyilemi, Tunde-Awe and Lois (2018) found that 
71.8% of Nigerian undergraduate students perceived domestic partnerships without 
marriage as a key factor of moral decadence in society, indicating that the act of 
cohabitation would violate religious and cultural codes and that marriage was 
important for legitimizing ones’ societal standing. Legally restricting the age of 
marriage to above 18 should thus be effective in reducing child marriage rates and 
its associated consequences like teenage pregnancy in societies where consensual 
unions are less of an option.3 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, contrary to 
existing studies which postulate that teenage birth rates decline along with child 
marriage rates, the results from this paper show otherwise. Using a staggered 
difference-in-differences (D-I-D) approach, we find that notwithstanding the 
criminalization of underage marriage which lowered child marriage rates and the 
likelihood of girls’ engaging in consensual unions, the law had no effect on total 
teenage birth rates and girls’ school attendance. Second, the results potentially help 
to shed more light on the effect of laws against early marriage on teenage pregnancy 
in the Latin American region, where consensual unions have become increasingly 
more common than formal unions characterized by marriages. According to DHS 
surveys from the 1990s, consensual unions make up a large proportion of 
partnerships throughout Latin America with rates of up to 61.5% in Dominican 
Republic (Castro-Martín, 2002). The findings from this paper using Mexico as a 
case study may therefore be generalizable to other countries in Latin America, 
assuming similar socio-cultural, economic and political climates.  
Lastly, this paper may be interesting for policy-makers who aim to improve 
the lives and welfare of adolescent girls through international guidelines and 
policies. The results from this study underscore the importance of accounting for 
country-specific socio-cultural trends, prior to adopting global policies that may not 
turn out to be a one-size-fits-all solution. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: section II provides a background on minimum marriageable age law 
reforms, and also discusses the conceptual framework for the topic in question; 
3 An analysis of the trends in consensual unions in Mexico using INEGI’s Population and Housing 
Census data from 1960 - 2010 reveals an increase in the proportion of girls aged 12-19 in consensual 
unions (2.9% in 1960 and 5.1% in 2010). Statistics from the 2010 Population and Housing Unit 
Censuses further indicate that the number of girls between 12 and 19 in consensual unions in Mexico 
was approximately 2.4 times more than those in formal unions characterized by marriage. 
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section III describes the data used in this study; section IV focuses on the use of 
difference-in-differences (D-I-D) as an empirical strategy, and discusses various 
identifying assumptions associated with the D-I-D approach; sections V, VI, VII, 
and VIII present the main results of the paper, report a set of robustness checks, 
discuss various heterogeneous effects of the law, and present additional results on 
schooling and consensual unions respectively; section IX finally concludes. 
 
II. Background and Conceptual Framework 
 
Legal Conditions 
 Exactly three decades ago in November 1989, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child was unanimously approved by the United Nations General 
Assembly. Participating members of the United Nations, including Mexico, were 
constitutionally bound to streamline legislative frameworks to protect children and 
adolescents’ rights without exceptions. The convention asserted that the onus was 
on policy-makers, governments and individuals to take into account the best interest 
of the child, which included a life free from discrimination and violence, the right 
to proper survival and development as well as respect for children’s views, opinions 
and individuality. Since Mexico’s ratification of the convention in 2000 which 
entailed various constitutional amendments, momentous progress has been made in 
alleviating malnutrition and infant mortality rates, and implementing compulsory 
primary school education among other advances.  
  On 4 December, 2014, significant extensions were made to the Law on 
Protection of the Rights of Girls, Boys and Adolescents, formally enacted in 2000. 
The reforms to the law in 2014 represented the largest milestone in legislative 
progress towards achieving greater child rights in Mexico over the last 25 to 30 
years. Under the previous version of the law, only 56 articles were stipulated to 
preserve child rights and did not include legal changes to the minimum 
marriageable age of girls and boys. The updated 2014 version of the law consisted 
of a total of 154 articles, divided into 6 chapters. Specifically, chapter 2 on “The 
rights of children and adolescents” had been modified to include article 45, which 
banned marriage below the age of 18 for all boys and girls without exceptions 
(Martín et al., 2016). While federal state guidelines to raise the minimum 
marriageable age to 18 were officially introduced in December 2014, 2 out of 32 
Mexican states had enacted the law prior to this date, namely Veracruz in February 
2014 and Baja California Sur in June 2014. By the end of 2017, 27 of 32 states had 
modified their family and civil law codes to abide to federal law, albeit in a 





4 Figure B1 of the Appendix illustrates the geographical and temporal variation in the enactment of 
the law across Mexican states.  
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     Table 1. Date of Enactment of Minimum Age Laws 
State Minimum Marriage 
Age (> 18) 
Exceptions 
Aguascalientes (AG) 22 February 2016 No 
Baja California (BC)* - - 
Baja California Sur 
(BS) 
30 June 2014 No 
Campeche (CM)* 15 May 2016 No 
Coahuila (CO) 4 September 2015 No 
Colima (CL) 10 September 2016 No 
Chiapas (CS) 6 April 2016 No 
Chihuahua (CH) 23 December 2017 No 
México City (DF) 13 July 2016 No 
Durango (DG) 26 February 2017 No 
Guanajuato (GT) - - 
Guerrero (GR) 9 May 2017 No 
Hidalgo (HG) 31 December 2016 No 
Jalisco (JA) 4 April 2015 No 
Mexico (EM) 14 March 2016 No 
Michoacán (MI) 25 April 2016 No 
Morelos (MO) 17 August 2016  No 
Nayarit (NA) 11 March 2016 No 
Nuevo Leon (NL) - - 
Oaxaca (OA) 31 December 2015 No 
Puebla (PU) 28 March 2016 No 
Queretaro (QT) - - 
Quintana Roo (QR) 19 December 2014 No 
San Luis Potasi (SL) 17 September 2015 No 
Sonora (SO)* - - 
Sinaloa (SI) 19 August 2016 No 
Tabasco (TB) 1 July 2017 No 
Tamaulipas (TM) 23 June 2016 No 
Tlaxcala (TL) 30 December 2016 No 
Veracruz (VE) 3 February 2014 No 
Yucatan (YU) 12 June 2015 No 
Zacatecas (ZA) 29 March 2017 No 
 
* ‘Marry-your-rapist’ laws were implemented in these states in May 2016, and exonerates the 
perpetrator of the crime, ‘estupro’ (consensual sex with a minor through seduction or deceit) in cases 
of marriage to the victim. We therefore exclude the 3 states from the analysis as they serve neither 
as control nor treatment, and could potentially confound the outcomes studied. See: 
http://www.congresoson.gob.mx:81/Content/InformacionPublica/Articulo17bisA/5/LXI/Dictamen
es16/DECRETO93.pdf for legal documentation. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) identifies child marriage 
as one of the key drivers of adolescent fertility, especially in regions like South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Prohibiting early marriages in these regions could 
therefore reduce teenage births, as girls are protected from entering unions at a 
young age, and hence are less likely to become teenage mothers (UNFPA, 2013). 
In Latin American countries like Mexico however, this mechanical relationship 
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between early marriage and childbearing is clouded by a rising (falling) trend in 
informal consensual unions (formal marriages). The fundamental theoretical 
question in the context of this study, is therefore how fertility differs when couples 
are in a consensual union as opposed to a marriage, rather than how fertility 
changes when girls are no longer in early unions. Subsequently, although it is often 
contended that minimum marriageable age laws are effective in reducing 
adolescent fertility, this is not a prediction that necessarily follows from economic 
theory. A particular case in point are models where family decisions over fertility, 
and investments in household public goods, are subject to a hold-up problem. A 
hold-up problem arises when part of the return on an individual’s relationship-
specific investments is expropriated ex post by her partner. Household models that 
feature hold-up problems have been proposed by Rasul (2006), Rainer (2007), and 
Rasul (2008). In this section, we present and discuss the implications of two 
models that bring the insights of this literature to bear on the context of this study. 
Subsequently in Appendix A, these models are formally derived.  
A key feature of both models is that couples are unable to commit ex ante 
to their future actions within their relationship. Non-commitment implies that 
marital bargains are subject to ex post renegotiation after investments in fertility 
are sunk. Formally, non-commitment gives rise to a dynamic decision-making 
process in which couples interact over two periods—a first when fertility 
investments are chosen and a second after these investments are sunk, and 
bargaining over the division of the marital surplus takes place. To generate 
comparative statics, both models assume that the prohibition of early marriages 
compels young couples to make their fertility decisions in an informal, consensual 
union instead of formal marriage, with the former being less costly to dissolve 
than the latter. 
 In the first model which draws upon Rasul (2008), the shift from marriage 
to a consensual union is assumed to change the relevant threat point when couples 
bargain over the division of marital surplus.  Before the implementation of age-
of-marriage laws, divorce among married girls below 18 was extremely rare in 
Mexico, and was therefore not a credible threat in marital bargains.5 In this case, 
the relevant threat point for household bargaining is instead an inside option given 
by some non-cooperative outcome within marriage. Since the prohibition of early 
marriage in Mexico lowers the cost of a union dissolution, it is plausible to assume 
that exiting a relationship, now becomes a credible threat. Thus, consider the 
thought-experiment of replacing, as the threat point, the inside option with the 
outside option of dissolving the relationship and possibly re-matching. In 
equilibrium, the model predicts that this increases investments in fertility among 
couples where men have a preference for more children than their female partners. 
5 The average proportion of married girls below 18 who got divorced between 2009-2013 was only 
0.21% (INEGI, 2020). 
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By contrast, if women have a preference for more children than their male 
partners, equilibrium investments in fertility decrease.6 
The second model, reminiscent of Rasul’s (2006) work, extends the first 
model to a setting where the probability of a relationship breakdown is positive, 
and endogenously determined by couples’ fertility investments. Since the age-of-
marriage laws in Mexico compels young couples to form consensual unions 
instead of formally marrying, and since it is easier and less costly to dissolve an 
informal union than a formal marriage, the comparative static of interest is a 
decrease in the costs associated with the dissolution of a relationship. A key 
feature of the model is that high dissolution costs and investments in fertility are 
substitutable reasons for why relationships remain intact. Thus, in order to 
safeguard against dissolution, couples increase fertility investments to make up 
for the loss in formal commitment stemming from the reduction in the costs of 
union dissolution. In essence, as long as economic or legal barriers to exiting a 
partnership are high, the model predicts that couples are effectively locked into 
relationships irrespective of how much they invest in it. Once exit barriers are 
lowered, couples have the incentive to counteract the loss of this ‘lock-in’ 
mechanism, by increasing their investments in relationship-specific capital such 
as children. In summary, the two models suggest that the effects on teenage 
fertility due minimum marriageable age laws largely remain an empirical question 




  Prior to the 2014 General Law on the Rights of Children and Adolescents, 
family and civil law codes on the minimum marriageable age in the majority of the 
states were inconsistent with federal law codes. In Aguascalientes for instance, 
federal law had established 18 as the minimum age at which one was allowed to 
marry, while 16 was the minimum age established by family and civil law codes. 
Starting from December 2014 however, all states were advised to harmonize family 
and civil law codes with federal law, which strictly prohibited marriage below the 
age of 18 without exceptions. Accordingly, this study defines the timing of the law 
enactment as the date which states had modified their family and civil law codes to 
complement federal law. Information on the respective dates which states revised 
their family and civil law codes was provided by the Executive Secretariat of the 
National System for the Integral Protection of Children and Adolescents, under the 
Mexican Office for Domestic Affairs (SEGOB).7 
6 As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, and as also highlighted by Rasul (2008), the underlying 
intuition for this result is that a change in the threat point from an inside to an outside option affects 
how the fertility preferences of each partner translate into fertility outcomes: in the inside-option 
bargaining environment, equilibrium investments in fertility depend more strongly on the female 
partner’s fertility preferences than on those of the male partner, while under the outside-option 
bargaining protocol, equilibrium investments in fertility depend equally on both partners’ fertility 
preferences. 
7 Information regarding the dates of law implementation were drawn by the Mexican Office for 
Domestic Affairs (SEGOB) from the National Supreme Court of Justice.  
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  The National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI) provides unit-
level data on registered marriages and births per annum from the Vital Statistics 
edition which include basic demographic characteristics such as age, marital status, 
education level, employment and rural residential status of both the girl and her 
partner. The registration of marriages and births is mandatory and free of charge, 
and can be done by submitting a soft or hard copy of a marriage or birth certificate 
to any local civil registry office. Fortunately, information on the state in which a 
marriage was registered as well as the state in which girls resided at the time of the 
marriage registration is also available. Accordingly, in section IV., we test if the 
law generated selective marriage registration in states where the law had not been 
implemented, as this could potentially upward bias child marriage estimates and 
associated fertility effects. The marriage certificate data however does not allow for 
the segregation of whether girls’ state of residences was pre- or post-marriage, 
implying that the law could still have stimulated girls to move from their previous 
state of residence to the state of residence recorded in the marriage certificates.8  
  Another major concern of analysing demographic information is the 
discrepancy of vital statistics due to underreporting. For marriages, this would be 
manifested in the form of informal partnerships such as consensual unions which 
are typically not recorded by definition. To account for this potential issue, we 
subsequently draw from a separate Child Labor Module (MTI) survey conducted 
by the INEGI containing information on girls’ marital statuses (including 
consensual unions). The results presented in section VIII. indicate that 
underreporting of marriages was not likely to be severe given the observed decrease 
(rather than increase in the case of underreporting due to the law) in the likelihood 
of girls being in consensual unions after the law.9 With regard to births, existing 
demography literature on Mexico document relatively high birth coverage across 
the country, with the exception of 3 states - Chiapas, Guerrero and Puebla.10 
Reconstructing births in Mexico for the period of 1990-2005 using INEGI’s 
Population and Housing Censuses, Perez and Meneses (2010) confirmed that most 
Mexican states have a relatively complete record of their births (over 95% of the 
births were registered). Welti-Chanes’s (2012) study on Mexican fertility data also 
8 In this regard, while the ITT approach addresses concerns related to selective marriage registration, 
it is not possible to rule out selective migration which is distinct from the former, as girls could have 
still relocated to another state in order to legally register their marriages. This is unlike the issue of 
selective marriage registration, where girls register their marriages in a state different from the one 
they reside in. 
9 While the results show that the law was not likely to have led to the underreporting of formal 
marriages, it is not possible to rule out measurement errors arising from the lack of marriage 
registrations in rural areas where registering matrimonies may be geographically more challenging. 
Bunting (2005) also highlights another potential issue of the possibility of age fabrication during 
marriage registration. In general, the falsification of one’s age is made easier when birth certificates 
are not properly registered. According to the INEGI however, the majority of births (about 95%) 
occur in hospitals which register these births, leaving less room for bias arising from this issue. 
10 Perez and Meneses (2010) note that the poor records of births in Chiapas, Guerrero and Puebla 
are a result of economic, social, geographical and cultural factors associated largely with the 
marginalization of these states. In the robustness analysis, we exclude these 3 states with poorer 
birth records to check if the impact of the law on teenage birth rates was underestimated.  
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showed an improvement in the quality of fertility records over the last few decades, 
with a steady decrease in the percentage of women with no data on the number of 
children born alive, or the date of birth of their child. Specifically, in the 2010 
Housing and Population Census, only 1.4% and 0.7% of women aged 12 years and 
older had no information about their total number of children born alive or their 
child’s date of birth respectively.  
  Yet despite the unlikelihood of large underreporting in fertility data, 
another concern could be that the law led to delays in birth registrations. Even 
though teenage birth rates are calculated according to the month and year in which 
the child was born rather than the date the birth was registered, delays in birth 
registrations as a result of the law would mean that these births, including 
information on when they occurred, would not be recorded till later (as INEGI’s 
yearly data set on fertility captures births based on the year in which they were 
registered, which subsequently also contains information on when the actual birth 
occurred). In order to check if the law significantly influenced the timing of birth 
registrations, we regress the proportion of births that were registered in a different 
year from the actual birth occurrence year, on the law, a year after the law was 
introduced (to account for the gestational length of a pregnancy and possible 
information lags about the law).11 The results are presented in Table C2 of the 
Appendix, and do not demonstrate evidence that minimum marriageable age laws 
increased the percentage of girls registering their births later. Altogether, estimates 
are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant indicating that lags in birth 
registrations due to the law was unlikely. Additionally, timely registration of births 
is required by law in most states where 180 days is the maximum number of days 
since the actual date of birth that a parent has to register the birth (INEGI, 2015). 
This means that if the birth occurred in the first half of the year, it is likely to be 
recorded in the birth register in the same year. If the birth occurred in the second 
half of the year however, it is possible that the birth would only be recorded in the 
following year’s birth register. Since 2017 is the last year of this study, we also 
include births that occurred in 2017 which were recorded in the 2018 birth register 
in order to minimize measurement issues arising from late birth registrations. 
  Following standard calculations of marriage and fertility rates in existing 
literature, we define child marriage rates (CMRs) as the absolute number of girls 
who married below the age of 18 per 1,000 of the population of girls between 12 
and 17 years of age. Similarly, teenage birth rates (TBRs) are defined as the absolute 
number of births to girls below the age of 18 per 1,000 of the population of girls 
between 12 and 17 years of age.12 Since the law prohibits marriages below the age 
11 In this respect, early birth registrations are not possible since birth certificates which are usually 
provided during the time of birth are required for the official registration of a birth. If a birth was 
recorded in a different year from the actual year in which it occurred, this would count as a late 
registration.  
12 According to the National Health Service (NHS), the average age at which a girl typically reaches 
fecundity is 12 (National Health Service, UK, 2016). However, since it is possible that girls may 
start fecundity as early as 10, we also use the population of girls between 10-17 years old as a 
robustness check. The significance of the results is unchanged, although the magnitude of the 
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of 18, it is of interest to examine girls in this particular age group who would have 
been most affected by such legislative changes. In order to examine possible 
heterogeneous marriage and fertility behaviour among different age groups, we also 
calculate monthly age-specific and marriage and fertility rates. For simplicity, child 
marriage rates and teenage birth rates will be referred to as CMRs and TBRs 
respectively in the following sections. These rates can be constructed for all 29 
states included in the sample from 2009 through 2017 on a monthly level, and 
should thus be sufficient to properly differentiate the causal effects of minimum 
marriageable age laws from pre-existing trends in marriage and fertility rates. 
Accordingly, we calculate CMRs and TBRs for all represented states using monthly 
data from 2009 to 2017 which allows for the controlling of pre-treatment time 
trends of up to 60 months (5 years) prior to the first law implementation date in the 
state of Veracruz in February 2014. As data ends in 2017 for the sample of analysis, 
post-treatment trends of up to 47 months are observed.   
  Data for state-level covariates are mostly acquired from the National 
Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI), Mexico’s national statistical 
database. Specifically, baseline controls like the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
are obtained from INEGI’s GDP and National Accounts database, and the male 
unemployment rate is taken from the National survey of Occupation and 
Employment (ENOE). Yearly level socio-demographic controls including the male-
female sex ratio, population growth rate, proportion of indigenous language 
speakers and the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15 and 16-17 are from the 
Population and Housing Census.13 We also control for a confounding event, the 
ENAPEA (‘Estrategia Nacional para la Prevención del Embarazo en 
Adolescentes’) campaign which was introduced in 2015. Specifically, ENAPEA 
was initiated to combat the high rate of teenage pregnancies across the country. The 
implementation of the program however, took place in a staggered manner across 
states between 2015 and 2017, and the exact dates which each state enacted 
ENAPEA was provided by the National Population Council (CONAPO).14 In 
separate specifications, we additionally include the proportion of junior high school 
dropouts to proxy for educational attainment, an indisputably important, yet 
potentially endogenous determinant of early marriage and adolescent pregnancy. 
Junior high school drop outs data is from the 2017 Annual Statistical and 
Geographical Yearbook which contains information on socio-economic, economic 
coefficients is smaller as expected since 12 is the minimum age one is allowed to marry in any state 
across Mexico, and any associated births below that age should thus not be affected by the legal 
reforms. 
13 Yearly socio-demographic controls are used as the INEGI does not provide monthly level 
information for socio-demographic controls. Notwithstanding, these variables are unlikely to change 
significantly month by month.  
14 ENAPEA is a multi-sectoral response to combating teenage pregnancy nationwide. To strengthen 
its implementation, strategic partnerships and cooperation with the Mexican government were 
established for each of the 32 states. The dates provided by CONAPO therefore signify the first 
effort and commitment made by each state government to reduce and eradicate teenage pregnancies. 
For official documentation of the ENAPEA program, see: http://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachm 
ent/file/328094/Informe_Ejecutivo_2017_ENAPEA.pdf. 
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and geographical aspects of the country, disaggregated by federal entities. Due to 
the ongoing Mexican drug war which has led to an increase in national crime rates 
since 2007, we include the sex crime rate as a control to isolate possible changes in 
TBRs due to sexual offenses from changes in TBRs as a result of the minimum 
marriageable age law. Crime data is obtained from INEGI’s administrative 
statistical register on Law Enforcement and Criminal Matters which provides 
information on the verdict of the crime committed, the type of crime committed, 
the location where the crime was reported and the month and year in which the 
crime was committed. 
  Lastly, we draw from a separate Child Labor Module (MTI) survey 
conducted by the INEGI to examine the effect of marriageable age law reforms on 
additional outcomes such as girls’ school attendance and their probability of being 
in a consensual union. The MTI survey interviews children aged between 5-17 in 
Mexico and is collected on a biennial basis starting from 2007 with the latest survey 
conducted in 2017, indicating four pre-treatment survey years and two post-
treatment survey years. It interviewed over 53,000 households with nearly 100,000 
individuals in each round, and contains information on girls’ conjugal statuses and 
school attendance, and a set of other individual and household level characteristics 
such as age, number of children, level of education, household size, household 
head’s educational attainment and employment status, single-parent household, 
female-headed household and rural residential status. 
 
IV. Empirical Framework 
 
  This study relies on the differential timing in the passing of minimum 
marriageable age laws across states to identify the impact of such legislative 
reforms on CMRs and TBRs in Mexico. Using both geographical and temporal 
variation in the timing of legal reforms over time, the identification strategy is based 
on a staggered difference-in-differences (D-I-D) approach which estimates the local 
average treatment effect (LATE). Consequently, the LATE will be estimated 
through the comparison of states that had and had not implemented the law, before 
and after the implementation of the law. Treatment is defined as states that had 
enacted the law in a respective month and year between February 2014 to December 
2017, and control states are defined as otherwise. In order to sufficiently account 
for pre-existing CMR and TBR trends prior to the time the law was first enacted in 
February 2014, we include data from February 2009 to January 2014 which 
accounts for pre-treatment periods of up to 60 months. The baseline D-I-D 
regression is subsequently the following:  
 
                      𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝑠,𝑡                   (1) 
 
                   𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑠,𝑡+12 = 𝐶0 + 𝐶1𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐶2𝑋𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠,𝑡                (2) 
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where the dependent variables 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑠,𝑡  is the child marriage rate in state s, during a 
respective month, t, and 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑠,𝑡+12  is the teenage birth rate in state s, 12 months (1 
year) after the law was implemented at time t to account for the gestational length 
of a typical pregnancy and possible information dissemination lags about the 
enactment of the law.15 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 in the months 
and years after state s passed the law in time t, and null otherwise. 𝜃𝑠 and 𝜎𝑠 are the 
state fixed effects which control for any time-invariant inter-state differences that 
influence CMRs or TBRs, and that may also be correlated with the timing of law 
enactment. Month fixed effects, 𝜆𝑡 and 𝜏𝑡 are included to account for aggregate 
shocks that could have impacted CMRs and TBRs in the absence of the legal 
reform. The inclusion of month fixed effects is crucial in eliminating bias that may 
arise from unobservable factors that change over time but are constant across states. 
We also include state-specific time trends 𝛾𝑠𝑡, and 𝜌𝑠𝑡 to account for any divergence 
in pre-existing state-specific trends due to the law. 
  𝑋𝑠,𝑡 is a vector of time-varying state level controls that influence the CMRs 
or TBRs. Specifically, we include the GDP per capita growth rate to account for 
changes in a state’s economy over time and include the male unemployment rate as 
a proxy for the labour market situation and the ‘quality’ of men. Greene and Rao 
(1995) among others have suggested that informal unions are typically preferred 
over marriages during bad economic times, attributing this trend to lower costs and 
the fact that women favour engaging in relationships with financially stable men. 
𝑋𝑠,𝑡  also contains various socio-demographic characteristics such as the population 
growth rate, male-female sex ratio, the proportion of indigenous language speakers, 
and the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15 and 16-17 to account for any 
compositional changes in the population. In the baseline regressions, we 
additionally control for the timing of the ENAPEA campaign aforementioned, 
which undoubtedly had a direct effect on TBRs. We also include a proxy for 
education represented by the proportion of junior high school dropouts in a separate 
specification, due to possible endogeneity to the main outcome variable. As part of 
the 2006 Secondary Education Reform (RES), the Secretariat of Public Education 
(SEP) introduced a new RES Programme which included sex education in seventh-
grade biology textbooks in Mexico (SEP, 2018). Since grade seven corresponds to 
the start of junior high (‘secundaria’), individuals leaving school before that grade 
would have had less exposure to sex education, which would inevitably affect 
TBRs. Lastly, amidst the ongoing Mexican drug war, we control for the sex crime 
rate measured as the absolute number of sex-related offenses per 1,000,000 of the 
15 While this is a standard measure across economic literature on fertility rates, we also examine the 
effect of the law on TBRs 9,10 and 11 months after the implementation of the law. The results remain 
significant, although the magnitude of coefficients is smaller for the 9th, 10th and 11th month 
compared to the 12th month. This indicates some delay in fertility responses, possibly due to lags in 
behavioural changes or information dissemination about the law. Additionally, the policy reform 
does not have an impact on TBRs prior to 9 months providing additional support that other 
confounding factors or events were unlikely to precede the law. 
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population, due to its possible correlation with the timing of the law and impact on 
TBRs (Tsaneva and Gunes, 2018). 𝑠,𝑡 and 𝜇𝑠,𝑡  are the usual disturbance terms. 
 
Timing of Law Enactment 
  One of the main identifying assumptions of the difference-in-differences 
estimation method is that the timing of law implementation was orthogonal to the 
expected changes in marriage and fertility rates. In order to provide supporting 
evidence of the independence of these events, we first examine the influence of 
political parties on the speed of law enactment. There may be concerns for instance, 
that political parties that were more progressive (conservative) in nature could have 
implemented the law sooner (later). Since the rate at which bills are passed as laws 
mostly depends on the approval of the president of the state, we examine the 
influence of the political party affiliation of each state’s president on the timing of 
law implementation.16 In 2013, one year prior to when the law was first enacted in 
any state, the presidents of 27 Mexican states that had introduced the law by 2017 
belonged to 5 different political parties. Accordingly, we plot the relationship 
between these political parties and the year in which minimum marriageable age 
laws were implemented across states. As shown in Figure C, states with presidents 
affiliated to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the same party as Mexico’s 
president in 2014, President Peña Nieto, on average enacted minimum marriageable 
age laws in 2016.  
 
       
Figure C. A graphical representation of states presidents’ political party affiliations and the timing 
of law implementation. Notes: This figure uses data on state presidents’ political party affiliation in 
2013, one year before the law was first implemented. PRI, PAN, PVEM, PRD and MC are the 5 
political parties that governed Mexican states represented in the sample. The black bars represent 
95% confidence intervals and mean point estimates are represented by the maroon dots. Each green 
16 See Article 40 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States on the enactment of 
federal laws: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5280961&fecha=30/11/2012.  
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point represents a state. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ 
laws are excluded. Data is from the Mexican Centre for Research and Development (CIDAC). 
 
  Overall, Figure C shows that most states affiliated with the PRI party 
implemented the law between 2015 and 2017. Interestingly, the mean 
implementation year for the PAN party, which has been known to be relatively more 
conservative on social issues and focused on foreign matters was between 2015 and 
2016, around the same time as PRI affiliated states. Since only one state was 
affiliated with each of the PVEM and the MC party, inferences on the average year 
of law implementation cannot be made due to low statistical power. Finally, 
although states affiliated with the PRD party appear to have enacted the law slightly 
later, the average difference in the timing of law implementation was only roughly 
half a year. Taken together, we argue that the approval of minimum marriageable 
age laws by state governments was likely to be random and unrelated to the pre-
existing trends in child marriage and adolescent fertility. 
  To provide further support for the exogeneity in the timing of law 
implementation across states, we examine the effect of the mean child marriage rate 
in 2013 on the date of law enactment, and perform the same analysis for changes in 
the mean child marriage rate. Panels A and B in Figure D show that neither child 
marriage rates nor child marriage growth rates explain the timing of marriageable 
age law reforms across states. As seen in both graphs, there appears to be no defined 
pattern in the timing of law implementation in states with average levels of child 
marriage or child marriage growth rates above the median and below the median. 
Specifically, Panel A shows that states with similar positive mean child marriage 
coefficients like Zacatecas (‘ZA’), Chiapas (‘CS’) and Yucatan (‘YU’) for instance 
implemented laws in 2017, 2016 and 2015 respectively. A similar pattern is 
observed for states with negative mean child marriage coefficients where the law 
appears to have been introduced across various years, though many states had 
enacted the law in 2016. Guerrero (‘GR’), an outlier in the data with higher average 
child marriage levels than other states had minimum marriageable age laws enacted 
relatively later in 2017. Considering the negative implications of child marriage and 
the subsequent urgency to eliminate the practice, it is conceivable that states with 
higher child marriage rates and growth rates would have implemented the law 
sooner. 
  Coincidentally, Panel B shows no clear relationship between growth rates 
in the mean child marriage rate and the year in which the minimum marriageable 
age laws were enacted. The states of Quintana Roo (‘QR’) and Oaxaca (‘OA’) with 
negative changes in the average child marriage rate for example, appear to have 
implemented the law sooner (2014 and 2015 respectively) than other states like 
Zacatecas (‘ZA’) and Nuevo Leon (‘NL’) that also experienced negative mean child 
marriage growth rates (law was only implemented in 2017 and 2018 respectively). 
There is additionally little evidence demonstrating that states with positive changes 
in the mean child marriage rate like Guerrero (‘GR’) and Michoacan (‘MI’) 
implemented the law sooner than others, although the state of Coahuila (‘CO’), an 
outlier with particularly high mean child marriage growth rates introduced the law 
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in 2015, a year after age-of-marriage laws were first implemented. Lastly, we 
regress the year in which the law was enacted on the child marriage rate, and rate 
of change in child marriage, and observe statistically insignificant estimates with 






Figure D. A graphical analysis of the relationship between average child marriage levels in 2013 
(Panel A) and 2013 child marriage growth rates (Panel B), and the year of law enactment. Notes: 
Panels A and B show a scatter plot of the relationship between mean child marriage rates and the 
17 In correspondence with confidential sources at the Mexican Research Institute for Health and 
Demography (INSAD), the rate at which age-of-marriage laws were introduced in Mexico was 
barely related to the degree of severity of child marriage across states. It is noted that in rare cases, 
more conservative political parties could implement the law later. Figure C however demonstrates 
little evidence that political parties played a major role in determining when minimum marriageable 
age laws were enacted across states.   
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timing of law implementation, and mean child marriage growth rates and the timing of law 
implementation respectively. Abbreviation for states are represented by two-letter codes. 3 states, 
Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are excluded. Child marriage 
rates are calculated from the Nuptiality administrative records provided by the National Institute for 
Statistics and Geography (INEGI). 
 
  In order to provide further support that covariates included in Eqs. (1) and 
(2) are exogenous to the timing of the law, we perform a regression of 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 on 
the vector of controls described above. The results show that three of the covariates, 
namely the share of girls between 14-15, the share of girls between 16-17, and the 
male unemployment rate have a statistically significant relationship with the timing 
of the law enactment. As a robustness test, we subsequently exclude these three 
covariates from baseline regressions, and find that estimates are not altered by a 
large magnitude and maintain statistical significance. As a final robustness test, we 
regress 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 on CMRs 1,2 and 3 years prior to when the law was implemented in 
each state to check that CMRs were not influenced by other confounding events 
that may have preceded the minimum marriageable age law reforms. Table C3 of 
the Appendix shows the results from this analysis, which produces estimates that 
are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
 
Selective Marriage Registration  
  Despite the inclusion of month and state fixed effects, state-specific time 
trends, and a set of controls that influence CMRs and TBRs, a potential threat to 
identification remains due to selective marriage registration across states. For 
example, girls who resided in a state where marriage below the age of 18 was 
banned could have registered their marriages in states that had yet to introduce the 
law. Neglecting such responses could subsequently bias estimates upwards as states 
in which the law was implemented would have lower than actual CMRs and 
associated TBRs, and the opposite would be true for states where the law had not 
yet been enacted. To test for such behavioural responses, I estimate the proportion 
of girls who registered their marriages in states different from the one that they 
resided, in the absence of the law. More formally, I estimate the following fixed 
effects model: 
 
           𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠,𝑡 
∗ = 𝐷0 + 𝐷1𝑁𝑜_𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐷2𝑋𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜕𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠,𝑡                  (3)  
 
Where 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠,𝑡 
∗  is calculated as the number of girls in state s, who resided in a 
different state from the one where their marriage was registered, out of the total 
number of girls who were married below the age of 18 in that state. 𝑁𝑜_𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 is a 
binary variable equal to one for the years before state s, implemented the law at 
time t, 𝑋𝑠,𝑡 are the same set of time-varying state level covariates described in Eqs. 
(1) and (2) above, 𝜑𝑠 and 𝜔𝑡 are the state and month fixed effects respectively, 𝜕𝑠𝑡 
is the state-specific time trend, and 𝜖𝑠,𝑡  is the error term. The results from Eq. (3) 
are shown in Table 2, where column (I) is a stripped-down version which includes 
no controls, column (II) includes baseline covariates like the population growth 
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rate, the male-female sex ratio, the proportion of indigenous language speakers, the 
share of girls aged 12-13, 14-15 and 16-17, the GDP per capita growth rate and the 
male unemployment rate. Column (III) additionally includes the proportion of 
junior high school dropouts and the sex crime rate per 1,000,000 people. 
  Table 2 provides evidence of selective marriage registration across states, 
in response to the staggered implementation of minimum marriageable age laws. 
The results suggest that migration was possibly driven by the difference in the 
timing of legal reforms on the marriageable age as the share of girls below 18 who 
registered their marriages in a state, and who did not reside in that state increased 
by approximately 70% (0.033/0.047) in states where the law had not been enacted 
(column II). The inclusion of potentially endogenous covariates in column (III) does 
not change the results. Coefficients are significant at the 5% level and are positive 
across all three specifications.  
    
Table 2 
The effect of the law on the share of girls below 18 who got married in state in 
which they do not reside in. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Share of girls 0.033** 0.033** 0.032** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
Controls  No Yes Yes 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3103 3103 3103 
Mean (share of girls) 0.047 0.047 0.047 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws 
are excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
As a consequence of selective marriage registration, CMRs and TBRs are calculated 
based on the state of residence of girls, as opposed to the state in which their 
marriages or births were registered in order to circumvent the issue of selective 
marriage registration across states. By fixing individuals to their states of residence, 
any migration influenced by the date of the law enactment should not affect their 
assigned subjection to the law. The results presented in the following sections 
should therefore be interpreted as intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates rather than the 
LATE, and albeit this approach potentially attenuates estimates, it reduces the 





Child Marriage Rates (CMRs) 
  The validity of a difference-in-difference (D-I-D) set up is contingent upon 
the common trend assumption, which is that treated and untreated states follow 
similar CMR and TBR trends in the absence of minimum marriageable age laws. 
The fulfilment of this condition should in theory, strengthen the causal 
interpretation of estimates. To test if this identifying assumption holds, I consider a 
72-month window, ranging from 36 months before the enactment of the law to 36 
months after the law was introduced, and estimate the impact of minimum 
marriageable age laws on CMRs in the following regression:18 
 
 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡
−36 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡
−35 + ⋯ + 𝛽54𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡
+36 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝑠,𝑡     (4) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑠,𝑡  is the child marriage rate in state s during month t, regardless of the 
state where marriages were registered. 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡
−𝑘 equals to one in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ month before 
the law was enacted, and 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡
+𝑘 is equal to one in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ month after restrictions 
on the minimum marriageable age were imposed. To illustrate the effect of the 
policy distinctly and dynamically, the month in which the law was implemented is 
excluded to de-trend and centre estimates around month 0, defined as the month of 
the policy change. 𝜃𝑠 and 𝜆𝑡 are vectors of state and year dummies which control 
for time-constant and time-specific factors that may influence CMRs across states. 
In order to account for any deviations from pre-existing state-specific trends caused 
by the law, we include state-specific linear time trends, 𝛾𝑠𝑡.  𝑠,𝑡  is the error term. 






Figure E. The dynamic evolvement of CMRs before and after the law. Notes: This figure plots 
trends in the child marriage rate 36 months prior to the implementation of the law up to 36 months 
after the law was enacted. CMRs are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT approach) 
and regressions include baseline controls, state, and month fixed effects, and state-specific time 
trends. The dashed bars represent 95% confidence intervals and monthly point estimates are adjusted 
for clustering at the state-level. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-
rapist’ laws are excluded. Data come from Nuptiality administrative records provided by the 
National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI).  
 
As can be seen, the average percentage change in CMRs prior to the policy change 
is centred around zero, indicating that a decline in CMRs did not precede the 
implementation of minimum marriageable age laws. The dramatic fall in CMRs 
immediately after the legislative reforms suggests the effectiveness of legal 
restrictions on the marriageable age in curbing child marriage practices. Point 
estimates a month before and after the law show that CMRs fell by about 22% due 
to legal reforms on the marriageable age. The impact of the policy also appears to 
persist for at least 36 months after its official implementation. Table 3 presents 
results from the first-order outcome of interest, which estimates Eq. (1) of the 
relationship between age-of-marriage laws and CMRs.  
 
Table 3 
Effect of the law on child marriage rates. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Law -0.219*** -0.216*** -0.218*** 
 (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) 
 [0.060] [0.057] [0.057] 
Controls  No Yes Yes 
Sex crime rate, share of high school 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3103 3103 3103 
Mean (CMRs) 0.443 0.443 0.443 
Control mean (CMRs) 0.533 0.533 0.533 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. Child marriage rates are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT 
approach). 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are 
excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Column (I) includes state and month fixed effects, and state-specific time trends 
without the inclusion of controls, column (II) adds baseline controls that are 
conceivably exogenous to the timing of the law implementation and CMRs, and 
column (III) incorporates potentially endogenous covariates such as the proportion 
of junior high school dropouts, and the sex crime rate per 1,000,000 people. Using 
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column (II) as the benchmark specification which includes baseline controls, the 
enactment of minimum marriageable age laws appears to have decreased CMRs by 
49% (0.216/0.443) with significant estimates at the 1% level. In comparison to the 
control mean indicating the average CMR in the absence of the law, the effect is 
slightly smaller with a reduction in CMRs by about 41%. The coefficient from the 
regression of CMR on 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 without the inclusion of any controls shows that 
CMRs had declined by the same amount of about 49%. Baseline estimates barely 
differ with the addition of potentially endogenous covariates in column (III).  
 
Teenage birth rates (TBRs) 
  Considering the strong positive relationship that has been documented 
between early unions and premature childbearing, raising the minimum 
marriageable age should lower the incidence of teenage births. Table 4 presents 
results from the second-order outcome of interest which estimates Eq. (2) of the 
relationship between minimum marriageable age law reforms and adolescent 
fertility. 
   
Table 4 
Effect of law on teenage birth rates (TBRs). 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Total TBRs -0.017 -0.020 -0.015 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
 [0.039] [0.041] [0.044] 
Controls No Yes Yes 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends    
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2755 2755 2755 
Mean (Total TBRs) 0.931 0.931 0.931 
Control mean (Total TBRs) 0.954 0.954 0.954 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. Teenage birth rates are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT 
approach). 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are 
excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Contrary to expectations that curbing early unions should also preclude teenage 
births, the results from Table 4 show otherwise. Estimates across all three 
specifications are negative, but not significant. Moreover, the magnitude of TBR 
coefficients are small and zero-bound, suggesting that the age-of-marriage reforms 
in Mexico did not have an impact on adolescent fertility rates, despite the 
documented positive correlation between child marriage and teenage pregnancy.   
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  To provide further support for a causal relationship between total TBRs 
and marriage law reforms, I repeat the analysis of the common trend assumption in 
Eq. (4), but replace the dependent variable with TBRs calculated as the absolute 
number of births to girls below 18 per 1,000 of the population of girls between 12 
and 17 years of age. Figure F exhibits pre- and post-reform monthly TBR trends 
with 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure F. The dynamic evolvement of TBRs before and after the law. Notes: This figure plots trends 
in the teenage birth rate 36 months prior to the implementation of the law and 36 months after the 
law was enacted. TBRs are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT approach) and 
regressions include baseline controls, state, and month fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. 
The dashed bars represent 95% confidence intervals and monthly point estimates are adjusted for 
clustering at the state-level. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ 
laws are excluded. Data come from Birth administrative records provided by the National Institute 
for Statistics and Geography (INEGI).  
 
Similar to CMR trends, the overall average change in TBRs is centred around zero 
prior to the enactment of the law with mean percentage changes in TBRs spanning 
from -0.05% to 0.05% during the 36-month pre-reform period. Taking into account 
the gestational length of a typical pregnancy and possible information 
dissemination lags about the minimum marriageable age laws, Figure F shows that 
TBRs barely changed a year (12 months) after the age-of-marriage laws were 
introduced at time period 0. On the contrary, nearly 2 years (23 months) after the 
implementation of the law, the percentage change in TBRs appears to be on an 
appreciable trend up to the 36th month. Taken together, the results suggest that 
minimum marriageable age laws were not effective in mitigating adolescent 
pregnancies, although they did decrease child marriage rates in Mexico. This result 
confirms the theoretical argument that a priori, it is not clear how age-of-marriage 







Heterogeneous Treatment Effects  
  While Figures E and F show parallel trends in CMRs and TBRs in the 
absence of the legal reform, thereby satisfying the identifying assumption of a 
difference-in-differences empirical strategy, de Chaisemartin and D’ Haultfœuille 
(2019) note that treatment effects may not always be constant and estimates could 
still be biased if this is the case.19 For example, the effect of age-of-marriage laws 
on child marriage practices and associated fertility may vary across states, and could 
change over time as a result of differences in law enforcement. In a cross-country 
analysis on the effectiveness of age-of-marriage laws, Collin and Talbot (2017) 
found that in the majority of the countries in their sample, such laws were typically 
not properly enforced. In the event that laws are weakly imposed in some states, 
girls would therefore still be allowed to marry below 18 and the intended effect of 
the law on child marriage rates would be smaller than in states with proper legal 
enforcement.  
  In order to shed more light on the issue of law enforcement in the Mexican 
context, we plot separate CMRs for girls belonging to age groups of between 12 
and 24 as shown in Figure G, to compare CMRs among age groups below 18 and 
those above 18.20 If the law was properly enforced, one should see a significant 
decline in the CMRs from 2013, one year before the law was first implemented in 
any state, to 2017, when 27 states had already introduced age-of-marriage laws. The 
graph shows that the difference between CMRs for girls aged 17 and 18 increased 
by about 0.66 between 2013 and 2017. In 2013, the difference in CMRs between 
these two age groups was 0.94 and by 2017, this difference had increased to 1.60. 
CMRs especially for girls aged 16 and 17 fell drastically from 1.11 to 0.07 and 1.40 
to 0.08 respectively. The remaining above zero CMRs for girls below 18 are likely 
to be from the 5 states that had yet to implement the law by the end of 2017. Taken 
together, these statistics lend support to the proper enforcement of the minimum 
marriageable age laws in Mexico, as the CMRs of target age groups (those below 
18) decreased sharply to nearly 0.  
 
19 Using Gentzkow et al.’s (2011) data set, de Chaisemartin and D’ Haultfœuille (2019) show that 
approximately 40% of the weights attached to the fixed effects coefficient of interest are negative 
when the treatment effect varies across groups and periods. Since the coefficient of interest is a 
weighted sum of several difference-in-differences (across time and groups), negative weights are an 
issue as coefficients would appear negative, even if the actual average treatment effect (ATE) is 
positive.  
20 We do not plot the CMRs for girls aged between 10 and 11 because 12 was the earliest age at 
which one could get married in any state before the legal reforms. Notwithstanding, we examine 
CMRs for these two age groups as a robustness check and observe zero-bound effects. 
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Figure G. A comparison of age-specific CMRs in 2013 and 2017. Notes: This figure presents CMRs 
calculated for each age group between 12 to 24 for 2013, one year before the law was first 
implemented and 2017, the last year for the sample of analysis. Each blue bar represents the CMR 
for the respective age group. Three states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-
rapist’ laws are excluded. Data come from Nuptiality administrative records provided by the 
National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI). 
 
  An alternative method to test how well marriageable age laws were 
imposed in Mexico is to examine the mean of CMRs calculated according to the 
state where marriages were registered, both in the presence and absence of the law. 
If the law was appropriately enforced, CMRs should be zero in states where child 
marriage is banned, as the registration of marriages among girls below 18 would no 
longer be permitted. The results from the descriptive analysis are presented in Table 
5 and provide evidence that minimum marriageable age laws were by and large 
properly enforced, albeit not perfectly.  
 
Table 5. Law Enforcement 
Child marriage rates according to state of registration 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Law = 1 0.0 0.1 0 0.7 552 
Law = 0 0.5 0.4 0 3.1 2,551 
Notes: Law=1 for months after state banned marriage below 18. Law=0 for months before state 
banned marriage below 18. Three states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-
rapist’ laws are excluded.  
 
As can be seen, the mean CMR after the implementation of the law is 0, compared 
to the mean CMR before the law was introduced with a rate of 0.5. The above zero 
value (0.7) of the upper bound in states where the law had been enacted however 
indicates that while the policy was enforced in general, it was not strictly imposed. 
  Given the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects across states due 
to improper legal enforcement, de Chaisemartin and D’ Haultfœuille (2019) suggest 
calculating the weights of baseline regressions and the ratio of the explanatory 
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variable of interest, 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡, divided by the standard deviation of weights. To do so, 
we use de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille’s (2019) Stata command 
‘twowayfeweights’ to check the ratio of negative weights in the baseline regression 
of CMRs on 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡. It is recommended that if a large number of weights are 
negative, an alternative difference-in-differences estimator (‘Wald-DID’) which 
accounts for heterogeneous treatment effects across states and time should be used 
(see de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2019)). Altogether, the results from the 
weights analysis reveal that only 12% of the weights are negative (66 out of 552 
weights) in the baseline specification, while the remainder are positive. 
Additionally, the test shows that the corresponding weights of the main explanatory 
variable of interest, 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡, are barely correlated with the treatment effect of 
minimum marriageable age laws (correlation coefficient is -0.017). Because laws 
were generally properly enforced with some minor exceptions (see Table 5), it is 
unlikely that states would re-enter the ‘untreated’ position (and thus increase the 
probability of getting negative weights), since minimum marriageable age laws 
were likely to remain in place once they were imposed.21 The small proportion of 
negative weights from the baseline specification is therefore plausible, and supports 
the fact that the fixed effects difference-in-differences estimator used in the baseline 




  In this section, I check the sensitivity of the main results to various 
specifications and conduct a falsification test to provide support for the internal 
validity of the baseline estimates. Table 6 presents the findings from 5 different 
sensitivity analyses, and compares the estimates from each specification to the main 
TBR coefficient (-0.020) in Table 4. First, one may argue that states with relatively 
higher population growth rates have different TBR patterns, which could have 
driven the main results. To check the robustness of the estimates to the exclusion 
of such states, we omit three states with the highest population growth rates as 
reported in the INEGI’s 2015 Intercensal Survey: Quintana Roo (+13.3%), Baja 
California Sur (+11.8%) and Queretaro (+11.5%). As shown in column (I), the 
results are not sensitive to the omission of these states, albeit the coefficient 
increases in magnitude by 0.023. Second, there may be concerns that the higher rate 
of underreporting of births that has been documented in 3 states: Chiapas, Guerrero 
and Puebla, would suppress the effect of the age-of-marriage laws on total TBRs. 
Accordingly, we omit these 3 states from the main analysis and find that the 
resulting estimate is close to the baseline estimate of -0.020 (see column (II)). 
21 To provide additional support for the proper legal enforcement, we further investigate the effect 
of the policy change on CMRs calculated according to where marriages were registered rather than 
the state where girls resided. If the law was properly enforced, the decrease in CMRs due to the law 
should be larger for CMRs calculated according to the state of registration rather than state of 
residence. As expected, CMR coefficients from the analysis are larger, negative and significant at 
the 1% level (see Table C4 of the Appendix).  
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Considering that over 95% of births are registered in Mexico (see Perez and 
Meneses, 2010), excluding the 3 states with relatively lower birth registrations is 
unlikely to influence the main results to a large extent.  
  Next, in column (III), we exclude 3 states with the highest proportion of 
proclaimed Catholics between the ages of 10 and 19: Aguascalientes (93.6%), 
Zacatecas (94.3%) and Guanajuato (94.5%). Due to the paucity of regular data on 
religion or other proxies for religion such as church attendance, the inclusion of 
religion as a control in the main regressions is not feasible. Yet, religion plausibly 
plays a major role in teenage pregnancy as pre-marital sex for instance is frowned 
upon, especially in Catholicism. The results show that the omission of relatively 
more religious states increases the baseline estimate of -0.020 by a magnitude of 
0.004, and remains statistically insignificant. This suggests that the effect of 
minimum marriageable age laws on TBRs was not likely to have been affected by 
the degree of religiosity across states.  
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. All regressions include state and month fixed effects, and state-specific time 
trends. Teenage birth rates are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT approach). All 
specifications other than (V) exclude 3 states: Baja California, Campeche and Sonora, with ‘marry-
your-rapist’ laws. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
  Another law that could have possibly confounded the effect of the age-of-
marriage reforms is legalization of abortion in the Federal District of Mexico in 
2007. Under this law, women could demand abortion services upon request in the 
first 12 weeks of the pregnancy, and up till 2017, the Federal District of Mexico 
remained the only state where abortion was legal while abortion continued to be 
Table 6 
Sensitivity analysis of the effect of the law on teenage birth rates (TBRs) among 
girls in consensual unions. 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Total TBRs  -0.043 -0.019 -0.024 -0.022 -0.026 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.036) 
 [0.049] [0.045] [0.047] [0.044] [0.037] 
Excludes high population 
growth rate states 
Yes No No No No 
Omit underreporting states No Yes No No No 
Excludes religious states No No Yes No No 
Excludes Mexico City No No No Yes No 
Includes ‘marry-your-rapist’ 
states 
No No No No Yes 
Observations 2470 2470 2470 2660 3040 
Mean (Total TBRs) 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 
Control mean (Total TBRs) 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 
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restricted across other states.22 Consequently, we exclude the Federal District of 
Mexico from the analysis as coefficients could be downward bias if girls who had 
access to abortion decided to terminate their pregnancies. The omission of Mexico 
City results in an increase in the main coefficient of total TBRs minimally by 0.002 
(column (IV)) as expected, given that girls may have taken the opportunity to abort 
their child since it was legal to do so. Lastly, we probe the robustness of our main 
estimates by including the 3 states with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws that are omitted 
from the main analyses. Doing so increases the main TBR coefficient by a 
magnitude of 0.006, an arguably insignificant amount, similar to what was observed 
across all other specifications (I – IV).23  
  To further demonstrate that the results are not spurious, we run a 
falsification test to check the validity of the common trend assumption by 
simulating a random month and year of law implementation between 2009 and 
2017, which are the first and last years in the sample. By doing so, states are 
assigned a placebo legal reform date, different from their actual date of law 
enactment. If the fall in CMRs truly came from legal changes to the minimum 
marriageable age and no other events, one should expect the CMR coefficients of 
this placebo test to be zero or at least close to zero. Accordingly, the main 
specification in Eq. (2) is re-estimated with the placebo dates of law 
implementation. This exercise is repeated 20,000 times and point estimates from 
each regression are stored. As shown in Figure H, the distribution of the estimated 
coefficients from the 20,000 simulations in the probability density plot is centred 
around zero. Specifically, the mean CMR estimate from this exercise is 
approximately equal to 0 (0.00102) and the red line representing the benchmark 
estimate of -0.216 in column (II) of Table 3 clearly lies outside of the range of 
coefficients from the 20,000 simulations generated by this placebo experiment.  
 
22 Prior to 2016, Mexico City was officially called the ‘Federal District of Mexico’. For clarification, 
the legalization of abortion did not take place in the State of Mexico (state code ‘EM’, see Table 1), 
which is a separate entity from the Federal District of Mexico (state code ‘DF’). 
23 CMR results with the inclusion of the 3 ‘marry-your-rapist’ states are presented in Table C5 of the 
Appendix, and show minimal changes (increase in magnitude of 0.01) to the main CMR estimate. 
Coefficients remain significant at the 1% level and are negative. 
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Figure H. Results from 20,000 simulated placebo law enactment dates. Notes: This figure plots the 
cumulative distribution function (left) and the probability density function (right) of the estimated 
CMR coefficients from 20,000 simulations using a randomly generated law implementation date. 3 
states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are excluded. 
 
VII. Heterogeneous Effects 
 
Age-Specific Effects 
  It is interesting to examine how age-of-marriage laws impacted various 
target age groups differently as this could have important implications for 
educational attainment for example. It is reported that the highest drop out rate is 
registered in high school (‘preparatoria’), which consists of grades 10-12 and 
children aged between 15-18 years old. According to the Mexican National Institute 
for the Evaluation of Education (INEE), the dropout rate between 2014-2015 for all 
of those enrolled at this level of schooling was approximately 14.4%, compared to 
4.4% for those enrolled in junior high school (‘secundaria’) (INEE, 2018). 
Correspondingly, we re-estimate Eq. (1) and replace the dependent variable with 
CMRs of each age group between 12-17 years old. The results are presented in a 
coefficient plot in Figure I, and show that girls in the 16-17-year-old age group were 
most affected by the legal reform out of all other age groups. In particular, estimates 
for the two age groups are significant at the 1% level, with large negative 
coefficients (t-statistics are -3.66 and -4.37 respectively for 16- and 17-year olds), 
while CMR estimates for those aged between 12-15 are negative, but not 
statistically significant (see Table C1 of the Appendix).24  
 
24 Table C1 of the Appendix also shows that CMRs for girls between 18-20 were not affected by the 
age-of-marriage reform. This indicates that delays in unions due to the law was unlikely, and that 
the law achieved its intended effect on the target age group (only those below 18), providing further 
support for the exogeneity of the law.  
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Figure I. Coefficient plot of age-specific CMRs. Notes: This graph presents coefficient estimates of 
the regression of age-specific CMRs on the law with the inclusion of baseline controls, state and 
month fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. CMRs are calculated according to girls’ state of 
residence (ITT approach). The straight-lined bars represent 95% confidence intervals and point 
estimates are adjusted for clustering at the state-level. Three states, Baja California, Campeche and 
Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are excluded. Data come from Nuptiality administrative 
records provided by the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI).  
 
  To check for age-specific effects of the law on TBRs, we re-estimate Eq. 
(2), and replace the dependent variable with age-specific TBRs. Estimates from the 
analysis reveal that while minimum marriageable age laws did not lower total 
TBRs, it appears to have decreased TBRs among girls in the 12-year old age group 
by about 140% (-0.007/-0.005), with significant estimates at the 5% level (see Table 
C6 of the Appendix). Because a simultaneous decline in CMRs among 12-year old 
girls is not observed however, this indicates that the fall in TBRs among 12-year 
old girls was unlikely to be due to a reduction in child marriage rates, and was likely 
to come from other sources correlated with legal reforms to the marriageable age. 
In Figures B2 and B3 of the Appendix, we additionally plot the pre-trends of CMRs 
and TBRs by age group to check that age-specific marriage and birth patterns were 
not on diverging paths in the absence of law implementation. Altogether, the event-
study graphs of age-specific CMRs and TBRs provide support for the common-
trend assumption and demonstrate that both the percentage change in marriage and 
birth rates were centred around zero prior to law implementation. 
 
Socio-Economic Status 
  Next, it is important to examine if age-of-marriage laws impacted the 
fertility choice of girls from various socio-economic groups differently. Especially 
since poorer girls are more susceptible to teenage pregnancy as a result of inter alia, 
a lack of education and destitution, it would be useful to check if raising the 
minimum age of marriage was effective in reducing the incidence of teenage births 
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among girls from lower socio-economic status (SES), which is arguably the highest 
risk group. Accordingly, we use information on girls’ partner’s education and rural 
residential status provided in the Vital Statistics edition of INEGI’s fertility records, 
to calculate TBRs according to girls’ partner’s education level and rural-urban 
residential status. Albeit the birth registers also provide information on the 
employment status (but not income level) and education level of girls, we do not 
use these variables as proxies for SES since whether a girl is employed or is in 
school, may not just reflect her income-earning potential, but could also be 
influenced by whether her parents for instance, are economically dependent on her 
for subsistence.25  
  Table 7 presents the findings from the analysis and show that minimum 
marriageable age laws did not have a significantly different impact on adolescent 
fertility among girls with low educated and high educated partners.26  
25 It could be argued that a girl’s partner’s educational status could also be affected by the law if 
underaged teenage boys now return to school due to the marriage ban. Due to the paucity of data on 
more suitable proxies for SES such as a mother’s education for example, TBR estimates for girls’ 
partner’s education should be interpreted with some caution. In these cases, however, it is more 
likely that girls rather than boys exit schooling due to marriage, which has been well documented 
across existing literature on child marriage. 
26 Low educated partners are defined as individuals who had completed primary school but not junior 
high school (‘secundaria’). As the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) only introduced sex 
education in seventh-grade biology textbooks corresponding to the start of junior high 
(‘secundaria’), boys who dropped out of school before that level would have had less exposure to 
sex education which could have in turn affected TBRs (SEP, 2018). 
Table 7  
Effect of the law on teenage birth rates (TBRs), according to socio-economic 
status. 
 (I) (II) (III) Mean  








 [0.024] [0.024] [0.026]  








 [0.016] [0.017] [0.017]  
TBRs (urban) 0.023 0.024 0.021  
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) 0.543 
 [0.042] [0.045] [0.045]  
TBRs (rural) -0.046 -0.048* -0.039*  
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.022) 0.335 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.023]  
Controls No Yes Yes  
Sex crime rate, share of high school 
dropouts 
No No Yes  
State FE Yes Yes Yes  
Month FE Yes Yes Yes  
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes  
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 2755 2755 2755  
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Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. Teenage birth rates are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT 
approach). Three states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are 
excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
TBR estimates for both education groups are insignificant and negative, although 
the magnitude of the coefficients is larger for girls with high educated partners. 
Interestingly, we find that the age-of-marriage law reforms decreased TBRs among 
rural girls, defined as those who live in areas with less than 2,500 inhabitants, in 
line with INEGI’s definition of rural residence. The benchmark estimate in column 
(II) reveals that TBRs among girls living in rural areas decreased by about 14% 
(0.048/0.335), with significant coefficients at the 10% level. On the other hand, 
TBR estimates for urban girls are positive, although not statistically significant. 
Theoretically, the opposite signed estimates for rural and urban TBRs are consistent 
with model 1 in Appendix A, provided that rural girls have a stronger preference 
for fertility than urban girls, ceteris paribus. Taken together, these results 
demonstrate that while raising the minimum age of marriage did not lower 
aggregate TBRs on average, it appears to have been successful in mitigating 
adolescent fertility in rural communities. This finding is encouraging, as early 
motherhood has been linked to the perpetuation of the poverty cycle, particularly 
among those from lower socio-economic classes. Lowering teenage birth rates in 
poorer areas could therefore decrease the likelihood that girls remain trapped in 
acute destitution in the long-run.  
 
High versus Low CMR States 
  In order to gain a more holistic overview of the heterogeneous effects of 
Mexico’s minimum marriageable age law reforms, we perform a sample split of 
states in which CMRs were higher prior to when the law was first introduced in 
2014, and those for which CMRs were lower. Specifically, we sort states according 
to the average CMR over 60 months (2009 – 2013) before the law was first 
implemented in February 2014 in the state of Veracruz. States with CMRs above 
1.0 (approximately 75th percentile) are considered ‘high CMR’ states, and those 
with rates below 1.0 are classified as ‘low CMR’ states. Subsequently, we examine 
the effect of the age-of-marriage reforms on the 2 separate samples, with results 
shown in Table 8. Altogether, the estimates indicate that the minimum marriageable 
age laws in Mexico disproportionately benefitted states where child marriage was 
not as rampant to begin with. As can be seen, the law decreased CMRs by the same 
magnitude as the main results (49% (0.156/0.318)) in ‘low CMR states’, whereas 
no impact of the age-of-marriage law reforms on ‘high CMR states’ is observed. 
The magnitude of CMR coefficients for ‘high CMR states’ is more than twice the 
‘low CMR states’, but not statistically significant. These findings are consistent 
with Wodon et al.’s (2017) study on child marriage laws which concluded that legal 
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reforms to the marriageable age alone are not sufficient for ending the practice of 
child marriage in the long run, particularly in places where early unions may be 
more common and socially accepted. The results from this analysis also confirm 
that the total decline in CMRs was driven mainly by states where child marriage 
was less commonly practiced. Finally, we perform the same analysis for TBRs and 
do not observe significant changes in TBRs as a result of the law in ‘low CMR 
states’ or ‘high CMR states’, further confirming that the age-of-marriage laws in 
Mexico had no impact on teenage pregnancies (see Table C7 of the Appendix). 
 
Table 8 
Effect of the law on child marriage rates in states with low and high average 
child marriage rates prior to the law.  
 (I) (II) (III) 
CMRs (low CMR states) -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.156*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
 [0.048] [0.051] [0.048] 
Observations 2354 2354 2354 
Mean  0.318 0.318 0.318 
Control Mean 0.379 0.379 0.379 
CMRs (high CMR states) -0.366 -0.364 -0.361 
 (0.194) (0.188) (0.189) 
 [0.228] [0.223] [0.227] 
Observations 749 749 749 
Mean  0.836 0.836 0.836 
Control Mean 1.029 1.029 1.029 
Controls  No Yes Yes 
Sex crime rate, share of high school 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws 
are excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
VIII. Additional Results 
 
  A study by the World Bank and the International Centre for Research on 
Women (ICRW) suggests that early marriage reduces educational prospects for girls 
(Wodon et al., 2017). This is especially the case in many developing countries 
where girls often have to choose either formal schooling or marriage, but not both, 
making it challenging for them to remain in school after getting married. In turn, 
this could hamper their long-run human capital accumulation and leave them 
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trapped in a poverty cycle. UNICEF additionally asserts that young women in 
consensual unions are equally, if not more vulnerable than those in formal unions 
characterized by marriage (UNICEF, 2005). Because of the informal nature of 
consensual unions, girls are not protected by civil or customary laws. In cases of 
domestic violence for example, girls in consensual unions may not be able to seek 
protection by exiting the union as divorce laws would not apply. In the event that 
minimum marriageable age laws in Mexico generate a rise in consensual unions 
among girls who consider these unions to be good substitutes for marriage, raising 
the minimum age of marriage would still be futile in protecting adolescent girls 
from entering early unions.  
  Accordingly, in this section, we draw from a separate Child Labor Module 
(MTI) survey conducted by the INEGI, to test if the law had positive spillover 
effects on these additional outcomes that undoubtedly affect girls’ long-run well-
being. As previously discussed in section III., the MTI contains information on 
girls’ conjugal statuses and school attendance, including a set of other individual 
and household level characteristics such as age, number of children, level of 
education, school attendance, household size, household head’s educational 
attainment and employment status, single-parent household, female-headed 
household and rural residential status. Using information on girls’ school 
attendance and consensual union status as the dependent variables in separate 
regressions, we estimate a linear probability model of the following form: 
 
                      𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + ∅𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜔𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑠,𝑡                 (5) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to one if a girl attends school or if she is in a 
consensual union, and zero otherwise for both cases. 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠,𝑡 is a dummy equal to 
one for the survey years after minimum marriageable age laws were introduced in 
state s. Since the MTI was conducted on a biennial basis from 2007-2017, there are 
4 pre-treatment survey years and 2 post-treatment survey years. 𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is a vector of 
time-varying individual and household level covariates as described above that 
could influence girls’ school attendance or probability of being in a consensual 
union. We additionally control for the timing of ENAPEA given its direct influence 
on TBRs. ∅𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 are the state and survey year fixed effects respectively, which 
account for any time-constant state level factors that may affect the dependent 
variable of interest, and any aggregate shocks that could influence girls’ schooling 
and consensual union status. State-specific time trends, 𝜔𝑠𝑡, are also included to 
control for any deviations from pre-existing state-specific trends due to the law. 
𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is the usual disturbance term.  
  Taken together, the results from Eq. (5) presented in Table 9 show that the 
law did not have any effect on the likelihood of girls attending school, although it 
did decrease the probability of girls being in consensual unions. Specifically, 
estimates for girls’ school attendance are close to zero and statistically insignificant 
across all specifications. This finding is however plausible in the Mexican context. 
According to INEGI’s 2014 National Survey on Demographic Dynamics, the lack 
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of financial resources rather than marriage is the main reason for leaving school 
among all age groups between 12-17. The survey shows that the proportion of girls 
who dropped out of school due to marriage was less than 20% across all age groups, 
compared to 30-45% who left school due to poverty. In this regard, prohibiting 
adolescent marriages is not likely to have a significant impact on schooling 
outcomes since marriage is not the main reason as to why girls drop out of school 
in Mexico.  
  On the other hand, the minimum marriageable age law reform appears to 
have lowered the probability of a girl being in a consensual union by approximately 
1.2 percentage points (or 44% when compared to the mean). As shown in Table 9, 
the coefficient of the consensual union variable in the baseline specification (II) is 
negative with a magnitude of 0.012 and significant at the 1% level. Estimates from 
the probit model are reported in {.} parentheses, and reflect the similar coefficients 
as those from the linear probability model. In column (III), the inclusion of 
potentially endogenous covariates such as the number of children and level of 
education decreases the size of the effect of the law on the likelihood of being in a 
consensual union to roughly 0.9 percentage points. To the best of our knowledge, 
only one cross-country study by Wodon et al., (2017) has examined the 
effectiveness of child marriage laws in curbing informal early unions. The authors 
note that they do not distinguish between formal and informal unions for some 
countries in their data set, due to the way child marriage is measured in the DHS 
and MICS surveys used in their study.27 In this particular case study on Mexico, the 
detailed information on girls’ marital statuses provided by the MTI allows the 
distinction between marriages and consensual unions. Specifically, the socio-
demographic questionnaire contains 7 different categories of conjugal statuses: 
Consensual union, Married, Separated, Divorced, Single, Widowed and 
Unspecified, which enables the analysis of the effect of the law on girls’ consensual 
union status explicitly.   
  The decrease in the likelihood of girls being in consensual unions by a 
similar magnitude to the fall in child marriage rates (44% versus 49%), potentially 
reflects positive spillover effects of minimum marriageable age laws. This could be 
attributed to changing attitudes towards early unions, or improved knowledge and 
awareness of child marriage due to the law for instance. To date however, a limited 
number of studies have examined the relationship between marriageable age 
policies and evolving knowledge and attitudes towards child marriage practices. 
The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) documents that only 23 
out of 150 potentially relevant efforts to curb child marriage attempted to measure 
changes in child marriage-related behaviours, knowledge, or attitudes among 
corresponding stakeholders (Malhotra et al., 2011). Consequently, given the dearth 
27 After accounting for exceptions to the legal age of marriage with parental or judicial consent, 
Wodon et al. (2017) found that about 7.5 million girls still marry illegally each year, accounting for 
68% of all child marriages. They concluded that while raising the minimum age of marriage is useful 
in preventing early unions in places with proper legal enforcement, it is not sufficient for ending the 
practice in the long run.  
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of data on changing knowledge and attitudes towards child marriage, girls’ 
perceptions on the ideal age for marriage, or the perceived costs of marriage and 
consensual unions in Mexico for example, it is not possible to confirm that the 
observed fall in the probability of girls in consensual unions was due to any of these 
changing societal trends as a result of legal reforms to the marriageable age. 
Notwithstanding, community-based policies that aim to raise awareness on the 
negative consequences of early marriage have been shown to positively impact 
attitudes, knowledge and beliefs about child marriage practices in Ethiopia, Yemen 




Effect of law on the probability of school attendance and being in a consensual 
union. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
School attendance 0.005 {0.006} 0.005 {0.005} 0.010 {0.009} 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.010] 
Observations 260,819 260,819 124,106 
Mean 0.924 0.924 0.924 
Control Mean 0.921 0.921 0.921 






 [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] 
Observations 124,119 124,119 124,098 
Mean 0.027 0.027 0.027 
Control Mean 0.027 0.027 0.027 









State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific 
Time Trends 
Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Marginal effects from the probit 
model are reported in parentheses {.}. Controls include age, household size, household head’s 
educational attainment and employment status, a dummy denoting if the individual belongs to a 
single-parent household or female-headed household and rural residential status. Endogenous 
controls include the number of children. State and month fixed effects, and state-specific linear time 
trends are included in all specifications. Three states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with 




  This paper was mainly motivated by the need for a greater understanding 
of country-specific socio-cultural contexts in global policy adoption. The complete 
prohibition of marriage below the age of 18 is undoubtedly a positive step towards 
protecting adolescent girls from the consequences of child marriage such as teenage 
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pregnancy among others, although the effectiveness of such policies may differ 
across places. It is important to consider that international standards and guidelines 
may not necessarily be a one-size-fits-all solution. Given evidence of the declining 
marital trends and associated fertility among girls below 18 in Mexico, the role of 
religion, underlying economic conditions and heterogenous behavioural responses, 
it is not completely clear that minimum marriageable age law reforms would be 
effective in reducing teenage birth rates. 
  In this study, we show that while minimum marriageable age law reforms 
in Mexico were successful in mitigating child marriage rates by 49%, it had no 
apparent impact on total teenage birth rates, contrary to what had been postulated 
in existing literature. Our findings also indicate evidence of large positive spillover 
effects of raising the minimum marriageable age in curbing consensual unions, 
which are more informal in nature. The estimates from our analyses show that age-
of-marriage laws decreased the probability of girls being in consensual unions about 
44%, a similar magnitude to the fall in child marriage rates. No effects of the law 
on girls’ school attendance however, are observed. Given that the lack of financial 
resources rather than marriage is the main reason for dropping out of school in 
Mexico, this result is plausible. We also find that 16-17-year-old girls, and not other 
age groups drove the decrease in aggregate child marriages in response to the age-
of-marriage laws. Additionally, the law appears to have disproportionately 
benefitted states where child marriage practices were not as prominent before, 
suggesting that legal reforms to the age of marriage are not sufficient for ending 
child marriage in places where this practice may be more common and socially 
accepted. Finally, teenage birth rates among girls residing in rural areas declined by 
approximately 14% as a result of the minimum marriageable age law reforms. This 
suggests that age-of-marriage laws have the potential to mitigate teenage 
pregnancies in destitute areas, where girls may be more vulnerable to becoming 
teenage mothers. If this effect is sustained in the long run, the odds of girls escaping 
the poverty cycle are likely to be higher. 
  Lastly, while this study is able to shed light on the relationship between 
age-of-marriage laws, early marriage and adolescent fertility using a Latin 
American middle-income country like Mexico as a case study, more research on 
how such policies alter the dynamics between formal and informal unions is 
required. It would be interesting for example, to examine the causal effect of 
minimum marriageable age laws on the composition of girls across marital status 
groups and the associated fertility effects. This would however depend on the 
availability of data on fertility choice, changes in the perceived costs of formal and 
informal unions, evolving attitudes and knowledge towards early unions, and more 
formal documentation of consensual unions for instance, that is currently lacking. 
The findings from this paper could also potentially be extended to countries in the 
Latin American region where marriages among adolescent girls have been 
declining in popularity, assuming similar legal, socio-cultural and economic 
conditions. Considering the widespread practice of cohabitation without marriage 
among other pre-existing socio-cultural trends, age-of-marriage laws should be 
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accompanied by other policies aimed at discouraging early unions in order to be 




A. Conceptual Framework 
This section presents two models that produce the results described in Section II. 
The two models bring some of the findings of Rasul (2006, 2008) to bear on the 
context of our study. Our notation largely follows that of Rasul’s (2008).  
 
Basic Model 
  Consider a couple that is comprised of two decision-makers, one female 
(𝑓) and one male (𝑚). The two partners interact over two periods. In period 1, each 
partner i (i=𝑓,𝑚) makes a sunk investment, 𝑞𝑖, to produce children. This leads to 
𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚) children being born. Each partner bears a cost of investing, c(𝑞𝑖), which 
is  assumed to be non-negative and convex.  In period 2, the couple decides whether 
or not to continue their relationship. In the case that they remain as a 
couple,renegotiation over whatever relationship surplus has been created takes 
place. Here, we use the Nash bargaining solution to describe the outcome of these 
renegotiations, with the assumption that utility is transferable across partners. 
The payoffs to 𝑓 and 𝑚, if they remain as a couple in period 2 and 
renegotiate over the division of the relationship surplus are respectively: 
 
                                          𝑈𝑓 = 𝑣𝑓 + 𝑉
𝑓(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗) + 𝑡                                      (1) 
                                        𝑈𝑚 = 𝑣𝑚 + 𝑉
𝑚(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑚
∗ ) − 𝑡,                                  (2) 
 
where 𝑣𝑖 denotes some private gain from the relationship, 𝑉
𝑖(. ) is 𝑖’s utility from 
her/his children, and t is the renegotiated utility transfer, which can be positive (if 
it is from 𝑚 to 𝑓) or negative (if it is from 𝑓 to 𝑚). Each partner’s utility from 
her/his children depends both on the number of children, 𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), and her/his 
desired number of children, 𝜋𝑖
∗.   
  On the other hand, the payoffs to 𝑓 and 𝑚 if the relationship dissolves in 
period 2 is: 
 
                                        ?̅?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑖
∗) − 0.5𝜅,                                      (3) 
 
where 𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚) is the number of children produced within the relationship, and 𝜅 
is the cost of relationship dissolution assumed to be split equally between partners. 
In what follows, we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this two-stage 
game using the backwards induction procedure. 
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Model 1: A change in the threat point from an inside to an outside option 
In our first model, we follow Rasul (2008) in assuming that the gains to 
being in a relationship are greater than being single (i.e., 𝑈𝑓 + 𝑈𝑚 > ?̅?𝑓 + ?̅?𝑚). 
Thus, in period 2, there is a positive relationship surplus to be bargained over. 
Applying the Nash bargaining solution with the dissolution payoffs (?̅?𝑓 , ?̅?𝑚) as the 
threat point, the equilibrium Nash bargained transfer is given by: 
 
𝑡𝑒 = (1 − 𝜃)[𝑣𝑚 + 𝑉
𝑚(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑚
∗ ) − ?̅?𝑚(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑚
∗ ) − 0.5𝜅] 
 −𝜃[𝑣𝑓 + 𝑉
𝑓(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗) − ?̅?𝑓(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗) − 0.5𝜅],                   (4) 
 
where 𝜃 and (1 − 𝜃) denotes the bargaining power of the male and female partner 
respectively.  
  In period 1, the equilibrium fertility investments 𝑞𝑓 and 𝑞𝑚 are chosen 
non-cooperatively and simultaneously to maximize 𝑣𝑓 + 𝑉
𝑓(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗) +
𝑡𝑒 − 𝑐(𝑞𝑓) and 𝑣𝑚 + 𝑉
𝑚(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑚
∗ ) − 𝑡𝑒 − 𝑐(𝑞𝑚), respectively. Thus, the 
Nash equilibrium fertility investments made by 𝑓 and 𝑚, denoted by (𝑞𝑓
𝑒 , 𝑞𝑚
𝑒 ), are 
the solutions to the following first-order conditions: 
 
         𝑁𝑞𝑓[?̅?𝑁
𝑓






𝑚)] = 𝑐′(𝑞𝑓)                     (5)             







𝑚)] = 𝑐′(𝑞𝑚),                          (6)  
 
where subscripts indicate partial differentiation with respect to the indexed 
variables, and where the arguments of all functions have been dropped for 
notational convenience.  
Let us now turn to the question of how age-of-marriage laws affect 
equilibrium investments in fertility. One way of capturing this in our model is to 
assume that the relevant threat point in household bargaining changes from an 
inside to an outside option. Since divorce among married girls below 18 was 
extremely rare in Mexico prior to the implementation of the law, it was not a 
credible threat in marital bargains. In this case, the relevant threat point for 
household bargaining is instead an inside option given by some non-cooperative 
outcome within marriage. Given that the prohibition of early marriages in Mexico 
lowered the cost of a union dissolution, it is a plausible assumption that exiting a 
relationship, now becomes a credible threat. Thus, consider the thought-experiment 
of replacing, as the threat point, an inside option with an outside option of dissolving 
the relationship and possibly re-matching. 
To this end, we first specify functional forms for payoffs within a 
relationship, and if relationship bargaining breaks down. Accordingly, let the utility 
that partner i derives from children when the relationship remains intact be given 
by: 
 
 𝑉𝑖(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑖
∗) = 𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚) − 0.5[𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚) − 𝜋𝑖
∗]
2
,              (7) 
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where the second term captures a utility loss that each partner suffers if she/he does 
not achieve her/his preferred fertility level in the case that household bargaining 
breaks down 
Second, let the utility that partner  derives from children if bargaining 
breaks down be given by: 
 
 ?̅?𝑖(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑖
∗) = 𝛿𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚) − 0.5𝜂[𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚) − 𝜋𝑖
∗]
2
,           (8) 
 
where the interpretation of the parameter pair (𝛿, 𝜂) depends on what the relevant 
threat point in household bargaining is (see Rasul, 2008). If couples dissolve their 
union if bargaining breaks down (i.e., by using their outside option), partners are 
free to re-match and pursue their fertility goals with future partners. Thus, they are 
assumed to no longer suffer disutility from any divergence between their fertility 
preference and the number of children in their previous relationship, so that 𝜂 = 0. 
If instead, union dissolution is not a credible threat, the relevant threat point in 
household bargaining would be some non-cooperative outcome within the 
relationship (i.e. an inside option). In this case, partners are unable to pursue their 
fertility goals in a new relationship, and therefore continue to suffer a loss from not 
having achieved their desired fertility level in the current relationship. Thus, 𝜂 = 1 
if the relevant threat point is a non-cooperative outcome in the existing relationship. 
For both the inside and outside option bargaining, we assume that 𝛿 < 1, i.e., the 
value of benefits from children are lower if they are brought by parents that either 
act non-cooperatively (inside option) or are no longer a couple (outside option).  
Third, to obtain closed-form solutions, let the cost of investing in fertility be 
given by 𝑐(𝑞𝑖) = 0.5𝑞𝑖
2, nd the number of children produced in the relationship 
be given by: 
 
                                                      𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚) = 𝑞𝑓 + 𝛾𝑞𝑚,                                             (9) 
 
where 𝛾 captures the importance of the male partner’s fertility investment relative 
to that of the female partner’s. We make the plausible assumption that the female 
partner’s fertility investment is more important than that of the male partner’s, 
such that 𝛾 < 1.28 Finally, to keep derivations as simple as possible, we assume 
that 𝑓 and 𝑚 have equal bargaining power, so that 𝛿 = 1 − 𝛿 = 0.5. 
  In order to solve for the equilibrium number of children, 𝑁(𝑞𝑓
𝑒 , 𝑞𝑚
𝑒 ), under 
the inside and outside option bargaining environment, we substitute the relevant 
derivatives of the specific payoffs in Eqs. (7) to (9) into Eqs. (5) and (6), and solve 
28 As noted by Rasul (2008), the female partner’s investments in fertility include those related to 
biology of child rearing, such as time devoted to pregnancy, childbirth and lactation over the fertility 
period. While male partners also contribute their time in these phases, these investments are assumed 
to be less crucial in determining the fertility outcome.  
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them simultaneously for the equilibrium fertility investments 𝑞𝑓
𝑒 and 𝑞𝑚
𝑒  which we 
use to calculate 𝑁(𝑞𝑓
𝑒 , 𝑞𝑚
𝑒 ). Subsequently, we obtain:  
 
     𝑁(𝑞𝑓
𝑒 , 𝑞𝑚





             𝑖𝑓 𝜂 = 1 (𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
(1+𝛾2)[0.5(𝜋𝑓+𝜋𝑚)+1]
2+𝛾2
     𝑖𝑓 𝜂 = 0 (𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
    
 
Note that a switch in the threat point from an inside to an outside option affects how 
the fertility preferences of each partner translate into fertility outcomes: in the inside 
option bargaining environment, equilibrium fertility depends more strongly on the 
female partner’s fertility preferences than on the male partner’s fertility preferences, 
while under the outside option bargaining protocol, equilibrium fertility depends 





𝑒 |𝑛 = 0) ⋛  𝑁(𝑞𝑓
𝑒 , 𝑞𝑚
𝑒 |𝑛 = 1)    ⟺    𝜋𝑚 ⋛ 𝜋𝑓 . 
 
Thus, a change in threat point from an inside option to an outside option increases 
equilibrium fertility among couples where men have a preference for more children 
than their female partners. By contrast, if women have a preference for more 
children than their male partners, equilibrium investments in fertility decrease. 
 
Model 2: The commitment value of children with endogenous relationship 
breakdown 
  In our second model, we follow Rasul (2006) in letting the probability of 
relationship breakdown be positive, and endogenously determined by couples’ 
fertility investments. To this end, we extend the basic model by assuming that the 
private gain from being in a relationship, 𝑣i, is randomly drawn from a known 
distribution. This gain is unknown when couples invest in fertility in period 1, but 
is realized at the beginning of period 2 before partners decide whether or not to 
remain as a couple. 
  The equilibrium fertility outcome is subsequently derived through 
backwards induction. If the couple remains married, they renegotiate over the 
division of the relationship surplus, with dissolution as the relevant threat point. In 
this case, the partners’ Nash-bargained payoffs are as in model 1 and are given by:  
 
              𝑈𝑓 = 𝑣𝑓 + 𝑉
𝑓(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗) + 𝑡𝑒                                    (10) 
             𝑈𝑚 = 𝑣𝑚 + 𝑉
𝑚(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑚
∗ ) − 𝑡𝑒 ,                               (11) 
 
where the equilibrium-negotiated transfer, 𝑡𝑒, is characterized in Eq. (4). If instead, 
the couple dissolves their union, each partner’s payoff would be as in Eq. (5)., i.e., 
?̅?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑖
∗) − 0.5𝜅. 
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  Next, consider the couple’s decision of whether or not to remain married. 
We assume that a dissolution occurs if and only if it is efficient to do so, that is, if 
and only if 𝑈𝑓 + 𝑈𝑚 > ?̅?𝑓 + ?̅?𝑚. Substituting in the payoffs above and after re-
arranging, partners will remain as a couple if their joint private gains from the 
relationship, 𝜙 = 𝑣𝑓 + 𝑣𝑚, are sufficiently large: 
 
𝜙 > 𝜙∗ = −𝜅 − ∑ [Vi(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓





In what follows, we let −𝜙∗ = 𝑆(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗, 𝜋𝑚
∗ ) for notational convenience, 
where 𝑆(∙) captures the relationship surplus net of the joint private gains from the 
relationship. We follow Rasul (2008) in assuming that the joint private gains from 
marriage are distributed according to a log-concave probability distribution 𝑔(𝜙), 
with support (−∞, ∞), and an associated cumulative density function 𝐺(𝜙). 
  Moving backwards to period 1, partner i’s ex ante payoff before she/he 
invests in fertility is:  
 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝔼𝜙(𝑈
𝑖|𝜙 > 𝜙∗) + 𝔼𝜙(?̅?
𝑖|𝜙 ≤ 𝜙∗), 
 
where the first term captures i’s expected payoff within the relationship conditional 
on the relationship surviving, and the second term is i’s payoff in case the 
relationship breaks down. After substituting in Eqs. (10), (11), and (4), each 
partners’ ex ante payoffs can be written as: 
 
 𝑃𝑓 = ?̅?𝑓(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗) − 0.5𝜅 
               +(1 − 𝜃)[ℎ(𝜙∗) + (1 − 𝐺(𝜙∗)) 𝑆(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗, 𝜋𝑚
∗ )],             (12) 
 
 𝑃𝑚 = ?̅?𝑚(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑚
∗ ) − 0.5𝜅 
                         +𝜃[ℎ(𝜙∗) + (1 − 𝐺(𝜙∗))𝑆(𝑁(𝑞𝑓 , 𝑞𝑚), 𝜋𝑓
∗, 𝜋𝑚
∗ )],                       (13) 
 
where ℎ(𝜙∗) = ∫ 𝜙𝑔(𝜙)𝑑𝜙
∞
𝜙∗
 are the expected joint private gains from the 
relationship, conditional on the relationship remaining intact. Following Rasul 
(2008), we impose four assumptions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium in partners’ fertility investments: (i) 𝑆𝑞𝑖 = 𝑁𝑞𝑖(𝑉𝑁
𝑖 − ?̅?𝑁
𝑖 ) > 0 for 
all i, which ensures that the returns to fertility investments are higher in an intact 
relationship than in singlehood; (ii) 𝑔′(𝜙∗) > 0, which implies that the marginal 
relationship is likely to break up; (iii) 1 − 𝐺(𝜙∗) >  ℎ′(𝜙∗), which imposes an 
upper bound on how quickly the expected private gains in marriage decline in 
fertility investments; and (iv) 𝜙∗ < −[2𝑔(𝜙∗) + ℎ′′(𝜙∗)]/𝑔′(𝜙∗), which ensures 
that partners’ ex ante payoffs are concave in each partner’s fertility investment. 
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  Let us now characterize one partner’s, say 𝑓’s, fertility investment 
(symmetrical arguments apply to the other partner’s investment). The first-order 






𝑁𝑞𝑓 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑆𝑞𝑤[(1 − 𝐺(𝜙
∗)) − ℎ′(𝜙∗) + 𝑔(𝜙∗)𝑆] = 𝑐′(𝑞𝑓), 
 
where subscripts indicate partial differentiation with respect to the indexed 
variables, and where the arguments of all functions are dropped for simplicity. By 
investing in children, each partner: (i) increases her/his payoff if the union dissolves 
(first term); (ii) increases the relationship surplus in case they remain as a couple 
(second term); (iii) lowers their expected private gains from the relationship, 
conditional on the relationship remaining intact (third term); and (iv) increases the 
probability that their marriage remains intact (fourth term).  
  The comparative static of interest is a decrease in the costs associated with 
the dissolution of a relationship. Since by assumption, partners’ ex ante payoffs are 
concave in each of their investments in fertility, this comparative static is obtained 
by differentiating the first-order condition for 𝑓’s fertility investment with respect 




= (1 − 𝜃)(𝑆𝑞𝑤)
2[2𝑔(𝜙∗) + ℎ′(𝜙∗) + 𝑔′(𝜙∗)𝜙∗] < 0 
 
Accordingly, investments in fertility increase as the costs of dissolving a 
relationship fall. It should be noted however, that this overall result is driven by two 
opposing/competing effects. On the one hand, as 𝜅 falls, a relationship is more 
unstable ceteris paribus and this decreases incentives to invest in children. On the 
other hand, with a lower 𝜅, investments in children gain influence relative to 
dissolution costs in stabilizing the marriage, which increases incentives to invest in 
children. Overall, in equilibrium, the latter effect dominates so that fertility 
increases as 𝜅 falls. Intuitively, high dissolution costs and investments in fertility 
are substitutable reasons for why relationships remain intact. Thus, as long as 
economic or legal barriers to exiting a partnership are high, the model postulates 
that couples are effectively locked into relationships irrespective of how much they 
invest in it. Once exit barriers are lowered, couples have the incentive to counteract 
the loss of this ‘lock-in’ mechanism, by increasing their investments in relationship-












Figure B1. Geographical and temporal variation in the timing of the law enactment. Notes: This 
figure illustrates the year in which states across Mexico implemented minimum marriageable age 
laws. Unshaded areas represent states where the policy has not been implemented. 
 
 
Figure B2. The dynamic evolvement of age-specific CMRs before and after the law. Notes: This 
figure plots trends in the child marriage rate for age groups 12-17 36 months prior to the 
implementation of the law and 36 months after the law was enacted. CMRs are calculated according 
to individuals’ state of residence (ITT approach) and regressions include baseline controls, state, and 
month fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. The dashed bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals and monthly point estimates are adjusted for clustering at the state-level. Three states, Baja 
California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are excluded. Data come from 





Figure B3. The dynamic evolvement of age-specific TBRs before and after the law. Notes: This 
figure plots trends in the teenage birth rate for age groups 12-17 36 months prior to the 
implementation of the law and 36 months after the law was enacted. TBRs are calculated according 
to individuals’ state of residence (ITT approach) and regressions include baseline controls, state, and 
month fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. The dashed bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals and monthly point estimates are adjusted for clustering at the state-level. Three states, Baja 
California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are excluded. Data come from 



























 C. Tables 
 
Table C1 
Effect of the law on child marriage rates (CMRs) by age group. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
CMRs (age 12) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CMRs (age 13) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
CMRs (age 14) -0.028 -0.025 -0.026 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] 
CMRs (age 15) -0.077 -0.072 -0.076 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) 
 [0.053] [0.052] [0.052] 
CMRs (age 16) -0.486*** -0.482*** -0.482*** 
 (0.138) (0.132) (0.132) 
 [0.151] [0.151] [0.143] 
CMRs (age 17) -0.626*** -0.624*** -0.631*** 
 (0.149) (0.143) (0.143) 
 [0.158] [0.156] [0.157] 
CMRs (age 18) 0.036 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.082) 
 [0.087] [0.084] [0.091] 
CMRs (age 19) 0.031 0.006 0.002 
 (0.080) (0.073) (0.074) 
 [0.084] [0.082] [0.081] 
CMRs (age 20) -0.021 -0.058 -0.060 
 (0.069) (0.067) (0.068) 
 [0.076] [0.070] [0.072] 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Proportion of high school drop outs, 
sex crime rate 
No No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3103 3103 3103 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. Child marriage rates are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT 
approach). 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are 







The effect of minimum marriageable age laws on late birth registrations. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Share of late birth registrations 0.025 0.035 0.031 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
 [0.021] [0.023] [0.025] 
Controls  No Yes Yes 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2755 2755 2755 
Mean dep. var 0.484 0.484 0.484 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws 
are excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Table C3 
Effect of the law on child marriage rates 1,2 and 3 years prior to law 
implementation. 
 (t-1) (t-2) (t-3) 
CMRs -0.002 0.026 0.020 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.035) 
 [0.031] [0.041] [0.039] 
Baseline controls  Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2755 2407 2059 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. Child marriage rates are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT 
approach). 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are 











Effect of the law on child marriage rates, based on state of registration. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
CMRs  -0.233*** -0.232*** -0.234*** 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.057) 
 [0.064] [0.062] [0.062] 
Controls  No Yes Yes 
Sex crime rate, share of high school 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3103 3103 3103 
Mean  0.442 0.442 0.442 
Control Mean 0.532 0.532 0.532 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws 
are excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Table C5 
Effect of the law on child marriage rates (CMRs), including 3 ‘marry-your-
rapist’ states. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
CMRs  -0.228*** -0.226*** -0.227*** 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
 [0.057] [0.056] [0.059] 
Observations 3424 3424 3424 
Mean  0.441 0.441 0.441 
Control Mean 0.523 0.523 0.523 
Controls  No Yes Yes 
Sex crime rate, share of high school 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 








Effect of law on teenage birth rates (TBRs) by age group. 
 (I) (II) (III) 
TBRs (age 12) -0.006* -0.007** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] 
TBRs (age 13) -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
TBRs (age 14) -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) 
 [0.021] [0.019] [0.018] 
TBRs (age 15) 0.015 0.010 0.018 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) 
 [0.053] [0.052] [0.052] 
TBRs (age 16) -0.035 -0.035 -0.028 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) 
 [0.070] [0.072] [0.071] 
TBRs (age 17) -0.068 -0.079 -0.066 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.119) 
 [0.117] [0.126] [0.131] 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Proportion of high school drop outs, 
sex crime rate 
No No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2755 2755 2755 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. Child marriage rates are calculated according to girls’ state of residence (ITT 
approach). 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws are 
excluded. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Table C7 
Effect of the law on child marriage rates in states with low and high average 
child marriage rates prior to the law.  
 (I) (II) (III) 
TBRs (low CMR states) -0.007 0.002 0.003 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) 
 [0.049] [0.050] [0.055] 
Observations 2090 2090 2090 
Mean  0.872 0.872 0.872 
Control Mean 0.893 0.893 0.893 
TBRs (high CMR states) 0.003 -0.035 -0.037 
 (0.078) (0.056) (0.051) 
 [0.078] [0.062] [0.058] 
Observations 665 665 665 
62 
Mean  1.118 1.118 1.118 
Control Mean 1.149 1.149 1.149 
Controls  No Yes Yes 
Sex crime rate, share of high school 








State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Wild-Cluster Bootstrapped SE [.] Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). As a robustness 
check, wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses [.] as recommended by 
Cameron et al. (2008) when the number of clusters is below 40. Controls include the population 
growth rate, proportion of indigenous language speakers, male-female sex ratio, GDP per capita 
growth rate, male unemployment rate, the share of girls aged between 12-13, 14-15, 16-17 and the 
ENAPEA program. 3 states, Baja California, Campeche and Sonora with ‘marry-your-rapist’ laws 
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This study explores the effect of economic booms in male-dominated industries like 
mining on female intra-household decision-making power. Using the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis as an exogenous event which led to a gold mining boom in 
Mexico, I find that women living in gold endowed municipalities experienced 
higher decision-making power contrary to some theoretical predictions. These 
results appear to be consistent with unitary household bargaining models which 
assume income pooling, as female decision-making power increased despite no 
changes in female labour force participation and an observed increase in male 
employment. Findings from a separate survey additionally show that while women 
residing in gold endowed states had higher decision-making power, they were also 
more likely to suffer from intimate partner violence (IPV). This suggests that a 
woman’s intra-household decision-making authority is not necessarily negatively 
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Mexico has a long-standing history of gold mining, where the practice of mining 
gold dates back to the pre-Hispanic times and contributed greatly to Latin 
America’s economic expansion during the colonial era. It was not until the last two 
decades however, that the Mexican gold mining industry took off. Prior to the 
2000s, Mexico predominantly focused on silver production, as the country had 
traditionally been the number one producer of the world’s silver. Due to market 
speculation of the impending 2007-2008 financial crisis, global gold prices starting 
increasing in 2003 and spiked sharply between 2006 and 2011, with Mexican gold 
production following the same trend. This event, together with the influx of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) for mining explorations, inevitably generated a shift in 
focus from silver to gold mining in Mexico during this time period (The Mexican 
Ministry of Economy, 2013).1 According to the National Institute for Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI), the production of gold in Mexico increased three-fold at an 
average rate of about 5.3% each year between 2000 and 2011. Relative to the world 
however, Mexico’s global share in gold production during the mining boom only 
increased from about 0.3% in 2000 to 2.8% in 2011 (The Observatory of Economic 
Complexity (OEC)). Notwithstanding, Mexico’s rich endowment in precious 
metals like gold in addition to the gold mining boom due to the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis, provides an ideal setting for studies that aim to understand how 
male employment stimulated by mineral-led activities, impact female intra-
household welfare outcomes like decision-making and intimate partner violence 
(IPV).  
  For many centuries, superstition has kept Latin American women away 
from mining as it was believed that if a woman went near a mine, it would become 
jealous, hide its wealth and cause catastrophes (Arcos et al., 2018). Lutz-Ley and 
Beuchler (2020) additionally note that because mining takes place in remote areas, 
miners are subject to long journeys, uncomfortable settings, and risky conditions. 
For these reasons, the mining industry has typically been male-dominated. In 
Mexico, despite efforts to increase female participation in the mining sector, the 
proportion of women in mining only increased from about 6% in 2004 to 13% in 
2009, and subsequently decreased to 11% in 2014 (National Institute for Statistics 
and Geography (INEGI), 2020).2 Figure A1 of the appendix also plots the absolute 
number of employees in gold mining by gender, between 1994 and 2014. The graph 
shows that while male employment in gold mining increased sharply especially 
between 2009 and 2014, female employment in gold mining only rose marginally 
during the same time period. Subsequently, in a mining report by the African Union 
(2009), it was suggested that booms in such male-dominated sectors would result 
in a decrease in women’s intra-household decision-making power. The underlying 
1 S & P Global (2018) estimates that the Latin American region receives approximately 28-30% of 
the global budget in mining explorations each year, with six mining powerhouses, Peru, Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina, Ecuador and Mexico accounting for the lion’s share (90%) of the region’s budget.
2 INEGI Data on the share of men and women in mining is only available for the years 1999, 2004, 
2009 and 2014 since the economic census is only conducted once every five years.  
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logic is that as the mining sector flourishes and more men than women gain 
employment, women become increasingly reliant on their partners’ incomes. 
Alternatively, busts in the mining industry could also decrease women’s decision-
making power through poorer employment prospects related to industrial crowding 
out effects. In a study on the U.K. by Aragon et al. (2018), coal mine closures were 
found to be associated with an increase (decrease) in male (female) employment 
due to the crowding out of female-dominated sectors like manufacturing. In the 
context of oil extraction in the U.S. however, Maurer and Potlogea (2020) did not 
observe any gender-biased crowding out effects, contrary to Aragon et al.’s (2018) 
findings. Ultimately, the impact of changes in extractive industries (EI) on female 
employment and in turn, intra-household decision-making outcomes remains 
inconclusive and renders further investigation. 
  To date, only one paper by Tolonen (2018), has explicitly explored the 
relationship between mining and spousal decision-making dynamics. In a cross-
country study on Sub-Saharan Africa, the author found no effect of local gold mine 
openings on women’s intra-household bargaining outcomes. This in turn raises the 
question of whether the commonly assumed negative relationship between gold 
mining and intra-household female decision-making power is consistent with real 
world data. This paper therefore endeavours to further test the hypothesized 
negative relationship between booms in male-dominated industries like mining, and 
female decision-making power in a Latin American country like Mexico. From a 
cultural and socio-economic perspective, the Sub-Sahara African region and Latin 
America are highly distinct, and could influence decision-making outcomes 
generated by a mining boom.3 Tolonen’s (2018) findings from her cross-country 
study on Sub-Saharan Africa may therefore not be generalizable to countries like 
Mexico in the Latin American region. In addition, since more indigenous women 
in Mexico have been documented to live in mining communities and are 
simultaneously poorer and subject to traditional gender stereotypes, understanding 
the impact of economic booms in male-dominated sectors like mining is important 
for enhancing and facilitating gender equality efforts among these particular 
demographic groups (Lutz-Ley and Buechler, 2020).  
  This paper contributes to existing literature in additional ways. First, no 
previous studies to my knowledge have used exogenous movements in global 
commodity prices to evaluate the effect of a mining boom on female intra-
household decision-making power and intimate partner violence (IPV). In 
particular, this study exploits the sharp rise in world gold prices between 2003 and 
2011, as well as the differences in gold endowment across municipalities and states 
in Mexico as sources of variation. The paper also utilizes two different data sources, 
one at the municipality level (MxFLS) and the other at the state level (ENDIREH), 
3 For instance, in Latin America, the machismo culture is particularly strong and had origins during 
colonial times, where women were perceived as weak, naive, and had to be protected by men as they 
could not fend for themselves (Bridges, 1980). Machoism is therefore often associated with an 
increased risk of intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetration, and implies that men of Latino origin 
engage in harmful behaviours such as drunkenness, violence and infidelity (Gutmann and Viveros, 
2005; Mancera et al., 2015).  
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to identify changes in not only female bargaining power, but also IPV outcomes 
during the gold mining boom respectively. To date, only two studies on Sub-
Saharan Africa have analysed the impact of mining on IPV. In a cross-country 
analysis on Sub-Saharan Africa, Kotsadam et al. (2016) found no significant 
relationship between both factors, whereas in a more location-specific study on 
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rustad et al. (2016) discovered that 
women who lived closer to artisanal and small-scale mining were more likely to 
experience sexual violence. In this study on Mexico, due to the detailed information 
on IPV provided by a state-level (ENDIREH) data set, I am able to segregate IPV 
into four different forms (physical, sexual and emotional abuse and threats of 
violence), unlike previous studies by Kotsadam et al. (2016) and Rustad et al. 
(2016) that only examined harder types of IPV like physical and sexual violence. 
  The results from the analyses show that women living in gold endowed 
states were more likely to suffer from various forms of IPV, though the types of 
IPV experienced by women were different for those who were poorer and wealthier. 
Given the spike in domestic violence during COVID-19, this study is therefore 
particularly relevant as it helps to shed some light on how changes in male 
employment as a result of economic booms or busts (in the context of COVID-19) 
affect women’s risk of IPV, especially in low-middle income countries like Mexico. 
The findings also reveal that women residing in gold endowed municipalities 
experienced an increase in their decision-making power at home, which was likely 
to be driven by a rise in male employment probabilities. Contrary to non-unitary 
household bargaining models (see McElroy and Horney, 1981, Lundberg and 
Pollak, 1994 and Lommerud, 2003) that predict a decline in a woman’s household 
bargaining power along with a concurrent increase in male employment 
opportunities generated by a mining boom for instance, the results from this study 
suggest that an increase in a husband’s outside option through better employment 
prospects relative to his wife’s, may not necessarily hamper her intra-household 
decision-making power ability. This finding can be juxtaposed against unitary 
household bargaining models that predict the pooling of household income 
(Samuelson, 1956). From a policy standpoint, it subsequently elucidates how 
income resources are distributed within the household, which carries important 
implications for the evaluation of future cash-transfer programs for example.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II provides a 
background on gold mining in Mexico and discusses relevant theories relating 
income-generating opportunities to intra-household female decision-making; 
section III describes the data and empirical method used in this study; section IV 
presents the main results of the paper, discusses possible channels and additional 









II. Background and Existing Literature 
 
II.1 Gold Mining in Mexico 
  This study specifically focuses on gold mining in Mexico. Due to market 
speculation of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the global demand for gold 
began increasing in the few years leading up to the crisis in 2003. Figure A1 of the 
appendix supports this phenomenon, and shows an increased demand for labour in 
the gold mining sector particularly for men, between 2004 and 2014. By 2011, the 
price of gold was approximately six times higher than pre-shock levels in 2002, 
with the steepest increase occurring between the end of 2006 and 2011.4 This event 
subsequently stimulated a gold mining boom across many mineral-led countries 
like Mexico, as gold production intensified in response to the spike in global gold 
prices (Engineering and Mining Journal, 2011). Figure A shows the natural log of 
the prices and production of gold through these shocks between 1998 and 2011.  
 
 
Figure A. Trends in world gold prices and gold production in Mexico. Notes: This figure plots trends 
in global gold prices and the production of gold in Mexico. Each point is the logged value of average 
prices over each year and the total production in each year. The blue (red) line denotes production 
(price). Data on Mexico’s gold production come from the National Institute for Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI), and data on world gold prices is from the London Metal Exchange’s (LME) 
monthly historical price series. 
  
As can be seen, global gold prices increased steadily from 2003 to 2011, and gold 
production in Mexico followed the same trend. It is worth noting that although the 
prices of other precious metals like silver rose as well, the increase was not as 
substantial as compared to gold. While the prices and production of silver nearly 
4 Given Mexico’s economic ties and dependence on the U.S. as an export market, all economic 
sectors including mining took the hit during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. This explains the 
slight fall in gold production between 2008 and 2009. Mining was however the first industrial sector 
in Mexico to recover from the crisis as the economy started to recover in 2009, which is depicted by 
the sharp increase in gold production and prices between 2009 and 2011 (Engineering and Mining 
Journal, 2011). Moreover, the panel MxFLS data used in this study was conducted in 2002, 2005-
2006 and 2009-2010, which does not overlap with the dip in gold production between 2008-2009. 
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doubled between 2009 and 2011, they were relatively constant before that period 
(see Figure A2 in the appendix). Moreover, silver has a much lower value to weight 
ratio than gold, where the gold-silver price ratio was 84:1 at the depth of the global 
financial crisis.5 Therefore despite Mexico being a large producer and exporter of 
silver, there is little temporal variation to exploit in silver mining production for this 
study. Accordingly, I test if the production of gold in Mexico responded to world 
gold prices, by conducting a first-stage analysis of the relationship between the two 
variables. The t-statistics of the effect of current prices on future production 1,2 and 
3 months after (t+1 to t+3) are highly statistically significant (18.09, 20.98, 20.96 
respectively), indicating that local production responded strongly to global prices.6 
Figure A additionally shows that local gold production and world prices followed 
highly similar trends during the sample period. 
  Most of the gold mining in Mexico is conducted by large-scale companies 
located in the north and central regions. Figure B illustrates the geographical 
variation in gold production across the respective Mexican states between 2003 and 
2011 specifically. As can be seen, three northern states: Sonora, Chihuahua and 
Durango contribute to the largest shares of gold produced in the country. While 
there is some gold mining activity in south-eastern states like Guerrero and Oaxaca, 
the average volume of gold produced in the north is approximately 4.5 times more 
than in these states. In total, about 14 out of 32 Mexican states are actively involved 
in the mining and production of gold, albeit the remaining 18 states also do produce 
gold but in much smaller quantities, contributing to only 0.4% of the total gold 
produced in Mexico.  
  Typically, the mining of gold is done through open-pit operations that use 
capital intensive technology, and many gold mining businesses in Mexico are 
owned by large international corporations or businesses rather than by locals.7 
Much of the Mexican soil is also favourable for the practice of mining exploration 
and exploitation, where approximately two-thirds of the national territory contain 
mineral resources that are suitable for mining purposes (Hurtado and Salazar, 
1999). On average, it is estimated that exploration activities of a mining area take 
10 years, and an additional 20 to 30 years for exploitation (The Mexican Geological 
Service (SGM), 2020).8 In the Mexican context, the relationship between ejidos and 
miners has also played a major role in mining production over the last three decades. 
Ejidos are essentially areas of land that are used for collective agricultural practices, 
whereby community members are assigned allotments on which they farm on, and 
have joint ownership over the land with other community members. In 1993, the 
mining law reform allowed ejidos and properties of agrarian communities to be 
5 Data for the gold and silver price ratio was from the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) 
and ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA). 
6 Estimation output for the regression is not listed; but available upon request. 
7 Open-pit mining is often used for extracting “hard rocks” such as metal ores like gold, silver, 
copper, iron, among others. The process begins by excavating large surface areas of the ground to 
expose and mine the metal ore beneath. Specifically, holes are drilled into the ground using 
explosives, and hard rock material is then removed layer-by-layer through controlled demolitions.
8 Information on the timeline of mining exploration and exploitation activities was provided by the 
Mexican Geological Service (SGM) through a public information request system.  
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privatized, meaning that in order for miners to carry out exploitation work on ejidos, 
they would have to have an agreement with the owners of the land, and have it 
registered with the agrarian registry (Penman, 2016). Under these circumstances, if 
a consensus between the owner of an ejido and prospective mining business was 
not reached, miners would not be able to conduct exploitation activities.9 
 
 
Figure B. A graphical representation of gold production across Mexican states between 2003 and 
2011. Notes: The graph shows the total production of gold (in kilograms) in each state between 
2003-2011. The darker the shaded area, the greater the quantity of gold produced in the state. Data 
on gold production come from the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI): Banco 
de Información Económica (BIE) series. 
 
II.2 Mining, Employment and Female Decision-Making Power: Conceptual 
Framework 
II.2a Non-Unitary Household Bargaining Models 
  Non-unitary household bargaining models in economics predict that 
external shift parameters such as an increase in female job opportunities for 
instance, are key determinants of a woman’s bargaining power.10 These external 
environmental factors are typically termed as the ‘outside option’, and are a 
function of an individual’s decision making authority (McElroy and Horney, 1981; 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1994; Lommerud, 2003). Subsequently, the theory suggests 
that a change in a woman’s outside option is sufficient to alter her aggregate 
bargaining power within the household. Improvements in relative or absolute job 
opportunities for women due to gold mining for example, should thus increase 
female bargaining power through the outside option. In regions like Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016) found that the intensification of mining 
activities generated more jobs for women in complementary sectors like the service 
9 For legal documentation of ejidos and mining concessions, see article 27 of the mining law: 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/151_110814.pdf. 
10 This study follows the theoretical framework of a non-unitary rather than unitary household 
bargaining model. A majority of empirical studies find little evidence in support of the unitary 
household model framework, which has been criticized for its over-simplicity and lack of 
applicability to real world data (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 2006; 
Bobonis, 2009; Cherchye et al., 2012). 
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industry. However, in a subsequent study on Sub-Saharan Africa by Tolonen (2018) 
the author found no impact of gold mining on spousal decision-making power, 
indicating that an improvement in a woman’s outside option through an increase in 
job opportunities may not necessarily guarantee an increase in her intra-household 
bargaining power. Whether the Mexican gold mining boom affected female 
decision-making power through employment, therefore remains an empirical 
question.  
  The extent to which an improvement in a woman’s outside option can be 
leveraged to her advantage also depends on how male income or employment 
changes relative to females’ during a gold mining boom. The prediction of non-
unitary household bargaining models is that if relative male income or employment 
increases, the intra-household gender wage gap widens and in turn lowers women’s 
decision-making power. In several studies on the Middle East and the U.K, booms 
in industries like crude oil and coal decreased female labour force participation due 
to higher male wages and increased household wealth, which subsequently crowded 
out female-dominated sectors like manufacturing (Ross, 2008; Aragon et al., 2018). 
Considering that mining is still a male-dominated activity, economic booms in the 
sector in theory, could disproportionately increase employment prospects for men 
and decrease female intra-household decision-making power (African Union, 
2009). 
 
II.2b Unitary Household Bargaining Models 
  Unitary household bargaining models on the other hand, assume the 
pooling of household income which implies that the household demand for goods 
and leisure are not dependent on the sources of income (i.e. the individual income 
contribution of the wife and the husband to household wealth), but rather the 
aggregate household income. Samuelson (1956) suggested that as long as there is a 
general consensus among household members on the aggregation of household 
income and preferences, the income pooling assumption is satisfied. Though the 
unitary model has been widely criticized for its over-simplicity and lack of 
applicability to real world data (see Lundberg and Pollak, 1994; Browning and 
Chiappori, 2006; Bobonis, 2009; Cherchye et al., 2012), there is evidence that some 
developing countries like India, still follow the unitary framework (see Neff et al., 
2012; Klasen and Pieters, 2015). Consequently, under the unitary household 
bargaining model, a woman’s intra-household decision-making authority is 
dependent on changes in the total household wealth, rather than on changes in her 
absolute or relative income prospects. In this regard, the outside option 
characterized by better employment opportunities in gold mining for instance, will 
not affect her intra-household decision-making power over the consumption of 
goods and services, unlike what is predicted by non-unitary household bargaining 
models. A total increase in household finances is therefore sufficient to increase her 





III. Data and Empirical Method 
 
III.a Data 
III.a1 Dependent Variables 
  This study draws from a panel data set to elicit the effect of the gold mining 
boom on female decision-making power in Mexico. Specifically, it utilizes the 
Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), which fortuitously overlaps with the timing 
of the gold mining boom as a result of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The 
MxFLS is a nationally representative panel survey containing information on the 
decision-making power of married or cohabiting couples, and interviewed 
approximately 8,400 households and 35,000 individuals in more than 150 
municipalities across Mexico.11 It also boasts low attrition rates with virtually 90% 
of households re-interviewed and tracked across all three survey waves. 
  To capture the differences in women’s intra-household decision-making 
power before and after the spike in gold mining production, I use all three waves of 
the MxFLS conducted in 2002, 2005-2006 and 2009-2010. In particular, I utilize 
the first wave of the MxFLS (2002) as the pre-treatment sample, and the last two 
waves (2005-2006, and 2009-2010) as the post-treatment sample given that gold 
prices only started increasing from 2003 onwards (see Figure A). Decision-making 
questionnaires specifically ask couples within a household about who made the 
decisions over twelve types of goods and services (children’s goods, private goods, 
spouse’s goods and household expenditures).12 Accordingly, I construct an average 
decision-making power index over all twelve decision-making questions, where 
each decision-making question is normalized with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1.13 The MxFLS additionally provides detailed information about an 
individual’s indigenous status, education, age, employment, month and year of 
interview, perception of safety, the number of kids at home, indicators of 
community and transport network quality, and most importantly, it notes the 
presence of a woman’s spouse during an interview which is included as a control 
to mitigate measurement errors resulting from possible reporting biases.14 
 
III.a2 Explanatory Variables 
  In order to examine the effect of the gold mining boom on female decision-
making power outcomes, I use exogenous global commodity shocks characterized 
11 In this study, the MxFLS sample excludes women who got divorced (and who may or may not 
have changed partners). The same women (and partners) are therefore followed over time across all 
three survey waves to attenuate concerns relating to possible endogenous marriage formation.  
12 Data and documentation are available at http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/. An example of the 
household decision making questionnaire can be found in Figure A3 of the appendix. 
13 Specifically, I assign a value of 3 if a woman responded that she was the sole decision-maker over 
that category of goods and services, 2 if the decision was made jointly with her husband, and 1 if 
her husband was the sole decision-maker of that category of goods and services. Each decision-
making question is then normalized with a range of 0 to 1. Using this information, I then construct 
an average decision-making power index over all twelve decisions. 
14 Reporting biases may arise from the ‘Hawthorne effect’, a psychological term referring to the 




by movements in gold prices. Considering that local prices of gold are likely to be 
endogenous to female intra-household bargaining power outcomes, for instance, 
mine openings or exploitation activities, could have been influenced by local gold 
prices, I use world gold prices instead, which is taken from the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) historical statistics for mineral and material 
commodities. In this context, the exogeneity assumption holds reasonably as world 
gold prices are unlikely to be influenced by women’s intra-household decision-
making behaviour in Mexico. Moreover, during the sample time frame, Mexico was 
not a major global exporter and producer of gold. Between 2002-2011, Mexico 
contributed to only 1.63% and 1.66% of the world’s total gold exports and 
production respectively (The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), 2019). 
Given the country’s small open gold economy, the issue of endogenous global gold 
prices is thus less of a concern due to Mexico’s insignificant share of global gold 
production and exports, which arguably has a negligible effect on world gold prices. 
  Next, since the drug war initiated by President Felipe Calderón in 2007 
reportedly encouraged drug cartels to switch from trafficking to gold mining, one 
cannot rule out the possibility that gold mining projects during the sample time 
frame were influenced by levels of violence, which in turn could have impacted 
female bargaining power outcomes (Global Initiative against Transnational 
Organized Crime (GIATOC), 2016). To circumvent this potential endogeneity, I 
use historical mining concessions data from 1973 to 1983 as a proxy for gold 
mineral endowment.15 In essence, mining concessions are land areas that are 
allocated and permitted by the government for the extraction of minerals such as 
gold.16 The data contains information on the land area granted for the exploitation 
of gold, and is taken from Mexican Ministry of Economy which provides 
information on the intended gold mining land area (in hectares). Location 
information such as the municipality, and the date during which the gold mining 
concession was granted is also provided. I omit concessions that listed the mining 
of other minerals such as copper and lead, among other minerals, to elicit and isolate 
changes in gold mining activities between 2003-2011, the period when gold prices 
started increasing. Two states: Mexico City (‘Federal District of Mexico’) and 
Quintana Roo, are also excluded from the analysis, as information on historical 
mining concessions for these states are not available.17 Summary statistics of 
dependent and independent variables are presented in Tables B1 and B2 of the 
Appendix. 
15 Since exploitation activities last on average between 20-30 years, I subtract 20-30 years from the 
time market speculation about the impending global financial crisis began in 2003, and thus use 
historical mining concessions from the 1973-1983 time period.
16 For legal documentation, see articles 15 and 19 of the mining law: http://www.diputados.gob.mx/L 
eyesBiblio/pdf/151_110814.pdf. 
17 The Federal District of Mexico and Quintana Roo are not known to be ‘mining’ states in general. 
Data on the production of gold and silver is available on the state level, but only specifically for 
states that are major producers of the two metals. States that produce relatively less of these minerals 
(such as the Federal District of Mexico and Quintana Roo) are grouped together under ‘others’ in 
the data. It is therefore not possible to know the exact amount of gold and silver produced in the two 
states, in addition to the lack of historical mining concessions data which is used as a proxy for 
endowment in this study. 
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III.a3 Additional Data Sources 
  In the baseline regressions, I include the homicide rate per 100,000 people 
as a control to account for the Mexican drug war that overlapped with the gold 
mining boom. Data on homicides is drawn from the death registry of the Vital 
Statistics edition provided by the National Institute for Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI). Public death certificates are released by the INEGI annually, and contain 
details on the cause of death, the day, month and year of death as well as the 
municipality and state in which the death occurred for the years 1990-2011. The 
availability of this data permits the selection and inclusion of only intentional 
homicides, and the matching of homicide rates to individuals’ decision-making 
outcomes months prior to their MxFLS interview. The National Agrarian Registry 
(RAN) also provides information on the number of ejidos per municipality and state 
which is added as a heterogeneous market trend in baseline regressions to control 
for initial municipality conditions.  
  As a robustness test, I draw from an alternative data set, the Mexican 
National Survey on the Dynamics of Household Relations (ENDIREH), to cross-
check female decision-making power outcomes observed in the MxFLS. ENDIREH 
is a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey containing 
information on women’s intra-household decision-making outcomes and self-
reported measures of IPV, which is used as an additional outcome in the paper. Like 
the MxFLS, the survey overlaps with the timing of the gold mining boom, and was 
conducted in 2003, 2006 and 2011. Altogether, ENDIREH surveyed 34,184, 
133,398 and 152,636 women who cohabitated with a partner or husband, and who 
were 15 years and above in 2003, 2006 and 2011 respectively.18 In particular, 
women were asked if they experienced any form of IPV in the 12 months prior to 
the interview as well as their decision-making power over various sets of goods and 
services. It is important to use ENDIREH to examine the effects of the gold mining 
boom on intra-household female welfare outcomes related to domestic violence for 
instance, as the ENDIREH is currently the only available data set in Mexico that 
contains detailed information about women’s IPV experiences. Different from the 
MxFLS however, location data for the ENDIREH is only available on the state rather 
than municipality level since the aim of the survey was to get a general gauge of 
the intensity and severity of domestic abuse across Mexico.  
 
III.b Empirical Strategy 
  An important assumption is that the production of gold which essentially 
serves as the treatment variable, intensified during the onset of the global financial 
crisis in 2003. Since the goal is to examine how intra-household female decision-
making authority was influenced by changes in employment due to the gold mining 
boom over time, it is necessary to ensure that there is variation in gold mining 
18 It is possible that the ENDIREH did not capture a particularly vulnerable age group of those below 
15, since marriage as young as the age of 12 was legal in some states in Mexico during the sample 
period. Nonetheless, the average proportion of girls married below 15 was approximately only 3.3% 




production activities stimulated by the global economic downturn. In order to test 
this assumption, I run a first-stage regression analysis of the relationship between 
world gold prices and Mexican gold production. As previously discussed in section 
II.1, the association between the two variables is highly significant and positive. 
Figure A provides further support for this assumption which shows that world gold 
prices and gold production in Mexico exhibited similar trends. The availability of 
data on the month and year of interview in the MxFLS additionally allows the 
matching of individuals to monthly values of world gold prices.  
  One of the limitations of this study however, is the paucity of 
geocoordinate data in both the MxFLS and ENDIREH. As such, calculating the 
exact distance of individuals to mines is not possible, unlike studies on Sub-Saharan 
Africa by Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016) and Kotsadam et al. (2016) for instance, 
that use the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) series containing geocoordinate 
data. Moreover, due to limited data availability on historical gold mining projects, 
I utilize historical gold mining concessions as an alternative, which is a continuous 
endowment variable indicating the land area designated for the exploitation and 
extraction of gold. Municipalities that have larger mining concession areas 
therefore signify greater gold endowment compared to those with smaller mining 
concession land areas. In this respect, the treatment intensity is determined by the 
size of gold mining concession areas in the municipalities where women reside. It 
is also worth noting that since concessioned land areas may be explored but not 
eventually exploited, the empirical strategy follows an intent-to-treat approach 
which relies on the assumption that rising gold prices encouraged the exploitation 
and production of gold. Lastly, out of the 136 municipalities represented in this 
study, approximately 39% have land areas designated for the mining of gold, 
ranging from 18 to 3362 hectares (18,000 to 33,622,813 square meters).  
  In order to fully exploit changes in gold mining production activities due 
to the global economic crisis, I interact historical gold mining concession areas with 
the global gold prices. Doing so should help to elicit the differences in employment 
and intra-household bargaining outcomes between women who live in 
municipalities endowed with gold during the mining boom, and those who do not. 
On this account, the empirical strategy follows a difference-in-differences method 
of estimation, and capitalizes on the temporal and geographical variation in gold 
mining production across Mexico. Accordingly, the baseline regression takes the 
following form: 
 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 =  𝐵0 + 𝐵1(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−5) + 𝐵2𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ + 𝐵3𝑍𝑚,𝑡
′ + ∅𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 is the average decision-making power index of woman i in 
municipality m at time t, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚 is the log of the land area claimed by gold 
mining concessions between 1973 and 1983 in municipality m, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−5 is the 
average world price of gold 5 months prior to the individuals’ interview month, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′  
and 𝑍𝑚,𝑡
′  are vectors of individual- and municipality-level covariates such as 
woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, 
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the presence of her spouse during the interview, the homicide rate per 100,000 
inhabitants, the introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws, and time trends 
interacted with municipal characteristics such as rural-urban status, transport 
network quality, community quality and the presence of ejidos, to account for 
heterogeneous market trends that may be correlated with initial municipal 
conditions.19 ∅𝑡 and 𝜋𝑖 are month and individual fixed effects respectively, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 
is the usual disturbance term.  
  It is crucial to control for municipality homicide rates as higher homicide 
rates have been found to lower women’s bargaining power at home (see Tsaneva et 
al., 2018).20 Due to the drug war, the Mexican mining industry grew in its 
susceptibility to drug-related criminal activity as the rising gold prices and 
concurrently declining profitability of drug trafficking from Mexico to the United 
States stimulated drug cartels to switch from trafficking to gold mining (Global 
Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GIATOC), 2016). Additionally, 
from the mid-1990s to the mid 2000s, Mexico implemented various divorce laws 
and reforms that criminalized domestic violence. Details on the dates of these 
various reforms can be found in Beleche’s (2017) study which examines the effect 
of these laws on female suicide in Mexico. Given the evidence that divorce law 
reforms and domestic violence laws improve a woman’s outside option, and hence 
her intra-household decision-making power (see Chiappori et al. 2002; Rangel 
2006; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006), it is important to include the timing of these 
reforms as controls in the benchmark regression. Lastly, while the lag of the average 
gold prices in the last 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 months also generates significant estimates 
for female decision-making power outcomes, this paper uses the average prices of 
gold over the last 5 months prior to the interview month of the individual, as this 
mean composite measure produces the most pronounced effect of the mining boom 
on women’s intra-household bargaining power. Because gold mining production 
might take some time to respond to changes in prices and hence generate lags in 
production and hiring adjustments, and since individuals may not immediately 
respond to economic stimulus, the more prominent results produced by the average 
of gold prices over the last 5 months is conceivable. In Figure A4 of the appendix, 
I present a coefficient plot of a woman’s mean decision-making power index 
according to the average gold prices over the last 1-6 months. In summary, the 
figure provides evidence that the choice of using average gold prices over the last 
5 months is not arbitrary (the coefficient plot is a quadratic function with a 
maximum point at the 5th lag).  
19 Transport network quality and community quality are indices calculated using standard principal 
component analysis. They include various transport network questions such as the kind of materials 
that the roads, streets or highways are made of, if cars were able to pass through the community in 
the last two years, inter alia, and community quality questions like flooding problems, air quality, 
the sufficiency of public light systems, among others. 
20 Because homicides are least subject to failure in reporting and are the most consistent with 
multiple studies using drug-related crimes, they remain the best indicator for violent living 
conditions despite the availability of data on other types of crimes related to the drug war (Ellsberg 
et al., 2011; Brown and Velásquez, 2017).
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  Next, the inclusion of individual fixed effects is also especially 
advantageous given the nature of this study as individual decision-making 
behaviour for instance, could vary greatly across individuals due to latent individual 
traits. Month of interview fixed effects additionally account for time trends that 
vary uniformly across municipalities. A potential threat to identification remains 
however, due to selective migration. For instance, women and men in the MxFLS 
could have moved to mining municipalities across the three survey waves in search 
of better job opportunities. It could also be that individuals migrated away from 
municipalities that were more dangerous as a result of the drug war, which has been 
reportedly associated with gold mining. Intra-household female welfare estimates 
could therefore be either upward or downward biased, depending on each specific 
scenario. Albeit an examination of the MxFLS shows that only 2.8% of women 
changed their municipalities of residence across all three survey waves, I 
nonetheless fix individuals to their municipality of residence in the first survey 
wave (2002) regardless of if they relocated to other municipalities over the years, 
to rule out any biases arising from selective migration. Consequently, the MxFLS 
results represent the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect as opposed to the average treatment 
effect (ATE) of the relationship between the gold mining boom and women’s intra-




IV.1 The Effect of the Gold Mining Boom on Women’s Decision-Making Power 
  Table 1 show the results from estimating equation (1) which estimates the 
effect of the gold mining boom on women’s mean overall decision-making power 
and their decision-making authority over individual goods and services. 
Specification (1) includes individual and month fixed effects, but no controls, (2) 
sequentially adds baseline controls, and (3) is the benchmark regression which 
includes non-parametric trends interacted with municipal characteristics 
aforementioned in section III.b, to account for heterogeneous market trends 
correlated with initial municipality conditions. Taken together, the results show that 
contrary to the commonly hypothesized negative relationship between mining and 
intra-household female decision-making power, women in gold endowed 
municipalities experienced an overall increase in their ability to partake in 
household decision-making processes. A more disaggregated analysis of the 
different categories of goods and services shows that the improvement in their 
average aggregate bargaining power was driven by three specific types of goods: 
food expenditures, money given to their own parents, and contraceptive use. The 
findings for the remaining categories of goods and services are presented in Table 
B3 of the appendix, and do not show a significant relationship with the gold mining 
boom.   
  The benchmark specification in column (3) reveals that women living in 
gold endowed municipalities experienced an improvement in their decision-making 
power by about 0.01 (0.006/0.541) of a standard deviation when compared to the 
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mean. Equivalently, this suggests that a two standard deviation increase in the price 
of gold results in a 0.02% increase in a woman’s decision-making power index. This 
effect appears to stem from an observed rise in women’s bargaining power over food 
expenditures, money given to the woman’s own parents and contraceptive use, where 
coefficient estimates for decision-making power over these particular goods in 
column (3) show an increase of 0.04%, 0.06% and 0.04% respectively, with a two 
standard deviation increase in gold prices. Though the magnitude of these effects is 
considerably small, the findings nonetheless indicate that economic booms in male-
dominated sectors like gold mining, do not necessarily worsen a woman’s decision-
making power at home and could instead lead to an increase in their intra-household 
bargaining power over certain goods. 
 
 Table 1 
The effect of the gold mining boom on female decision-making power (MxFLS data).  
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Mean DMP (all goods) 0.001 0.003     0.006*** 0.541 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Observations (N) 10,462 10,330 9,123  
DMP (individual goods): 
Food expenditures 0.014** 0.014**    0.018*** 0.829 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Observations (N) 7,075 6,987 6,187  
Money to own parents 0.000 0.003  0.016* 0.538 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)  
Observations (N) 7,125 7,025 6,144  
Contraceptive use  -0.000 0.005   0.011** 0.461 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  
Observations (N) 7,114 7,035 6,177  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  
Month FE Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls 
include a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her 
spouse during the interview, and municipality covariates like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the 
introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws. Column (1) does not include any controls, and columns 
(2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and time trends interacted with municipal characteristics such as 
rural-urban status, transport network quality, community quality and the presence of ejidos (heterogeneous 
market trends) respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
  In order to check that these results are not spurious, I draw from a separate 
pooled cross-sectional data set, ENDIREH. As discussed in section III.a3, the 
ENDIREH, which was conducted in 2003, 2006 and 2011 also contains information 
on women’s decision-making power, though geographic data is only available on 
the state-level. Subsequently, I utilize this data set as a robustness check to examine 
if the gold mining boom indeed generated an increase in intra-household female 
bargaining power as reflected in the MxFLS.21 Since individuals in the ENDIREH 
21 The ENDIREH contains a total of thirteen decision-making questions in the 2003 and 2011 
surveys, though the 2006 survey only contains eleven questions. For consistency, I exclude the two 
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however, were only interviewed over a period of one month between mid-October 
and mid-November for all three survey rounds, exploiting gold prices as a source 
of temporal variation is not feasible. Consequently, I define the post-treatment 
group as individuals interviewed in the 2006 and 2011 survey during which gold 
prices and production increased sharply, and those interviewed in 2003 as the pre-
treatment group. Given that the ENDIREH surveyed individuals about their 
experiences with IPV and intra-household bargaining power 12 months (1 year) 
prior to the date of interview in the ENDIREH, responses in 2003 represent 2002 
outcomes before gold prices started to rise in 2003. Table B4 of the appendix reports 
some descriptive statistics of the mean value of all covariates for both treatment and 
control groups in the ENDIREH. The summary statistics show that women in the 
control group are more likely to be rural and indigenous, have more children and 
have higher levels of education compared to the treated group. Given that the 
Mexican drug war only began in 2007, the large differences in the homicide rate 
between the treated and control group is expected as the control group was exposed 
to much less violence prior to 2007. The phase-in implementation of three domestic 
violence and divorce laws across states and time also explains the difference in 
mean values between the treated and control groups. For most of the covariates, the 
difference in means between both groups are statistically significant, indicating the 
importance of controlling for these covariates in the baseline regressions. 
Accordingly, I estimate the following difference-in-differences model:  
 
     𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 =  𝐵0 + 𝐵1(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝐵2𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ + 𝐵3𝑍𝑠,𝑡
′ + ∅𝑡 + 𝜋𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡       (2) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is woman i’s average decision-making power index in state s during 
survey year t, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 is the log of the land area claimed by gold mining 
concessions between 1973 and 1983 in state s, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 
for the survey years 2006 and 2011 during the peak of the gold price increase, and 
0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′  and 𝑍𝑠,𝑡
′  are vectors of individual- and state-level covariates such 
as a woman’s rural and indigenous status, age, age squared, length of relationship 
with her partner, number of children, education level, the homicide rate per 100,000 
inhabitants, the timing of domestic violence and divorce law reforms across 
Mexican states and time trends interacted with state characteristics such as 
proximity to coast, protected areas, presence of ejidos, population density and 
physio geographic classification to account for heterogeneous market trends 
associated with prior state conditions. ∅𝑡 and 𝜋𝑠 is the survey year of interview and 
state fixed effects respectively, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is the error term. The results from 
estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 2.  
 
  
questions that were missing from the 2006 survey, and subsequently select questions that are similar 
to the ones asked in the MxFLS. This results in a remainder of six suitable decision-making questions 
that are then used to construct the average decision-making power index. For example, questions 
like ‘who makes decisions about your participation in social or political activities?’ are excluded as 
they are not asked in the MxFLS data set.  
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 Table 2 
The effect of the mining boom on female decision-making outcomes (ENDIREH data). 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
(std. dev.) 
DMP index (overall) 0.001 0.001    0.003** 0.640 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Observations (N) 191,768 186,506 186,506  
DMP index (HH expenditures) 0.004 0.003     0.011*** 0.832 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Observations (N) 190,246 185,107 185,107  
DMP index (who uses the -0.004* -0.005*   -0.006*** 0.622 
contraception) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Observations (N) 115,055 112,242 112,242  
DMP index (contraceptive use) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.594 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Observations (N) 116,173 113,328 113,328  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
State FE Yes Yes Yes  
Survey Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include a 
woman’s rural and indigenous status, age, age squared, length of relationship with her partner, number of children, 
education level, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the introduction of 
domestic violence and divorce laws. Column (1) does not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially 
add baseline controls and time trends interacted with state characteristics like proximity to coast, protected areas, 
presence of ejidos, population density and physio geographic classification (heterogeneous market trends) 
respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
  As can be seen, the same qualitative conclusion from the MxFLS data set 
can be drawn, where the estimated coefficient of a woman’s overall decision-
making power index is positive and statistically significant. In particular, women 
living in gold endowed states experienced increases in their aggregate decision-
making power by 0.0005 (0.003/0.640) of a standard deviation relative to the mean. 
Similar to the MxFLS, this result appears to be driven particularly by household 
expenditures where women’s decision-making power over this category of goods 
increased by about 0.013 (0.011/0.832) of a standard deviation. The findings in 
Table 2 also indicate that women in gold endowed states experienced lower 
bargaining power over the decision of which partner should use contraception, with 
estimated coefficients showing a decline in her decision-making authority over this 
matter by 0.001 (0.006/0.622) when compared to the mean. Estimates for a 
woman’s bargaining power over contraceptive use however, which is analogous to 
the question asked in the MxFLS and not who uses contraception, is statistically 
insignificant and zero-bound. The effect of the gold mining boom on the remaining 
decision-making categories which do not show a statistically significant 
relationship are presented in Table B5 of the appendix. Taken together, albeit the 
estimated coefficients from the analysis using both the MxFLS and ENDIREH are 
quantitatively small, they support the basic conclusion that the gold mining boom 






IV.2 Possible Channels   
  It is important to examine the effect of the gold mining boom on labour 
market outcomes and other determinants of welfare, to better understand the 
underlying mechanisms behind the increases in female decision-making power. 
Accordingly, Table 3 presents results from an analysis of the effect of the gold 
mining boom on male and female employment probabilities in the MxFLS. It also 
shows the impact of the gold mining boom on individuals’ perceptions of safety 
given the reported association between drug-related violence and gold mines in 
Mexico (GIATOC, 2016).  
 
 Table 3 
The effect of mining on labor market outcomes and perceptions of safety (MxFLS data). 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Men:     
Employed    0.018***     0.019***   0.012* 0.803 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)  
Observations (N) 8,420 7,906 6,968  
Fear of assault  0.028* 0.026  0.029* 0.296 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)  
Observations (N) 8,747 7,924 7,042  
Women:     
Employed 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.190 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)  
Observations (N) 10,471 10,338 9,131  
Fear of assault 0.017 0.019 0.014 0.370 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)  
Observations (N) 10,471 10,338 9,131  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  
Month FE Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls 
include a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her 
spouse during the interview, and municipality covariates like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the 
introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws. Column (1) does not include any controls, and columns 
(2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and time trends interacted with municipal characteristics such as 
rural-urban status, transport network quality, community quality and the presence of ejidos (heterogeneous 
market trends) respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Across all three specifications, the estimates reveal that men living in gold endowed 
municipalities experienced an increase in employment prospects during the mining 
boom. Female employment on the other hand, appears to have been unaffected. In 
particular, male employment probability estimates are statistically significant at the 
10% level and positive in the baseline specification in (3), where the estimated 
coefficient shows an increase in male employment of 1.2 percentage points (or 1.5% 
when compared to the sample mean). Coefficients for female employment 
probabilities however, are insignificant and close to zero, indicating that while the 
gold mining boom had a positive impact on male employment, it did not have any 
effect on female labour force participation. 
  Altogether, these results suggest that the observed increase in female 
decision-making power was likely to be driven by increases in male employment 
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during the gold mining boom. Unitary household bargaining models lend support 
to this finding as women’s intra-household decision-making power increased 
despite no observable changes in their employment probabilities. This indicates 
income pooling which is a central prediction of unitary models of the household, 
where the consumption of goods by the husband or wife depends solely on the total 
household income rather than on the sources of income (Samuelson, 1956). The 
same household income effect has also been documented in other developing 
countries like India (see Neff et al., 2012; Klasen and Pieters, 2015), where the 
elasticity of female labour supply increased in response to higher household wealth. 
Subsequently, since male employment in gold endowed municipalities increased, 
suggesting a rise in aggregate household income, women simply could have had 
more household wealth to allocate expenditures to household goods like food. In 
addition, the 2002 MxFLS pre-treatment survey wave shows that women had higher 
decision-making power over household goods and services compared to men (0.404 
for women versus 0.176 for men), lending support to the idea that since women 
have conventionally had more control over household matters, the increase in 
women’s bargaining power over this particular set of goods and services could have 
simply been driven by an improvement in their husbands’ employment 
opportunities. 
  Table 3 also reveals some evidence of a decrease in men’s perception of 
safety in gold endowed municipalities during the boom, though there were no 
changes in women’s safety perceptions. The estimated coefficients for men’s fear 
of assault are significant and positive at the 10% level, and show that the gold 
mining boom increased men’s fear of getting assaulted by 2.9 percentage points (or 
10% when compared to the sample mean). This result is plausible, and could 
possibly be explained by the increase in drug-related violence in gold endowed 
municipalities as some Mexican drug cartels reportedly switched into gold 
production, and since mining is still predominantly a male economic sector 
(GIATOC, 2016). Men in gold endowed municipalities are therefore likely to be 
exposed to more dangerous surroundings as a result. Subsequently as expected, the 
baseline regressions show a strong and significant positive correlation between 
men’s fear of assault and the municipal homicide rate. A first-stage regression 
analysis of the relationship between the homicide rate and the interaction term of 
gold prices and endowment, also reveal statistically significant t-statistics (2.86), 
indicating a positive relationship between the gold mining boom and violence.22 
Lastly, these findings also provide evidence of the male-breadwinner stereotype, 
where despite men being more afraid of getting assaulted or attacked during the 
gold mining boom, male employment probabilities still increased, with no 




22 Output is not listed, but available upon request. 
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IV.3 Additional Outcome: Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) 
  Since the state-level ENDIREH data set also contains information on 
women’s experiences of intimate partner violence (IPV), I examine the effect of the 
gold mining boom on several types of gender-based violence as an additional 
outcome in the study. Following Bobonis et al.’s (2013) approach, IPV incidences 
are grouped into the four main categories: physical, sexual and emotional abuse, 
and the threat of violence, with a total of eight questions classified under physical 
violence, three questions under sexual violence, thirteen questions under emotional 
violence, and two questions under the threat of violence.23 For physical and sexual 
violence, I create dichotomous variables equal to one if a woman experienced a 
single incident in the past year. Considering that emotional violence is more likely 
to be subject to personal interpretation, I construct an emotional violence indicator 
equal to one if a woman answered “yes” to one incident, but stated that it happened 
multiple times, or if she answered “yes” to at least two emotional abuse questions. 
Lastly, the threat of violence indicator is equal to unity if a woman answered “yes” 
to at least one threat of violence question.     
  Accordingly, I estimate the same equation in (2), but replace the dependent 
variable with dichotomous indicators of the four different types of IPV. The results 
from the analysis are displayed in Table 4, and show that while women in gold 
endowed states had increased decision-making power at home, they were also more 
likely suffer from all four forms of IPV. Specifically, the benchmark specification 
in column (3) shows that women living in gold endowed states experienced 
approximately 0.9, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points more emotional abuse, threats 
of violence, physical abuse and sexual abuse respectively.24 Compared to the mean 
values during the pre-treatment period before the gold mining boom, these figures 
represent an average increase in all four types of IPV by approximately 3.0% 
(emotional abuse), 3.4% (threats of violence), 3.8% (physical abuse) and 5.5% 
(sexual abuse). In a cross-country study on male-female job opportunities and IPV, 
Bhalotra et al. (2020) documented similar effect sizes of female unemployment on 
the incidence of physical violence. In their paper, a 1% increase in female 
unemployment was associated with a 2.75% and 2.87% increase in physical abuse 
respectively.  
  The positive relationship between the gold mining boom and women’s risk 
of domestic violence could potentially be a result of male psychological stresses 
related to increased levels of fear. As shown in Table 3, the gold mining boom had a 
negative impact on men’s perception of safety, which was likely due to increased 
23 For a detailed breakdown of the specific IPV questions and categorization, see Bobonis et al.’s 
(2013) online appendix: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.5.1.179. In 2003, only 
twenty-nine questions on IPV were asked compared to the 2006 and 2011 survey rounds which had 
thirty IPV questions. I therefore only include the twenty-nine IPV questions from 2003 across all 
survey years to ensure consistency in the IPV measures.
24 According to Cameron et al. (2008), standard errors of the main IPV estimates are likely to be 
underestimated due to the small number of clusters (30 states), which is below the recommended 
benchmark of 40. As a robustness check, I therefore present wild-cluster bootstrapped standard 
errors in Table B6 of the appendix, which show that standard errors increase slightly as expected, 
and estimates remain statistically significant.  
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drug-related crime in mining areas. These findings can therefore be juxtaposed 
against several studies by Angelucci (2008) and Heise and Kotsadam (2015) for 
instance, that underscore psychological stress and trauma as drivers of domestic 
abuse. The rise in female intra-household decision-making power along with a 
concurrent increase in domestic violence is a striking finding, which could also 
possibly be explained by theories on male-backlash. The male-backlash effect, first 
proposed by Macmillan and Gartner (1999) suggests that when a wife experiences an 
increase in her tangible or intangible independence, men may be stimulated to 
perpetrate more violence as a means of “reinstating dominance and authority over his 
wife.” Therefore, in order to emotionally compensate for the increase in women’s 
decision-making power at home despite better employment prospects, men may 
retaliate through various forms of IPV.  
 
  Table 4 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include a 
woman’s rural and indigenous status, age, age squared, length of relationship with her partner, number of children, 
education level, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the introduction of 
domestic violence and divorce laws. Column (1) does not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially 
add baseline controls and time trends interacted with state characteristics like proximity to coast, protected areas,  
presence of ejidos, population density and physio geographic classification (heterogeneous market trends) 
respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Notwithstanding, given that women’s IPV outcomes are from a more spatially 
aggregated analysis (state-level) compared to decision-making outcomes conducted 
at the municipality level, one should remain cautious about attributing the rise in 
women’s IPV risk solely to these mechanisms related to the gold mining boom. 
Because more spatially disaggregated data on IPV in Mexico is not available, it is not 
feasible to check if the mechanisms that happen at a more localized level, like at the 
municipality level in the MxFLS for example, are comparable to those that occur at a 
more aggregated level. Lastly, in order to provide a more detailed breakdown of the 
effect of the gold mining boom on IPV, I create a dummy for each individual question 
on physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse and the threat of violence, and 
The effect of the gold mining boom on intimate partner violence (IPV) (ENDIREH 
data). 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Emotional Abuse 0.002 0.002     0.009*** 0.297 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations (N) 168,787 163,902 163,902  
Threat of Violence   0.001**       0.002**   0.001** 0.029 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,940 186,666 186,666  
Physical Abuse   0.002**     0.002**   0.003** 0.080 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 192,011 186,730 186,730  
Sexual Abuse    0.003***        0.004***    0.004*** 0.073 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,665 186,413 186,413  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
State FE Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
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conduct an analysis analogous to equation (2). Results from the analysis are presented 
in Tables B7, B8, B9 and B10 of the appendix. 
  Next, I examine the impact of the gold mining boom on women’s IPV 
outcomes across various socio-economic groups. Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997), 
Aizer (2010) and Anderberg et al. (2016) found that higher female labour force 
participation and wages is associated with less domestic abuse. Wider educational 
gaps between women and their spouses have also been documented to increase IPV 
risk (Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013; Heath, 2014). Additionally, because rural areas 
may have weaker policing, or have greater proportions of indigenous populations 
where the machismo culture is likely to be stronger, women residing in secluded 
places may also be subject to more IPV. To test for the presence of such 
heterogeneous effects, I divide women from the ENDIREH into three sub-samples 
according to their employment status, education level and rural residential status.25 
Accordingly, I examine the effect of the gold mining boom on each of the three sub-
samples of women by repeating the estimation in equation (2), with the results 
presented in Table 5.  
 
  Table 5 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include 
a woman’s rural and indigenous status, age, age squared, length of relationship with her partner, number of 
children, education level, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the 
introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws. Heterogeneous trends include time trends interacted with 
state characteristics like proximity to coast, protected areas, presence of ejidos, population density and physio 
geographic classification. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
25 Women are considered employed if they had worked at least one hour in the past week. According 
to the INEGI’s definition, women living in localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants are classified 
as rural. Lastly, educated women are defined as those who have completed at least junior high school 
(‘secundaria’), which is Mexico’s basic compulsory education requirement. 
The effect of mining on the incidence of intimate partner violence (IPV) among women 
from low socio-economic classes (ENDIREH data). 
 Unemployed  Rural  Low educated 
Emotional Abuse  0.008*       0.010***  0.008* 
 (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Mean  0.341  0.265  0.296 
Observations (N) 24,888  33,527  105,714 
Threat of Violence   0.004**  -0.002  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Mean  0.040  0.030  0.034 
Observations (N) 27,758  37,430  120,203 
Physical Abuse      0.009***     0.007**     0.004** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Mean  0.109  0.083  0.084 
Observations (N) 27,777  37,435  120,234 
Sexual Abuse    0.008***  0.002      0.007*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Mean dep. var 0.096  0.081  0.087 
Observations (N) 27,660  37,372  120,027 
Baseline controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Heterogeneous trends Yes  Yes  
State FE Yes  Yes  
Survey year FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
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The findings show that the indicator for physical violence is positive and significant 
for all three sub-samples of women, where the probability of physical abuse is 
approximately 0.9, 0.7 and 0.4 percentage points (8.3%, 8.4% and 4.8% in 
comparison to the mean) higher for unemployed, rural women, and low educated 
women respectively. In addition, the results reveal that women from lower socio-
economic classes were also more likely to experience emotional abuse with 
estimated coefficients significant and positive across the three difference groups of 
women (0.8, 1 and 0.8 percentage points for unemployed, rural and low educated 
women respectively). Overall, less educated and unemployed women appear to 
suffer more from sexual abuse, facing an increase in the probability of this type of 
abuse by about 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points. Since a woman’s employment 
however, is likely to be endogenous to the explanatory mining boom variable, the 
estimates for unemployed (and employed) women should be interpreted with 
caution.   
  In a subsequent analysis, I estimate the impact of the mining boom on 
women from upper socio-economic classes: those who are employed, live in urban 
areas and are relatively more educated. The results in Table 6 demonstrate that 
compared to poorer women, the positive gold mining shock did not have any impact 
on the probability of physical abuse for women from upper socio-economic classes. 
In particular, the coefficients for the physical abuse indicator across all three sub-
sampled of women are statistically insignificant and close to zero. Women who are 
more well-off however, appear to suffer more from emotional abuse and threats of 
violence than poorer women. The results show that employed, urban and high 
educated women experienced a 0.8, 0.7 and 1.2 percentage point (2.9%, 2.3% and 
4% respectively when compared to the mean) increase in their likelihood of 
emotional abuse, and urban and high educated women were subject to 0.2 and 0.3 
percentage points (6.9% and 12.5% respectively) more threats of violence from 
their partners respectively. The findings also indicate that urban women are more 
likely to suffer from sexual abuse than employed and high educated women, with a 
0.4 percentage point (5.6%) increase in their probability of experiencing this type 
of IPV.  
  To explain why poorer women may be more susceptible to harder forms 
of IPV like physical abuse, I draw from a pioneering study by Gelles (1976) which 
showed that women who had fewer financial resources were less likely to leave an 
abusive relationship. Given that poorer women may be more hesitant to report 
domestic violence or file for divorce due to their lower income earning potential, 
and hence greater reliance on their husbands’ incomes, men with partners from 
lower socio-economic classes may be less wary about exhibiting harder types of 
IPV like physical or sexual abuse. On the other hand, women from upper socio-
economic classes may be more likely to report domestic violence or file for divorce 
in cases of wife abuse, given their greater economic independence and earning 
potential. Partners of women from higher socio-economic classes may thus commit 





Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include a 
woman’s rural and indigenous status, age, age squared, length of relationship with her partner, number of 
children, education level, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the 
introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws. Heterogeneous trends include time trends interacted with 
state characteristics like proximity to coast, protected areas, presence of ejidos, population density and physio 
geographic classification. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
IV.4a Robustness: Sensitivity Analyses and Alternative Measures of DMP 
 To further probe the robustness of the main results, I use an alternative 
empirical model to examine the effect of the gold mining boom on female decision-
making power. Specifically, I estimate a multinomial logit fixed effects model 
where the decision-making power indicator is a categorical dependent variable 
ranging from 1 to 3, with the same covariates and fixed effects as in equation (1). 
For instance, if a woman responds that she was the sole decision-maker of that 
particular good category, it is assigned a value of 3 (woman has full power in 
decision-making). If the decision was jointly made with her husband, the category 
is assigned a value of 2, and if the decision was made solely by her husband, the 
category is assigned a value of 1 (indicating that the woman had no bargaining 
power over that good at all). Accordingly, the results from the analysis are presented 
in Table B11 of the appendix, which show qualitatively similar results as Table 1. 
Using value 3 (woman has full decision-making power) as the base comparison 
category, the findings indicate that with a unit increase in the decision-making 
power over the money given to a woman’s spouse’s parents ceteris paribus, the 
logarithm of the probability that the husband makes the full decision (decision is 
jointly made) in this category relative to the wife making the full decision in this 
category decreases by 0.246 (0.248). Equivalently, decision-making over food 
expenditures is only statistically significant for the joint decision-making category 
The effect of mining on the incidence of intimate partner violence (IPV) among women 
from upper socio-economic classes (ENDIREH data). 
 Employed  Urban  High educated 
Emotional Abuse     0.008***     0.007***   0.012*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Mean dep. var 0.275  0.306  0.298 
Observations (N) 123,484  130,375  58,607 
Threat of Violence -0.000     0.002***    0.003** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Mean dep. var 0.024  0.029  0.024 
Observations (N) 141,539  149,236  66,918 
Physical Abuse -0.001  0.001  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Mean dep. var 0.065  0.078  0.074 
Observations (N) 141,581  149,295  66,951 
Sexual Abuse 0.002       0.004***  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Mean dep. var 0.061  0.071  0.057 
Observations (N) 141,386  149,041  66,837 
Baseline controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes Heterogeneous trends Yes  Yes  
State FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Survey Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
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and shows that the odds of the decision being made jointly in this category versus 
the decision being made fully by the wife decreases by 0.088. Coefficient estimates 
are not significant for other categories of goods and services. In essence, the results 
point to the same baseline conclusion that women living in gold endowed 
municipalities were more likely to partake in intra-household decision-making 
processes compared to those that did not.  
  As an additional robustness check, I conduct a series of sensitivity analyses 
on the main female decision-making power estimates presented in Table 1. First, I 
omit municipalities in three Northern states: Oaxaca, Chihuahua and Durango where 
gold mining activity is the most prominent (see Figure B) to ensure that the main 
results are not driven by mining intensive states in this region of Mexico’s 
geographical landscape. Altogether, the results presented in Table 7 show that the 
baseline estimate in column (3) of Table 1 increases by 0.002 to 0.007 compared to 
the main estimate of 0.005, with coefficients remaining significant at the 5% level. 
Next, I exclude municipalities with high levels of violence, specifically those in the 
75th percentile according to the homicide rate. I do so to check if more violent 
municipalities downward biased the main female decision-making power estimates 
given the positive correlation between gold mining and drug-related violence, and 
subsequently, the documented negative effect of violence on women’s intra-
household bargaining power (see Tsaneva et al., 2018). The results from this analysis 
provide some indication that the main coefficient of a woman’s decision-making 
power in Table 1 is underestimated, as excluding violent municipalities increases the 
estimated coefficient by 0.001 when compared to the baseline estimate of 0.005. This 
therefore suggests that in the absence of the confounding drug war, women residing 
in gold endowed municipalities would have had higher intra-household decision-
making power than reported in Table 1.  
  In a following robustness check, I include the interaction term of homicide 
rates, gold endowment and world gold prices. Albeit the movement of drug cartels 
into gold mining reportedly only intensified from 2012 onwards according to 
GIATOC (2016), one cannot rule out that the spike in gold mining opportunities 
during the sample period prior to 2012, was also accompanied by an increase in drug-
related crime. Since excluding violent municipalities increases the main decision-
making power estimate, and given the evidence presented in Table 3 reflecting 
decreased perceptions of safety among men in the MxFLS, it is important to account 
for the possible conflicting impact that drug-related violence could have had on 
female intra-household bargaining outcomes during the gold mining boom. 
Subsequently, Table 7 shows that the inclusion of the interaction term of drug-related 
crime proxied by homicide rates with gold endowment and price, decreases the 
statistical significance of the main estimate to the 10% level. The estimated 
coefficient of a woman’s overall mean decision-making power index also decreases, 
though minimally by 0.001 compared to the main coefficient of 0.005. Taken 
together, this indicates that the relationship between drug-related crime and the gold 
mining boom in Mexico was not likely to have affected female decision-making 
power outcomes significantly, at least during the sample period of the study. In 
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addition, a number of papers namely by Brown et al. (2017), Ajzenman et al. (2015) 
and Velásquez (2010) have reaffirmed that differences in the economic impact of the 
global financial crisis were uncorrelated with differences in homicide growth rates 
across municipalities in Mexico.  
 
 Table 7 
Sensitivity analysis of effect of the gold mining boom on female decision-making power 
(overall) (MxFLS data). 
Dependent Variable: Woman’s decision-making power (overall) 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Exclude northern  0.001 0.004    0.007** 0.539 
municipalities (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  
Observations (N) 9,225 9,107 8,020  
Exclude violent municipalities  0.003*    0.004***    0.006** 0.540 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  
Observations (N) 7,580 7,501 6,763  
HR*Gendowment*Price 0.000 0.001  0.004* 0.541 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)  
Observations (N) 10,462 10,330 9,123  
World export value of gold 0.013* 0.012*  0.016* 0.548 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  
Observations (N) 7,786 5,078 4,664  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  
Month FE Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls 
include a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her 
spouse during the interview, and municipality covariates like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the 
introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws. Column (1) does not include any controls, and columns (2), 
(3) sequentially add baseline controls and time trends interacted with municipal characteristics such as rural-
urban status, transport network quality, community quality and the presence of ejidos (heterogeneous market 
trends) respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
  As a final robustness test, I replace global gold prices with the world value 
of gold exports less Mexico, with data provided by the International Trade Centre 
(ITC). Because the value of women’s assets increases along with the rising global 
gold prices if they possess gold jewellery for instance, this would improve their 
outside option, which could subsequently increase their intra-household decision-
making power as predicted by non-unitary household bargaining models. The ITC 
however, only supplies trade data containing information on each country’s export 
value of gold from 2004 to present. As such, it is not feasible to use all three waves 
of the MxFLS for this analysis as no available data exists for the first wave conducted 
in 2002. Accordingly, I utilize two waves of the MxFLS conducted in 2005-2006 and 
2009-2010, and match individuals’ month and year of interview to the world value of 
gold exports. Results from estimating an analogous regression to equation (1), 
replacing world gold prices with the world value of gold exports less Mexico is shown 
in Table 7. The estimates support the basic conclusion that women residing in gold 
endowed municipalities experienced increases in their decision-making power. 
Coefficients are nonetheless evidently larger, reflecting an increase of 0.011, up from 
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the main estimate of 0.005, which could possibly be explained by the different sample 
and time frame analysed.   
 
IV.4b Robustness: Parallel Trends 
  The difference-in-differences estimation method hinges on the assumption 
that in the absence of the gold mining boom, the decision-making outcomes for 
women in the treatment group (those living in gold endowed municipalities), and 
women in the control group (women who do not live in gold mining municipalities) 
follow parallel trends. Accordingly, I plot the average decision-making power index 
of women in both groups across all three MxFLS survey waves in Figure C. The 
graph provides some support for the common trends assumption required for a 
difference-in-differences analysis as it indicates that trends in women’s average 
decision-making power index for both the treatment and control group were on 
similar paths during the pre-gold mining boom period (wave 1 to 2). Moreover, 
Figure C shows a divergence in women’s decision-making power trends between 
the treatment and control group during the gold mining boom (wave 2 to 3), with 
women in the treated (control) group experiencing higher (lower) average decision-
making power during this time period. This observation is consistent with the main 
estimates presented in Table 1, showing that women who resided in gold endowed 
municipalities experienced higher decision-making power at home. 
 
 
Figure C. Trends in women’s mean decision-making power (DMP) index in the MxFLS across three 
survey waves (2002, 2005-2006, 2009-2010). Notes: This figure plots pre- (before the gold mining 
boom) and post- (during the gold mining boom) trends of women’s average decision-making power 
indices across all three MxFLS waves. The blue (red) line denotes the treatment (control) group.  
 
V. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
  How accurate are theories that postulate a decrease in female decision-
making power during booms in male-dominated sectors like gold mining? One 
existing study by Tolonen (2018) which focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, has yet to 
discover any effects of gold mining on women’s intra-household decision-making 
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outcomes. Using Mexico’s gold mining boom which was stimulated by the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis as an exogenous event, I show that women residing in 
gold endowed municipalities experienced small but statistically significant 
increases in their average decision-making power over a set of goods and services, 
against the theoretical predictions by non-unitary household bargaining models. 
The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneous market trends, an alternative 
decision-making power index, various sensitivity analyses, and are consistent with 
findings from a separate state-level survey (ENDIREH) containing similar 
questionnaires on spousal decision-making.  
  The rise in female decision-making authority is likely to have been driven 
by the increase in male employment during the gold mining boom, but not female 
employment as no changes in female employment probabilities were observed. 
These findings are consistent with unitary household bargaining models, which 
predict that regardless of how much each individual contributes to household 
income, the outcomes of household decisions only depend on the aggregate 
household wealth. The results also provide support for the income pooling 
assumption of the unitary household bargaining framework, as women still 
experienced increases in their decision-making power, particularly over household 
goods like food expenditures for instance, despite not working more. This indicates 
that financial gains from the increase in male employment was likely to have been 
allocated to household expenditures, which women have traditionally been more 
responsible for. This finding carries important implications for poverty alleviation 
initiatives like cash-transfer programs for instance, as it implies that the outcomes 
are independent of the recipient of the transfer.  
  Using an alternative state-level data set (ENDIREH) containing 
information on women’s IPV experiences, I additionally find that although women 
living in gold endowed states experienced higher intra-household bargaining 
power, they were also more likely to suffer from four different types (physical, 
sexual, and emotional abuse, and threats of violence) of IPV. Particularly, poorer 
women were more susceptible to hard forms of IPV like physical abuse, and more 
well-off women suffered from softer forms of IPV like threats of violence and 
emotional abuse. These findings could possibly be attributed to various factors such 
as men’s heightened fear of assault and psychological stress possibly due to drug-
related crime in gold mining areas, differences in poor and rich women’s responses 
and acceptance towards domestic violence and the male-backlash effect. A 
limitation of the data on IPV however, is that location information which is only 
available at the state-level is not as disaggregated as that of the MxFLS panel which 
contains municipality data. Therefore, since the regression for IPV outcomes is not 
as tightly controlled as those for decision-making power using the MxFLS, caution 
is required when attributing any effects on IPV solely to the gold mining boom. 
Nonetheless, since the ENDIREH is the only Mexican survey that has extensively 
surveyed women across the country about their IPV experiences, the results 
arguably still shed some light, more broadly, on the effects of changing economic 
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conditions on women’s probability of IPV in the context of a Latin American 
country like Mexico.   
  From a policy perspective, this study underscores the need for more work 
in altering social and gender norms to accommodate increases in intra-household 
female decision-making power. In particular, it is important for gender 
mainstreaming efforts to specifically target the balancing of male psychological and 
emotional shifts along with increases in both tangible and intangible aspects of 
female empowerment. For instance, efforts should focus on providing more 
counselling services for men facing stressful periods, and in mitigating the male-
backlash effect where men’s authority may come under threat. Doing so could help 
to ensure that an increase in a woman’s bargaining power would not be 
accompanied by more IPV as demonstrated in this study.  
  More generally, this paper highlights the importance of investing more in 
women shelters rather than substitute them with policies that may backfire, such as 
giving cash to victims of domestic violence (The Michoacan State Congress, 2019). 
Since economic booms in male-dominated sectors like mining women could 
generate more IPV, governments should focus on the provision of shelters in areas 
where women are more susceptible to domestic violence. Policy-makers should also 
encourage female employment during economic booms in male-dominated sectors. 
This paper shows that a gold mining boom in Mexico did not increase female 
employment, and that an increase in a woman’s intra-household decision-making 
power was likely to be driven by an increase male employment probability. In order 
to encourage and support female labour force participation during economic booms 
in male-dominated industries like mining for example, governments should 
consider cooperating closely with mining companies that operate in local 
communities. Newmont Goldcorp for instance, a Canadian mining company in 
Mexico set up an economic development program providing local SMEs with seed 
money to increase revenue. Such programs reduce tensions between rural 
communities and mining corporations by helping to stimulate local economies and 
improving the livelihoods of women, who are typically the owners of local SMEs. 
  What is the external validity of the results presented in this study? Due to 
socio-cultural differences, the findings from this paper may be more generalizable 
to mineral-rich countries in Latin America such as Colombia, Peru, Argentina, 
Brazil and Ecuador, rather than Africa, where little evidence of the impact of mining 
on female bargaining power and IPV was found (Kotsadam et al., 2016; Tolonen, 
2018). It may also be interesting for future research to examine the heterogeneous 
effects of different mining minerals on the various female welfare outcomes 
explored in this study. For example, oil extraction could have different effects on 
women’s intra-household well-being if the underlying mechanisms are distinct 








Appendix A: Figures  
 
 
Figure A1. Trends in the number of employees in gold mining, by gender. Notes: This diagram 
shows the trends in the number of male (blue) and female (red) employees hired in gold mining 
between 1999 and 2014. Data is from the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 
and is only available for the years 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 as the economic census is only 
conducted once every five years. 
 
 
Figure A2. Trends in world silver prices and Mexican silver production. Notes: This diagram shows 
the relationship between world silver prices and the production of silver in Mexico between 2001 
and 2011. Each point is the logged value of prices or production. The blue (red) line denotes 
production (price). Data on Mexico’s silver production come from the National Institute for Statistics 
and Geography (INEGI), and data on world silver prices is from the London Metal Exchange’s 





Figure A3. MxFLS questionnaire on decision-making. Notes: This diagram shows a sample of the 
decision-making questionnaire of the MxFLS survey. In total, twelve decision-making questions 
(‘A’ to ‘L’) are administered to both a woman and her partner. The decision-making questionnaire 




Figure A4. Coefficient plot for a woman’s relative decision-making power (DMP). Notes: This 
figure plots the coefficients of the regression of a woman’s decision-making power index on the lag 
of gold prices (t = 1, 2,..,6). The orange ‘x’ denotes the highest coefficient value at t-5, and shows a 














Appendix B: Tables   
 
  Table B1 
Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables. 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Dependent Variable – Woman’s average decision-making power (DMP) over all 
goods: 
Mean DMP index 
(MxFLS data) 
0.5 0.13 0 1 10,470 
Mean DMP index 
(ENDIREH data) 
0.7 0.21 0 1 191,768 
Dependent Variables – Woman’s decision-making power over (individual decisions) 
(MxFLS data): 
Contraceptive use 0.5 0.3 0 1 7,992 
Spouse’s work choice 0.2 0.3 0 1 10,397 
Own work choice 0.6 0.4 0 1 10,369 
Money given to spouse’s 
family 
0.3 0.3 0 1 7,833 
Money given to own 
family  
0.5 0.4 0 1 7,927 
Large expenditures 0.4 0.3 0 1 10,295 
Child’s health 0.5 0.3 0 1 8,668 
Child’s education 0.5 0.3 0 1 8,469 
Child’s clothes 0.6 0.4 0 1 7,192 
Spouse’s clothes 0.3 0.4 0 1 10,409 
Own clothes 0.8 0.3 0 1 10,430 
Food eaten in the house 0.8 0.3 0 1 10,388 
Other Dependent Variables (MxFLS data):  
Male employment 0.8 0.4 0 1 8,964 
Female employment 0.2 0.4 0 1 10,478 
Male fear of assault  0.3 0.5 0 1 9,069 
Female fear of assault 0.4 0.5 0 1 10,478 
IPV outcomes (ENDIREH data):  
Emotional Abuse 0.3 0.5 0 1 168,787 
Physical Abuse 0.1 0.3 0 1 192,011 
Sexual Abuse 0.1 0.2 0 1 191,665 
Threat of Violence  0.0 0.2 0 1 191,940 
Notes: Summary statistics of dependent variables. The number of observations (N) for decision-making power 
questions vary, since not all women in the sample have children, and some decisions are neither made by the 
husband or the wife.  
 Table B2 
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables. 
Independent Variables (MxFLS data):  
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Indigenous 0.1 0.3 0 1 10,478 
Presence of spouse during 
interview  
0.1 0.3 0 1 10,455 
Age 43.6 12.9 15 101 7,990 
Age squared 2,074 1,253 225 10,201 7,990 
Years of education 9.6 4.3 0 22 10,466 
Number of children 1.6 1.5 0 9 10,478 
Homicide rate 0.5 0.6 0 3.4 10,478 
Assist Law 0.7 0.4 0 1 10,478 
Divorce law 0.7 0.5 0 1 10,478 
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Penal Code 0.9 0.3 0 1 10,478 
Independent Variables (ENDIREH data): 
Rural status 0.2 0.4 0 1 192,055 
Indigenous  0.1 0.2 0 1 191,711 
Age 40.9 13.8 15 104 191,849 
Age squared 1860.1 1253.3 225 108,816 191,849 
Length of relationship 21.3 14.0 1 83 189,142 
Number of children 3.3 2.3 0 25 190,410 
Homicide rate 15.9 19.4 2.0 130.6 192,055 
Assist Law 0.8 0.4 0 1 192,061 
Divorce law 0.8 0.4 0 1 192,061 
Penal Code 0.9 0.3 0 1 192,061 
Notes: Summary statistics of independent variables. 
 
 Table B3 
The effect of the gold mining boom on female decision-making power (other goods and 
services) (MxFLS data).  
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Normalized DMP (individual goods):     
Own clothes -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.829 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)  
Observations (N) 10,419 10,288 9,087  
Spouse’s clothes -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.538 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)  
Observations (N) 7,125 7,025 6,144  
Child’s clothes 0.000 0.005  0.003 0.461 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)  
Observations (N) 5,880 5,819 5,092  
Child’s education 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.516 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)  
Observations (N) 7,779 7,692 6,774  
Child’s health  0.003 0.003 0.007 0.534 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)  
Observations (N) 8,049 7,954 7,014  
Spouse’s work choice -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 0.208 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)  
Observations (N) 10,389 10,258 9,053  
Own work choice 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.594 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Observations (N) 10,358 10,228 9,026  
Money given to spouse’s parents -0.003 0.000 0.008 0.292 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)  
Observations (N) 7,000 6,903 6,029  
Household expenditures 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.386 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  
Observations (N) 10,266 10,135 8,953  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  
Month FE Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls 
include a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her 
spouse during the interview, and municipality covariates like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the 
introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws. Column (1) does not include any controls, and columns 
(2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and time trends interacted with municipal characteristics such as 
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rural-urban status, transport network quality, community quality and the presence of ejidos (heterogeneous 
market trends) respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
Table B4 
Descriptive Statistics: ENDIREH survey 
          𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 1  (T)       𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 0  (C) 
Individual Covariates: 
Rural           0.196      0.229 
Indigenous           0.059      0.092 
Length of 
relationship 
          21.439      20.708 
Age            41.072      39.875 
Age squared            1877.746      1769.333 
Number of kids           3.181     3.624 
Education level           3.579     4.145 
State Covariates: 
Homicide rate           17.366     8.728 
Assist law           0.867     0.589 
Divorce law           0.861     0.518 
Penal Code           0.894     0.822 
Observations           160,750     31,305 
Notes: ‘T’ represents the treated group belonging to the 2006 and 2011 ENDIREH survey and ‘C’ represents the 
control group surveyed in 2003. The table reports mean values for each covariate and group.  
 
 Table B5 
The effect of the gold mining boom on female decision-making power (other goods and 
services) (ENDIREH data).  
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Normalized DMP (individual goods):     
Own work choice 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.829 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  
Observations (N) 171,794 169,236 167,236  
Expenditures on own goods 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.538 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Observations (N) 187,334 182,193 182,193  
Children’s goods 0.001  0.002*  0.001 0.461 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Observations (N) 162,143 158,935 158,935  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  
Month FE Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls 
include a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her 
spouse during the interview, and state controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Column (1) does 
not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and heterogeneous market trends 
respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0. 
 
   Table B6 
The effect of the gold mining boom on intimate partner violence (IPV) with wild-
cluster bootstrapped standard errors (ENDIREH data). 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Emotional Abuse 0.002 0.002    0.007** 0.297 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.008] 
Observations (N) 168,787 163,902 163,902  
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Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include 
a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her spouse 
during the interview, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Column (1) does 
not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and heterogeneous market 
trends respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
Table B7 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include 
a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her spouse 
during the interview, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Column (1) does 
not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and heterogeneous market 
trends respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
  Table B8 
Threat of Violence   0.001**       0.001**  0.001* 0.029 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Observations (N) 191,940 186,666 186,666  
Physical Abuse   0.002**     0.002**   0.003** 0.080 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
Observations (N) 192,011 186,730 186,730  
Sexual Abuse    0.003***       0.003**    0.004*** 0.073 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Observations (N) 191,665 186,413 186,413  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
State FE Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
The effect of mining on the incidence of physical intimate partner violence (IPV) 
(ENDIREH data). 
Physical abuse (individual questions):  
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Pushed you/   0.001**   0.001* 0.002 0.061 
Pulled your hair (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,999 186,720 186,720  
Tied you up  -0.000*  -0.000** -0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations (N) 191,961 186,684 186,684  
Kicked you   0.001**    0.001** 0.001 0.019 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,976 186,698 186,698  
Hit you with his hands    0.003***    0.003***   0.002** 0.047 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,979 186,702 186,702  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
State FE Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
The effect of mining on the incidence of sexual intimate partner violence (IPV) 
(ENDIREH data). 
Sexual abuse (individual questions): 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Forced sexual relations   0.001**   0.002** 0.001* 0.022 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations (N) 191,607 186,359 186,359  
Demand sex  0.003***  0.003** 0.004*** 0.069 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include 
a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her spouse 
during the interview, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Column (1) does 
not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and heterogeneous market 
trends respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
 Table B9 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include 
a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her spouse 
during the interview, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Column (1) does 
not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and heterogeneous market 
trends respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
   Table B10 
Observations (N) 191,648 186,397 186,397  
Used force to have sex   0.002***   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.023 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations (N) 191,530 186,287 186,287  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
State FE Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
The effect of mining on the incidence of the threat of violence (IPV) (ENDIREH data). 
Threat of violence (individual questions): 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Threatened with    0.001**  0.001*  0.001* 0.014 
weapon (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations (N) 191,958 186,684 186,684  
Threatened to kill you   0.001**   0.001** 0.001 0.025 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,943 186,668 186,668  
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  
Heterogeneous trends No No Yes  
State FE Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
The effect of mining on the incidence of the emotional intimate partner violence (IPV) 
(ENDIREH data). 
Emotional abuse (individual questions): 
 (1) (2) (3) Mean 
Destroyed things in   0.002**   0.002**   0.002** 0.046 
house (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,965 186,692 186,692  
Threatened to leave   0.002**   0.002**   0.002** 0.087 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,973 186,700 186,700  
Not allowed to leave 0.000 0.000  0.001* 0.036 
home (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations (N) 191,967 186,964 186,964  
Accused you of 0.001 0.001   0.003** 0.069 
cheating (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations (N) 191,940 186,667 186,667  
Made you feel fearful    0.003***    0.003***   0.002** 0.082 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Observations (N) 191,954 186,681 186,681  
Ignored you   0.003**   0.003** 0.003 0.096 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  
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Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls include 
a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her spouse 
during the interview, and state-level controls like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Column (1) does 
not include any controls, and columns (2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and heterogeneous market 
trends respectively. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p <0.1. 
 
 Table B11 
The effect of mining on female decision-making power (multinomial logit), with full 
decision-making power as the base category (MxFLS data). 
 Husband makes full decision  Joint decision-making  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Decision-making power over: 
Food Expenditures  -0.089 -0.068 -0.084  -0.063* -0.064* -0.088** 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.099)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.041) 
Observations (N) 5,504 5,429 4,786  5,504 5,429 4,786 
Money to spouse’s -0.232** -0.246** -0.246*  -0.206** -0.216** -0.248* 
parents (0.102) (0.104) (0.130)  (0.102) (0.103) (0.129) 
Observations (N) 3,784 3,733 3,276  3,784 3,733 3,276 
Baseline controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Heterogeneous  No No Yes  No No Yes 
trends  
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses (.). Baseline controls 
include a woman’s age, age squared, indigenous status, education level, number of children, the presence of her 
spouse during the interview, and municipality covariates like the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the 
introduction of domestic violence and divorce laws. Column (1) does not include any controls, and columns 
(2), (3) sequentially add baseline controls and time trends interacted with municipal characteristics such as 
rural-urban status, transport network quality, community quality and the presence of ejidos (heterogeneous 
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This paper examines the effect of violent living conditions on various forms of 
female empowerment in Mexico. Exploiting the exogenous rise in homicides 
between 2007 and 2011 as a source of variation and proxy for unsafe surroundings, 
the findings suggest that violence hampers women’s intra-household bargaining 
power, employment, mobility and emotional and mental well-being. Higher 
homicide rates also appear to have a weaker impact on poorer women’s labor supply 
even though these women remain fearful amidst increasingly homicidal 
surroundings, indicating a trade-off between income and emotional stability among 
those who are financially constrained. The negative effects of the drug war are also 
more salient among women who live in relatively more dangerous municipalities 
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The impact of violent living conditions on female welfare has not been 
widely explored in economic literature. Yet at present, there are approximately 45 
civil wars going on across the globe, with 10 out of these 45-armed conflicts 
resulting in over 1,000 fatalities. Using the Mexican Drug War as a natural 
experiment, this paper endeavours to shed more light on the effects of a violent 
milieu on various forms of female empowerment such as intra-household decision-
making power, employment, mobility, social capital and emotional well-being. In 
order to guide gender mainstreaming and gender equality efforts, understanding the 
consequences of violence on women’s welfare is imperative. 
From a theoretical perspective, non-unitary household bargaining models 
predict that external shift parameters such as the conditions of a woman’s living 
environment are key determinants of her bargaining power.1 These external 
environmental factors termed as ‘outside options’ affect the threat point in a 
marriage or domestic partnership, and are a function of an individual’s decision-
making authority (Lommerud 2003; Lundberg and Pollak 1994, McElroy and 
Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980). Non-unitary household bargaining models 
therefore hypothesize that changes in a wife’s outside option are sufficient to alter 
her aggregate bargaining power within the household. Studies by Chakraborty et al. 
(2018) and Siddique (2018) additionally suggest a negative relationship between 
violence and female labor force participation, especially when the opportunity cost 
of being unemployed is low. For example, married women living in violent 
environments may be incentivized to decrease their work effort if partners are 
willing to increase their workload to make up for the loss in aggregate household 
income through their wives’ lower labor force participation. The opposite may be 
true however, for women heading single-parent households as the economic trade-
offs of being unemployed are higher.  
More recent studies have also found evidence of a negative association 
between violence and women’s mobility. In the state of Bihar in India, 
Muralidharan and Prakash (2017) documented an increase in girls’ school 
enrolment due to a ‘Cycle program’ which provided girls with bicycles that 
subsequently enhanced safety. This case study indicates that in places like India 
where incidences of sexual assault and rape are generally higher, a dearth of safety 
on travel routes may hamper female labor force participation in the long run through 
poorer educational outcomes of girls. Sociological and economic literature has also 
highlighted trust as an important component of social capital, which has been shown 
to increase economic growth and investments in human capital through increases 
in employment (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
1 This study follows the framework of a non-unitary instead of unitary household bargaining model. 
A considerable number of empirical studies have not found support for unitary household models 
across different countries and contexts. On theoretical grounds, unitary household bargaining models 
have been criticized for their over-simplicity and inconsistency with real life data (Bobonis 2009; 
Browning and Chiappori 2006; Lundberg and Pollak 1994). 
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Coleman 1988). Particularly in developing and middle-income countries like 
Mexico with larger informal labor markets (about 60% of the population is in 
informal work), women may rely more on social capital for employment. Especially 
given the existing evidence of suppressed levels of trust during civil war and 
conflict, uncovering the relationship between female employment and lower trust 
levels (and hence lower stock of social capital) as a result of violence is important 
(Friebel et al. 2013; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). Lastly, violent environments 
may exacerbate female welfare outcomes as women have been found to suffer 
disproportionately more from mental and emotional distress during warfare as 
compared to men, further undermining their capabilities to partake in income-
generating activities (Dyregrov et al. 2000; Kuterovac et al.1994).  
In December 2006, the newly elected Mexican President Felipe Calderón, 
initiated Mexico’s war on drugs. This event entailed a massive deployment of army 
troops to combat drug cartels operating across the nation. Within two months of the 
government’s crackdown on drugs, nearly 20,000 military personnel were involved 
in operations aimed at curbing the country’s rampant drug trafficking activities. To 
date, one of the biggest costs of this intensive drug war has been human. According 
to the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the number of homicides between 
2007 and 2012 was about 40 percent higher than it would have been without the 
drug war (IEP, 2013). Specifically, the number of intentional homicides rose 
alarmingly from 8,800 in 2007 to approximately 27,000 in 2011.2 Accordingly, 
Figure A illustrates trends in intentional homicides between 1990 and 2011, and 
shows a sharp increase in the total number of homicides across the country starting 
in 2007 right after president Felipe Calderón took office at the end of 2006. The 
significant increase in the number of murders could be attributed to violent attacks 
on civilians by drug cartels in the initial years at the beginning of the drug war, but 
later resulted from clashes between the Mexican military and organized crime 
groups involved in drug trafficking. In total, the estimated economic costs 
associated with violence containment in Mexico amounted to approximately 4.4 
trillion pesos in 2012, enough to provide each Mexican citizen with 37,000 pesos 
(US$3,000), about twice the amount the government invests in health and education 
per individual. The IEP further calculated that the productivity loss per person 
during the period of intense violence was approximately 35 million pesos (US$2.6 
million). Putting these figures into perspective, the total amount of revenue 
generated from illegal drug trade ranged between 154 and 548 billion pesos 
(US$14.1 billion to US$50.3 billion) in 2013, while the number of additional lives 
lost due to the drug war in 2012 was 11,006, amounting to a cost of about US$29 
billion (IEP, 2013). Considering that this value is more than half of the average 
revenue gained through drug trading activities, the net welfare loss to the Mexican 
2 The distinction between intentional and unintentional homicides is important as unintentional 
homicides often result from accidental events that are unrelated to the drug war. Including 
unintentional homicides may add more noise in the data which could cloud the true effect of violent 
conditions on a woman’s relative decision-making power. 
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society is likely to have outweighed the benefits due to the negative spill over 
effects of this national conflict that are challenging to quantify.  
 
    
Figure A. Annual data on intentional homicides, National Institute for Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI). 
 
This study exploits a conceivably exogenous rise in the homicide rate 
between 2007 and 2011 during the Mexican Drug War, to analyse the impact of 
violent and precarious living conditions on various forms of female empowerment. 
Prior to President Felipe Calderón who was part of the National Action Party 
(PAN), the Mexican government typically took a passive stance on combating drug 
cartels in the 1980s through to the early 2000s. Using panel data from three waves 
of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), I track changes in a woman’s welfare 
over time as a result of higher homicide rates used as a proxy for violent living 
conditions. The choice of homicides as an indicator for dangerous living conditions 
is motivated by the fact that homicide rate data is least subject to under-reporting 
compared to other drug-related crimes, and provides a clear source of variation as 
a result of President Felipe Calderón’s plausibly unsystematic initiation of the drug 
war at the end of 2006. The MxFLS also provides a rich amount of both individual 
and household level information and allows for the inclusion of individual fixed 
effects to remove any unobserved individual heterogeneity that could be correlated 
with a woman’s welfare outcomes. This is especially advantageous given the nature 
of this study as individual decision-making behaviour for instance, could vary 
greatly across women due to latent individual traits.  
Altogether, the results from this study reveal lower female decision-making 
power over one specific set of goods and services which is that of their children’s, 
as a result of higher homicide rates. The findings also show that higher levels of 
violence are associated with poorer female employment outcomes, lower mobility 
and greater community distrust. Consistent with Siddique’s (2018) findings on 
India, I observe however, that violence had a weaker effect on economically 
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disadvantaged women in Mexico who may still have had to participate in the labor 
market despite increasingly precarious environments. The negative effects of 
violence on female welfare also appear to be stronger among women living in ‘high-
risk’ municipalities that were predisposed to more violence, and those who had 
previously been assaulted.  
The relevance of this study relates to the fact that many countries are still 
currently plagued with strife or are threatened by potential conflict. Understanding 
the way unsafe living conditions affect spousal intra-household dynamics is thus 
essential for streamlining protection efforts of women and children during 
vulnerable times. Building on previous literature that similarly adopt non-unitary 
household bargaining models, this paper would be one of the first to classify and 
examine external living conditions as an outside option or shift parameter of a 
woman’s bargaining power. Subsequently, it also sheds light on the trickle-down 
effect of weaker female decision-making power on children’s well-being. The lack 
of access to justice for women in Mexico provides another source of motivation for 
improving female welfare. Notwithstanding the implementation of the General Law 
of Access for Women to a Life Free of Violence (GLAWLFV) in 2007, Mexico has 
experienced a steady climb in the number of femicides since 2007 (Mexican 
Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, CMPDPH, 2012).3 
According to the CMPDPH and UN Women, the country still lags behind in 
normalizing the GLAWLFV across states and many women remain discriminated 
against while attempting to access the legal judicial system. In a milieu plagued 
with intense violence and conflict, it is thus increasingly important to enhance 
women’s safety considering their susceptibility to dangerous surroundings. 
Consequently, this paper strives to elucidate the need for greater protection of 
women within the Mexican society, by providing empirical evidence of the 
relationship between unsafe living environments and various facets of female 
empowerment.  
In what follows, Section II provides some background detail and related 
literature on the topic of violence, female well-being and the Mexican Drug War. 
Section III describes the data used to analyse the association between homicides 
and the various female welfare outcomes aforementioned, and Section IV explains 
the empirical strategy employed. Section V provides a detailed interpretation and 
analysis of the results, performs a series of robustness checks and explores 
heterogeneous impacts. Section VI finally concludes. 
 
II. Background and Related Literature 
 
II.1 The Mexican Drug War 
3 Femicides is a term used to describe gender-based murders that occur as a result of being a woman. 
Homicide rate data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) does not permit 
the segregation of femicides from non-femicides during the period of the MxFLS as information on 
the exact motivation behind killings is not provided. 
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Throughout the 1980s up till the mid-2000s, Mexico had remained relatively 
static in combating illegal drug trading activities. As a consequence, drug-related 
crimes such as homicides, car thefts, kidnappings, extortions and assaults 
experienced a steady declining trend up till 2007 (Rios, 2013). Almost immediately 
after President Felipe Calderón was inaugurated at the end of 2006 however, over 
7,000 Mexican army soldiers were mobilized to put a stop to the persisting brutality 
and violence instituted by powerful drug cartels across the country. Within two 
months of the drug war, nearly 20,000 military soldiers had been deployed to 
partake in Mexico’s intense fight against illegal drug trafficking. Since then, 
homicide rates spiked sharply due to violent clashes between civilians, political 
party members as well as organized crime groups (OCGs) largely associated with 
drug cartels. According to official homicide rate statistics by the National Institute 
for Statistics and Geography (INEGI), intentional homicides across Mexico 
increased by roughly 3-fold from 8,800 in 2007 to 27,000 in 2011 (see Figure A). 
Altogether, the number of lives claimed as a result of drug-war related crimes was 
estimated to be 60,000 during the same period, with a large proportion attributed to 
homicides.     
Qualitative and quantitative analyses by Espinosa and Rubin (2015), 
Escalante (2011) and Merino (2011) confirmed that the military interventions to 
contain drug-related violence had backfired and instead caused an increase in 
homicides. This was by and large a result of a potpourri of issues related to 
corruption, the lack of resources and prison-overcrowding, which the Mexican 
government had struggled to rectify. The drug war also affected men and women in 
different ways. While men were more subject to crimes related to extortions, 
business thefts and kidnappings, women were victimized by crimes that were more 
personal in nature (United Nations, 2011). Since the onset of the drug war, a large 
number of women and girls were pulled into sex slavery and used as drug 
traffickers. This phenomenon is likely to have been more prevalent among women 
from poorer households who may have resorted to drug trading activities for 
income. Crime statistics by the National Institute for Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI) additionally reveal that female incarcerations resulting from drug-related 
crimes increased by about 400% between 2007 and 2011, during the intensification 
of the drug war. Concurrently, Castellanos (2013) reported that women increasingly 
became targets of rape and sexual assault - offenses highly associated with illicit 
drug trading activities initiated by drug cartels. According to Amnesty 
International, a fifth of undocumented migrants travelling through Mexico by 
freight train were women and young girls, who were also mostly victims of human 
trafficking (Amnesty International, 2010).  
 
II.2 Violence and Intra-household Bargaining Power 
This study examines the relationship between violence and female welfare 
using three waves of the MxFLS. In a similar paper using two waves of the MxFLS, 
Tsaneva et al. (2018) find a decline in women’s absolute decision-making power 
on average when restricting their sample to women who are married, live with their 
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husbands and have at least one child. Using three waves of the MxFLS and 
restricting my sample to women who were married or cohabitating, and to women 
who did not have children, I observe a decline in a woman’s relative decision-
making power over one specific set of goods and services which is that of their 
children’s.4 The link between a woman’s living conditions as an outside option and 
her intra-household bargaining position, has been scarcely studied in the past until 
recently (Tsaneva et al., 2018). Non-unitary household bargaining models posit that 
improving a woman’s outside option inevitably increases her bargaining power, 
whether it may be through a direct and materialized improvement or a potential 
upgrade in her outside option (Aizer 2010; Pollak 2005).5 Other shift parameters of 
a woman’s outside option, such as labor market opportunities, sex ratios in the 
marriage market and divorce law reforms have also been explored in economic 
literature, although to a lesser extent than individual determinants of female 
decision-making power such as income, non-labor income, education, land and 
asset ownership. (Majlesi 2016; Brassiolo 2016; Jensen 2012; Bulte et al. 2011; 
Angrist 2002 and Chiappori et al. 2002).  
A large body of evidence also point to a positive relationship between 
female bargaining power and children’s health, nutritional status, educational 
outcomes as well as household consumption. Duflo (2003), Thomas (1994) and 
Thomas (1990) discovered that the larger the income or assets in the hands of 
women, the better the anthropometric status of offspring. Across several developing 
countries, a woman’s control of assets such as land has also been shown to be 
positively correlated with investments in children’s human capital accumulation 
(Gitter and Barham 2008; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Handa 1996). Women 
have also been found to devote larger budget shares to children and household 
consumption than men, underscoring the importance of female bargaining power 
for children’s welfare and development, especially in areas experiencing acute 
destitution (Duflo 2003; Phipps and Burton 1998; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 
1997; Handa 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad 1994; Thomas (1994, 1990)). Unlike 
previous studies that used proxies for female decision-making power such as 
income or non-labor income, newer datasets have reduced the need to use such 
traditional proxies of bargaining power that have been argued to be sensitive to 
identification issues. Specifically, the MxFLS used in this study permits the 
4 Tsaneva et al. (2018) argue that cohabiting women face different constraints than married women, 
and have a high attrition rate. In the context of Mexico however, Amador (2016) documented 
declining trends in marriages for cohorts born after 1975. Cohabitation has therefore grown to 
become an increasingly common family formation strategy among newer generations of both lowly 
and highly educated Mexican women. Cohabitating is thus more likely to be a persistent state 
without the transition into marriage. Given this demographic transition towards informal unions, 
cohabiting couples are more likely to face similar constraints as married couples and are 
subsequently included in my sample. 
5 In non-unitary household bargaining models, a woman’s income at the bargaining equilibrium may 
not necessarily equate to her income at the threat point of her marriage. For instance, a woman may 
choose to work after a divorce which is the marriage threat point, but not at a cooperative equilibrium 
where she earns zero income (Pollak, 2005). 
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mapping of changes in a woman’s living environment to her explicit decision-
making authority over a specific set of household and personal goods over time. 
This study adopts a non-unitary household bargaining model which predicts 
an aggregate increase in a woman’s decision-making power through an 
improvement in her outside option (Aizer 2010; Pollak 2005). Unitary bargaining 
models have been largely rejected on both empirical and theoretical grounds across 
economic literature. A growing number of empirical studies have failed to find 
support for the unitary household framework across various contexts and in real 
world data. In theory, unitary household bargaining models have been criticized for 
being over-simplistic by assuming that two family members pool income resources, 
are altruistic and maximize a single utility function. Therefore, while Samuelson’s 
(1956) and Becker’s (1974) unitary bargaining model provides a simple mechanism 
of household resource allocation, it ignores the fact that economic agents may have 
distinct preferences on the intra-household distribution of goods. Non-unitary 
bargaining models contrarily allow for greater flexibility in the range of decision-
making behaviour among family members.  
The conventional non-unitary decision-making model typically consists of 
two household members: a husband and a wife. Individually, the husband and the 
wife have a utility function consisting of their own consumption of private goods, 
where after maximizing the Nash production function, the respective utilities of the 
husband and wife are simplified to be: 
 
                       𝑈ℎ(𝑞ℎ) = 𝑇ℎ(𝑋) +  𝑎ℎ(𝑈ℎ(𝑞ℎ) − 𝑣ℎ(𝑝, 𝑦)), 
And 
                       𝑈𝑤(𝑞𝑤) = 𝑇𝑤(𝑋) +  𝑎𝑤(𝑈𝑤(𝑞𝑤) − 𝑣𝑤(𝑝, 𝑦)), 
 
The divorce ‘threat point’ is characterized by 𝑇ℎ(𝑋) and 𝑇𝑤(𝑋), where 𝑋 is a set 
of shift parameters which affect the conditions outside a marriage, or in other words, 
the husband and wife’s outside option. In the case where a marriage fails, the threat 
point would then represent the best a wife or husband can do if they leave the 
household (their utilities in the case of divorce). 𝑎ℎ and 𝑎𝑤 are the bargaining 
weights of the husband and wife and 𝑣ℎ(𝑝, 𝑦) and 𝑣𝑤(𝑝, 𝑦) represent the indirect 
utilities from a marriage which are functions of the price of consumption goods, 𝑝, 
and labor incomes, 𝑦.  
  In this study, I hypothesize that unsafe surroundings worsen a woman’s 
outside option, which in turn lowers her aggregate utility at the threat point. To date, 
only a handful of studies have empirically examined the association between 
outside options and intra-household decision-making dynamics. A well-researched 
external shift parameter of bargaining power relates to sex ratios in the marriage 
market and divorce law changes. In China, Bulte et al. (2011) discovered that the 
scarcer women were in the marriage market, the stronger their bargaining power 
within the household. Angrist (2002) also reported that higher male-female sex 
ratios in the United States motivated men to marry sooner, and also improved 
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female marriage prospects. Similarly, American women were found to receive 
larger income transfers from their spouses in a milieu with higher male to female 
population ratios, and with changes to divorce laws that favoured women 
(Chiappori et al., 2002). Results from Beleche’s (2017) recent study additionally 
indicate a reduction in physical and sexual violence by partners due to the Penal 
Code Reform in Mexico, which involved criminalizing domestic abuse. In Spain, 
divorce law reforms resulted in a significant reduction in spousal conflict and 
extreme partner violence as it facilitated the process of dissolving a marriage 
(Brassiolo, 2016).  
  Other forms of outside options such as labor market opportunities, gender-
specific police stations as well as previous exposure to familial domestic violence 
have also been explored. In developing countries like Mexico and Bangladesh, an 
improvement in the number of economic opportunities for women was found to 
increase a woman’s relative intra-household decision-making power. Majlesi’s 
(2016) study on Mexico revealed a positive impact of an increase in female 
manufacturing jobs on women’s relative bargaining outcomes within the 
household. Likewise, in Bangladesh, women living in areas with high factory 
density participated more in the labor force, had higher bargaining power and were 
more likely to have children who were enrolled in school (Kagy, 2014). The 
presence of legal enforcements favouring women, such as female police stations, 
has also been shown to reduce female homicide rates in Brazil, indicating the 
effectiveness of gender-specific legal institutions in controlling intimate partner 
violence through an improvement in women’s outside options (Perova and 
Reynolds, 2017). Lastly, Bowlus and Seitz’s (2006) study also suggests that 
husbands’ exposure to domestic violence during childhood, reduces wives’ outside 
options due to the increased probability that these husbands would become abusive 
future spouses.  
 
II.3 Violence and Other Determinants of Female Welfare 
Apart from intra-household decision-making power, this paper also 
examines the effect of violence on other forms of female empowerment such as 
employment, mobility, social capital and emotional and mental well-being. The 
relationship between violence and the aforementioned factors have been explored 
in both developed and developing countries like the United States, India, Uganda 
and to a lesser extent, Mexico. Particularly for crimes against women, Chakraborty 
et el. (2018) found lower levels of female labor force participation in communities 
reporting higher levels of sexual harassment in India. Similarly, Siddique (2018) 
documented a reduction in female employment probability in areas in India with 
higher reports of sexual assaults. The opposite effect of violence on female labor 
supply was found in the United States where during the second world war, women 
were compelled to participate in the labor market to make up for the loss in 
aggregate household income when men were recruited to combat in war (Acemoglu 
et al., 2004). In Mexico, Tsaneva et al. (2018) also documented an increase in 
female employment probabilities in the midst of the drug war, suggesting that this 
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was due to more men staying home as a result of increasingly violent living 
conditions.  
UN Women estimates that roughly 73.9% of journeys undertaken by 
Mexican women are on public transport (UN Women, 2017). Simultaneously, 
reports reveal striking evidence of widespread gender-based harassment on 
Mexico’s public transport systems, with nine out of ten women experiencing 
violence in public transportation spaces (Zermeño et al., 2009). This situation has 
been exacerbated by the ongoing war on drugs across the country as drug traffickers 
typically prefer well-connected roads and highways that lead to points of exit or 
entry, such as airports and maritime shipping ports that help to lower transportation 
costs (NDIC, 2011). In addition, an increasing number of women have been pulled 
into illicit drug trade, either through sex slavery or the compulsion to become 
assassins, couriers or watchers. The higher levels of violence and probability of 
assault on Mexico’s public transit systems may thus deter women from commuting 
altogether or compel them to switch to different modes or routes of transport that 
may increase travel times and the need to pay multiple fares. In the state of Bihar 
in India, Muralidharan and Prakash (2017) found evidence of a relationship 
between violence, female mobility and human capital accumulation. Under a ‘Cycle 
program’ which provided girls with bicycles, girls’ school enrolment rates 
increased due to enhancements in safety when commuting to school.  
      The impact of warfare or violent conflict on fear and psychological 
distress has also been documented across economic literature. Blattman and Annan 
(2010) found that exposure to the severe civil war conflict in Uganda imposed 
mental stress on ex-combatants, whom subsequently experienced reductions in their 
lifetime earnings. Their findings are consistent with developed countries like the 
United States, where ex-veterans who participated in the Vietnam War experienced 
a 15% decline in their long-term wages due to psychological distress from the war 
(Angrist, 1990). Additional evidence suggests gendered differences in the impact 
of combat on psychological health and educational outcomes. In studies by 
Dyregrov et al. (2000) and Kuterovac et al. (1994), girls were more likely to exhibit 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) resulting from exposure to war 
situations as compared to boys. Adolescent Tajikstani girls for example, were also 
found to have poorer educational outcomes than their male counterparts when 
exposed to civil war (Shemyakina, 2011). In the third wave of the MxFLS used in 
this study, I observe that women were also more likely to report being fearful of 
assault as compared to the second wave, indicating increased vulnerability during 
the drug war.6  
  Lastly, studies on warfare typically find an inverse relationship between 
trust and conflict, suggesting lower stocks of social capital in a violent milieu. In a 
cross-country analysis between 1981 and 2008, Rohner et al. (2013) discovered a 
negative and significant correlation between the frequency of civil war and average 
6 The proportion of women who reported feeling fearful was approximately 36.6% in the second 
wave and 40.2% in the third wave. 
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trust levels, suggesting that individuals are less trusting in a violent environment 
characterized by a drug war for instance. Trust is an important component of social 
capital, which is particularly beneficial for individuals living in societies with large 
informal labor markets. In a country like Mexico with approximately 60% of the 
population involved in the informal labor market, the likelihood of women gaining 
employment through non-formal means is high (ILO, 2014). Moreover, because 
females are also more likely to be involved in informal jobs than males, the role of 
trust is particularly important for women in accessing labor market opportunities 




  This study draws from two main sources of information, the Mexican 
National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the Mexican Family 
Life Survey (MxFLS). It merges monthly municipal-level homicide rates from the 
INEGI with information on intra-household decision-making, employment, 
mobility, social capital and emotional well-being from the MxFLS. Public death 
certificates are released by the INEGI annually, and contain details on the cause of 
death, the gender of the deceased, the day, month and year of death as well as the 
municipality in which the death occurred for the years 1990-2011. The availability 
of this data permits the selection and inclusion of only intentional homicides, and 
the matching of homicide rates to a woman’s bargaining power months prior to their 
MxFLS interview.7 The use of homicide rates as an indicator for a violent living 
environment is apt for several reasons in the case of Mexico. First, the conceivably 
exogenous increase in the number of homicides between 2007 and 2011 provides a 
good source of temporal variation suitable for panel data analysis. Table 1 shows 
the rising trend in the average quartic root of homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants 
across the three MxFLS interview waves in represented municipalities.8 During the 
pre-violence period from 2002 to 2006 (MxFLS1 and MxFLS2), the mean quartic 
root of homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants over the last trimester was about 
0.51. By the start of the third MxFLS wave in 2009, homicide rates had risen to an 
average rate of 0.64 before reaching a high of 0.67 in 2010. Across the 136 
municipalities included in this study, the percentage change in homicide rates 
ranged from -100% to 2000% between 2007 and 2011 indicating geographical 
variation in violence patterns across municipalities. Particularly, about 15% of the 
7 INEGI classifies deaths in accordance with the WHO international classification of deaths which 
can be found here: http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2016/en#/X85-Y09. The 
respective codes used to select intentional homicides range from X85 to Y09 in the ‘Assault’ section. 
The MxFLS only contains data on the month and year in which an individual was interviewed, 
dissimilar to the INEGI, which also provides information on the day the murder occurred. Under 
these data limitations, only the matching of homicide rates to a woman’s bargaining power by 
months prior to the interview instead of days is possible. 
8 Given that some municipalities in the MxFLS have zero homicides, the quartic root of homicides 
is used to preclude the dropping of observations. This measure produces results similar to applying 
log transformations for positive numbers and has been used in analyses across various related studies 
(Brown and Velásquez 2017; Thomas et al. 2017; Ashraf et al., 2015; Tarozzi et al., 2014). 
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municipalities experienced negative homicide growth rates over the respective 
period, 15% saw no changes in homicides and the majority of the municipalities 
(over 70%) experienced positive homicide growth rates.  
  There is reason to believe that municipalities closer to the U.S. border and 
those that had at least one drug cartel present prior to 2007 experienced greater 
increases in violence. Considering the high volume of drug trafficking across the 
U.S. - Mexico border through which people and weapons on top of drugs pass, it is 
likely that northern Mexican municipalities experienced different patterns of drug-
related violence. Municipalities with pre-existing drug cartels were also likely to be 
targeted by the government and thus may have experienced higher rates of violence. 
Using Coscia and Rios’s (2012) data on the presence of drug cartels in Mexico, I 
subsequently exploit the geographical variation in violence to test if the effects on 
female empowerment were larger in ‘higher-risk’ municipalities that had drug 
cartels present before 2007, and in municipalities along the U.S. - Mexico border 
(see section V).   
 
Table 1. 
Homicide rates across MxFLS1(2002), MxFLS2(2005-2006) and  MxFLS3(2009-
2010) 
Mean Quartic root of homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants (last 
trimester) 





0.510 0.415 0 1.194 136 
2005 
 
0.450 0.414 0 1.283 136 
2006 
 
0.558 0.403 0 1.273 136 
2009 
 
0.643 0.477 0 1.846 136 
2010 0.671 0.502 0 2.107 136 
Notes: This table displays the mean, standard deviation and range of the quartic root of homicide 
rates over time for each interview year in the MxFLS. A total of 136 municipalities are represented 
both in the MxFLS and my sample of analysis. 
   
  Data on murders are allegedly more credible in Mexico than other types 
of crime as a deceased body is documented in public records regardless of the 
willingness to report it. Offenses related to self-reported intimate partner assaults 
or domestic violence which also directly affect female welfare outcomes, have on 
the other hand been shown to suffer from more under-reporting (Ellsberg et. al, 
2001). A cross-check with several other studies using different drug-war related 
criminal data such as car thefts, extortions and kidnappings additionally exhibit 
similar patterns of increases as homicide rates (Brown and Velásquez, 2017; Rios 
2013; Molzhan et al. 2012). Because homicides are least subject to failure in 
reporting and are the most consistent with multiple studies using drug-related 
crimes, they remain the best indicator for violent living conditions despite the 
availability of data on other types of crimes related to the drug war.  
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  The MxFLS is a nationally representative panel survey, containing 
information on the decision-making power of married or cohabiting couples. 
Conducted over three different waves: 2002, 2005-2006, 2009-2010, the MxFLS 
interviewed 8400 households which included about 35,000 individuals in more than 
150 municipalities across Mexico. It explicitly asked couples within the household 
about who made decisions in four main categories: a). Wife’s private goods and 
services (clothing, money sent to own parents and work choice), b). Husband’s 
private goods and services (clothing, money sent to own parents and work choice) 
c). Household expenditure goods (food, major expenditures, contraceptive use) and 
d). Children’s goods (child’s health, child’s education and child’s clothing).9 
Detailed information about an individual’s indigenous status, education, age, 
employment and the number of kids at home are also provided, and included in the 
set of time-varying controls. The MxFLS additionally notes the presence of a 
woman’s spouse during an interview, which enables the accountability of possible 
measurement errors resulting from reporting biases.10 Lastly, the fortuitous overlap 
of the spike in the number of homicides in 2007 with the third wave of the MxFLS 
is especially helpful in providing insights into a woman’s well-being, pre and post 
exposure to violent environments. The MxFLS was also able to re-interview and 
trace virtually 90% of households across all three waves, making a comprehensive 
documentation of welfare changes in the Mexican society over time possible.11 
Summary statistics of the data are shown in Tables B1 and B2 of the appendix. 
 
IV. Identification Strategy 
  
IV.1 Simultaneity and Selection Bias 
  This study is subject to two main identification threats characterized by 
selective migration and reverse causation. The high incidence of homicides in some 
municipalities may have increased the likelihood of migration to safer areas as 
individuals searched for more security. This selectively migratory behaviour 
however could bias estimates downwards. If women had migrated to safer 
municipalities with lower homicide rates for example, the effect of a violent living 
environment on a woman’s welfare would be attenuated. Women who chose to 
migrate across municipalities could also have inherently different characteristics 
compared to women who did not move. If these unobserved individual traits are 
simultaneously correlated with female welfare outcomes, estimates would also be 
inaccurate. Moreover, while the data reveals minimal migration across 
municipalities among surveyed individuals, selective exposure to violence could 
9 Data and documentation are available at http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/. An example of the 
household decision-making questionnaire can be found in Figure A1 of the appendix. 
10 Reporting biases may arise from the ‘Hawthorne effect’, a psychological term referring to the 
alteration of one’s behavior or survey response due to the cognizance of being observed 
(Landsberger, 1957). 
11 See http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/english/assets/usersguidemxfls-3.pdf for additional information 
about the MxFLS.  
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still pose as a potential threat to identification.12 Even if the decision to migrate was 
not motivated by high homicide rates, it could have changed the municipality of 
choice of where to relocate to. To account for this possible source of endogeneity, 
individuals are fixed to their municipality of residence in the very first wave of the 
MxFLS, regardless of whether they had moved in the second or third waves of the 
survey. Coefficients therefore reflect intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates rather than the 
average overall effect of homicides on a woman’s well-being. ‘Selective stayers’ 
however, could still undermine the accuracy of estimates if some women, whom 
for unobservable reasons deliberately chose to remain in dangerous municipalities. 
Subsequently, I exclude women who moved across the three MxFLS waves from 
my sample of analysis, and observe that the main results remain significant with 
coefficients changing minimally.13 
        In order to mitigate potential simultaneity bias, I use the lag of average 
homicide rates in the last four months prior to the interview month and year, as the 
main explanatory variable representing an unsafe environment. The motivation 
behind this methodology is that current female outcomes should not, in theory, 
affect previous homicides. It is argued however, that one of limitations of this 
method is the increased difficulty in interpreting coefficients from regressions due 
to the use of a proxy (lagged value) for the original variable. The use of lagged 
homicide rates is nonetheless particularly appropriate for this study as past exposure 
to violent environments are likely to affect women’s welfare more so than current 
exposure. This could be due to lags in the dissemination of news on murders within 
a municipality for example, or the fact that previous violent experiences may instil 
fear and psychological distress among individuals. Individual level outcomes are 
also unlikely to affect aggregate municipal level homicide rates as killings largely 
due to the drug war were mostly unpredictable. Accordingly, I divide average 
homicide rates by trimesters and use the mean homicide rates over the last 4 months 
as the benchmark indicator for a violent environment.14 
 
IV.2 Individual Fixed Effects 
  The main empirical strategy employed in this paper is equivalent to a 
generalized difference-in-differences model, with homicide rates as a continuous 
treatment variable. Unit-level data provided by the MxFLS also allows the inclusion 
of individual fixed effects, which is essential in removing any latent and fixed 
individual characteristics that may be correlated with a woman’s welfare outcomes. 
Since individual heterogeneity plays a major role in influencing women’s 
12 The baseline dataset reveals a proportion of approximately 2.8% of women that changed their 
municipality of residence across the three waves. 
13 Results are presented in Table B3 of the appendix. 
14 Average homicide rates in the last trimester (4 months) generate the most pronounced effect of 
homicides on a woman’s decision-making power, although estimates produced from using mean 
homicide rates over the last quarter (3 months) or last 5 months do not differ significantly. Because 
feelings of fear and distrust for instance are likely to grow and accumulate in response to violence 
exposure over time, the use of a mean composite index of an unsafe environment rather than a 
disaggregated measure is justified. A plot of the average homicide rate coefficients over the last 1 to 
6 months is provided in Figure A2 of the appendix. 
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behaviour, the addition of individual fixed effects is especially important. 
Accordingly, the baseline regression model is estimated below: 
 
                        𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐵𝑜 + 𝐵1𝐻𝑅𝑚,𝑡−4 + 𝐵2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + ∅𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                        (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the respective outcome variable of interest such as a woman’s relative 
decision-making power index, employment probability, hours allocated to work in 
a week, probability of the fear of assault and of changing transportation routes and 
a measure of social capital: neighbourhood trust. A woman’s relative bargaining 
power index is calculated by taking the total number of sole decisions made by a 
wife less the total number of sole decisions made by her spouse in each decision-
making category type.15 Consistent with household bargaining literature, I separate 
decision-making questions (12 in total) into four distinct types: wife’s private goods 
and services, husband’s private goods and services household expenditure goods 
and children’s goods. The explanatory variable of interest, 𝐻𝑅𝑚,𝑡−4 is expressed as 
the average quartic root of homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in municipality m, 
over the last trimester according to an individual’s respective interview month and 
year at time t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of time-varying and observable individual and 
household covariates, which includes a woman’s indigenous status, age, age 
squared, an interview control denoting the presence of a wife’s spouse during the 
interview, the number of children below 15 years old at home, her educational 
attainment and her employment status. The choice of controls draws from existing 
household bargaining literature documenting the influence of these variables on 
various forms of female empowerment (among others, see, Ashraf et al. 2015; Bulte 
et al. 2011; Brown 2009; Datta 2006; Panda and Agarwal 2005). ∅𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 represent 
the individual and month of interview fixed effects accordingly, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error 
term.  
  The inclusion of individual fixed effects is necessary for removing any 
unobservable innate characteristics that influence a woman’s well-being, and month 
of interview fixed effects accounts for time trends that vary uniformly across 
municipalities. Subjects are assigned to the lag of homicide rates by months instead 
of years, due to the volatility and sensitivity of a woman’s welfare to many factors 
that plausibly make them more transient. Additionally, women are fixed to their 
municipalities of residence in the first wave of the MxFLS conducted in 2002, to 
minimize the severity of endogeneity issues related to selective migration discussed 
in the previous section. The sharp increase in homicide rates between 2007 and 
2011 and differences in patterns of violence across municipalities also provide 
temporal and geographical variation required for the estimation of a fixed effects 
model. 
 
15 I do not count decisions that were made together by both spouses as opinions regarding joint 
decision-making power are prone to great subjectivity. For instance, a woman who reports having 
joint decision-making authority over a specific good may have less than 50% of the decision-making 




V.1 Homicides and Female Welfare Outcomes 
  Table 2 displays results from the individual fixed effects model in equation 
(1) using homicide rates as a continuous treatment variable and as a proxy for 
violent living conditions. Column (1) includes only individual and municipality 
fixed effects but no controls, column (2) adds baseline covariates and column (3) 
includes potentially endogenous controls like a woman’s education, employment 




The effect of homicide rates (HR) on female welfare outcomes.  
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR -0.133** -0.146** -0.152** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean  0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 11085 10912 10903 
R2 0.463 0.467 0.469 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 













Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean  0.194 0.194 0.194  8.505 8.505 8.505 
N 10997 10902 10803  10997 10902 10803 
R2 0.592 0.605 0.607  0.605 0.616 0.618 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in parentheses. 
All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. Sample contains 
only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p <0.1. 
 
Altogether, the empirical estimates reveal a negative and significant effect of 
homicides on a woman’s relative decision-making power over only one category of 
goods and services: her children’s goods which include investments in education, 
 Fear of assault   Changed transport  Neighborhood trust 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 












Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Mean  0.369 0.369  0.092 0.092  0.786 0.786 
N 12233 12049  12138 9852  7570 7346 
R2 0.456 0.471  0.427 0.470  0.589 0.595 
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health and clothing.16 The model yields estimates that are robust at a 5 – 10% level 
and are economically meaningful across different specifications. In particular, a 1 
percentage point increase in the mean homicide rate over the last trimester decreases 
a woman’s relative decision-making power over her children’s goods by about 0.13 
to 0.15, or equivalently about 30% when compared to the mean. These findings can 
be juxtaposed against a large body of studies documenting a higher preference in 
the allocation of resources to children among women than men. A woman’s relative 
bargaining power over her children’s goods and services may therefore be more 
sensitive to negative income shocks due to increased violence for example.  
  Substituting the dependent variable from equation (1) with a binary 
variable equal to 1 if a woman is employed, and a continuous variable representing 
the number of hours a woman normally works in a week, I observe that higher 
homicide rates lowered employment outcomes.17 Since women from more well-off 
families may be less incentivized to work, I include a measure of household wealth 
as an additional control and robustness measure.18 Subsequently, the results reveal 
evidence of a significant and negative association between homicide rates and both 
employment outcomes, indicating that employment prospects were poorer amidst 
homicidal environments. In the baseline results in columns 2 and 5 of Table 2, a 
woman’s chance of employment and number of hours worked in a week fell by 
approximately 4.8 percentage points and 2.6 hours respectively, in response to a 
percentage point increase in the homicide rate. In comparison to the mean, these 
figures translate to about a 25% and 30% decrease respectively. Given that the 
average hourly minimum wage in Mexico is roughly 18.05 pesos (US$0.9), this 
amounts to a reduction of roughly 2,445 pesos (US$127) in potential annual 
earnings at the least (OECD, 2018). Results for male employment outcomes are 
presented in Table B5 of the appendix and show no significant impact of homicides 
on men’s probability of employment or hours allocated to work in the past week. 
This could be indicative of the fact that male employment may have been less 
sensitive to external environmental changes given husbands’ traditional roles as 
breadwinners of the family, and the fact that that fewer males were interviewed in 
the MxFLS. 
  The final set of results in Table 2 examine the relationship between 
homicides and a woman’s probability of the fear of assault, changing transportation 
16 Results on the effect of homicides on a woman’s relative decision-making power over her 
husband’s goods and services, her own private goods and services and household expenditures are 
shown in Table B6 of the appendix. 
17 I aggregate the time allocated to both primary and secondary jobs, as more than half (55.5%) of 
Mexican women not employed in agriculture were involved in informal work (National Institute for 
Statistics and Geography’s (INEGI), 2017 survey on occupation and employment). The likelihood 
of taking on supplementary jobs, for instance, participating flexibly in family run businesses is 
therefore high. 
18 The composite household wealth index is calculated using standard principal component analysis. 
It includes various household assets such as the ownership of a vehicle, an additional house, a dryer 
and washing machine, electrical appliances, furniture or refrigerator, a stove, a bicycle, farm animals 
and other domestic appliances. The wealth index additionally considers the quality of the house by 
accounting for the floor material and access to water through various sources. 
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routes as a security measure and community trust levels. The dependent variable 
from equation (1) is substituted with a dichotomous variable equal to 1 or 0 if a 
woman was afraid of getting assaulted in the day or night, if she changed her 
transportation route as a security measure, and if she perceived her neighbours to 
be trustworthy or not.19 In addition, I control for community level traits such as the 
log of community population, the proportion of households with electricity and an 
indicator measuring the level of development of community transport systems for 
the regression on transportation route changes.20 Coefficients with the inclusion of 
baseline covariates in columns 2, 4 and  6 show that a percentage point increase in 
the homicide rate corresponded to an increase of 8.7, 5.3 and 11.1 percentage points 
in a woman’s fear of assault, probability of changing transport routes, and 
neighbourhood distrust respectively. The expected rise in women’s fear amidst high 
homicide rates is consistent with Blattman and Annan’s (2010) study on Uganda, 
where ex-combatants experienced more psychological distress due to increased 
exposure to warfare. Moreover, exposure to situations like homicidal surroundings 
for instance, has been established as one of the triggers for post-traumatic stress 
disorders (PTSD) (Herman 2015; Flouri 2005). Safety on public transportation has 
also been shown to be an important factor in female labor force participation. 
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), limited access to safe 
transportation lowered the probability of female labor force participation by about 
16.5% in developing countries (ILO, 2017). In Mexico, 87.7% of women surveyed 
in Mexico City did not feel safe taking public transport, and 79.4% felt insecure and 
unsafe in public spaces (ENVIPE, 2016). This effect is likely to have been 
exacerbated in areas especially affected by the drug war, as drug traffickers would 
typically prefer well-connected roads and pathways that would help to reduce 
transportation costs. Moreover, since women undertake various activities related to 
child-care taking, household chores and market work, they may be required to 
commute to various places in a day, or travel during off-peak hours and take 
different modes of transport (Peters, 2002). The observed increase in the probability 
of transport route changes as a safety measure, together with the concurrent 
decrease in female employment is therefore plausible in the context of Mexico, 
where women have reportedly felt more unsafe during the period of the drug war. 
  Lastly, the observed lower levels of perceived neighbourhood trust, an 
indicator for social capital, is supported by existing research on civil conflict, 
psychological distress and aggregate community trust. In Sweden for example, 
19 The variable for neighbourhood trust is constructed from a household level questionnaire asking 
if people are trustworthy in the neighbourhood. Households which responded a). Disagree and b) 
Completely disagree to the statement were assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Because the 
MxFLS does not provide this question in wave 1, the analysis is limited to waves 2 and 3. 
20 The community transport development index is constructed by aggregating a total of 4 questions 
from the community transport questionnaire booklet in the MxFLS which specifically asked 
community representatives about a). if there was public transportation within the community, b). if 
there were enough roads for community traffic, c). the kind of materials that covered most of the 
roads/streets/highways in the community and d). if cars or trucks were able to travel on the principal 
road/highways/street that gave access to the community 2 years ago. The indicator ranges from 0 to 
4 with 0 being the worst. 
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individuals who exhibited signs of PTSD were found to be less trusting of others 
(Scheffer and Renck, 2008). A cross-country study also established a negative 
correlation between public trust and civil conflict, where trust levels fell in response 
to higher civil war frequencies (Rohner et al., 2013). Drawing on the work of 
Putnam (2000) and other sociological studies, trust as a civic norm leads to mutually 
beneficial outcomes on personal, economic and governmental levels. Economists 
also recognize trust as an important component of social capital as it lowers 
transaction costs associated with finding employment, which ultimately promotes 
greater welfare and economic growth (Hamilton, Helliwell and Woolcock 2016; 
Chou 2006; Iyer, Kitson and Toh 2005). Since a large majority of the Mexican 
population is engaged in the informal labor market with mostly women involved in 
this type of work, lower levels of trust suggest poorer labor market opportunities 




  A key identifying assumption of the individual fixed effects methodology 
in equation (1), is that homicide rate increases were orthogonal to trends in female 
bargaining power during the pre-violence period, before the onset of the drug war 
in 2007. In other words, the relative decision-making power of women for instance 
should exhibit a parallel trend in the years before 2007. If this condition fails to 
hold, the increase in homicides could be endogenous to a woman’s relative 
decision-making power. To provide support for the validity of the empirical 
strategy employed, I follow an approach adopted by Bauernschuster, Hener and 
Rainer (2016) and Havnes and Mogstad (2011), where individuals are divided into 
treatment and control groups according to the absolute rate of increase in homicides 
between 2007 and 2011. Municipalities are first sorted according to how fast 
homicide rates increased in the area. Based on the variation in homicide growth 
rates, women are then segregated into treatment and control groups with individuals 
living in municipalities above the median rate of increase assigned to ‘treatment’. 
Figure B illustrates the evolvement in relative decision-making power trends of 
women over the three MxFLS interview waves.  
  As can be seen, female bargaining power patterns over her children’s 
goods in the pre-violence period differ minimally between treated and untreated 
women. The post-violence period as defined by the onset of the drug war shows 
larger deviations in relative decision-making power trends between the two groups. 
Throughout the post-violence period from 2007 to 2011, women in the control 
group experienced an overall mean increase of 0.54 in their relative bargaining 
power over children’s goods, while treated women saw a decline of about 0.22 over 
the same sample period. A decrease in relative bargaining power for both treatment 
and control groups is nonetheless evident from the period just before the rise in 
homicides to after the increase in violence. Overall, the trends displayed in Figure 
B are consistent with the main results presented in Table 2, showing that women 
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exposed to higher levels of violence in terms of homicide rates experienced lower 
relative decision-making power over their children’s goods. 
 
      
Figure B. Relative decision-making power (DMP) trends preceding the drug war (MxFLS1 & 
MxFLS2) and after the onset of the drug war (MxFLS3). Each data point from 1 to 7 contains 
averages of relative DMP indices over eight or nine months. In sum, there are 58 unique interview 
dates between MxFLS1(2002) and MxFLS3(2010), with 25 in the pre-violence period and 33 in the 
post-violence era. 
 
To provide more support for unconfoundedness, I conduct a falsification 
test which performs a regression analogous to equation (1). Rather than examining 
the effect of past homicide rates on a woman’s welfare outcomes, I look at the 
impact of future homicide rates in period t+4. The explanatory variable of 
interest, 𝐻𝑅𝑚,𝑡+4 is the average quartic root of the homicide rate per 100,000 
inhabitants in municipality m, one trimester after a woman’s interview date. The 
analysis is motivated by the fact that future homicide rates should not in theory 
affect current female outcomes, if the increase in homicides is truly exogenous to 
pre-existing trends in a woman’s wellbeing. Accordingly, Table B4 of the appendix 
displays results from the falsification test, and shows an insignificant effect of 
future homicide rates on female welfare outcomes, other than on the fear of assault. 
The magnitude of the coefficients is additionally small (although not zero), lending 
support to the quick and sudden rise in homicides as an exogenous event. Lastly, 
the positive and significant effect of future homicide rates on the probability of 
fearing assault is expected, given that anticipated future attacks are likely to instil 
fear among individuals.  
 
V.3 Heterogeneous impacts 
 The rise in violence following President Calderón’s war against drug 
cartels could have had differential impacts across socio-economic groups, areas that 
were at a higher risk of violence and on women who had previous experiences of 
assault. Subsequently, the following section tests for heterogeneous impacts of the 
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drug war along these dimensions. First, I examine if higher homicide rates had 
disproportionately affected poorer women, by ranking individuals according to 
their household wealth. ‘Poor’ women are defined those that belong to households 
at the bottom 25th percentile of household income. Accordingly, I interact the 
homicide rate with a binary indicator equal to 1 if a woman is poor in equation (1). 
Table 3 presents the results from the analysis revealing the opposite effect of 





The effect of homicide rates (HR) on poorer women’s welfare outcomes. 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR * poor -0.117  -0.136 -0.152 
 (0.095) (0.101) (0.102) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 10739 10563 10556 
R2 0.473 0.478 0.480 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 












Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194  8.505 8.505 8.505 
N 10653 10556 10455  10653 10556 10455 
R2 0.757 0.763 0.765  0.688 0.695 0.696 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in parentheses. 
All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. Sample contains 
only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p <0.1. 
 
Estimates are additionally about 1.5 times larger than the main results, indicating that 
the effect of violence on female labor supply is weaker among poorer women who 
may have been compelled to work. This could be because of low husbands’ earnings 
for instance, which were insufficient to support children’s and household 
expenditures. Women from poorer households also have greater economic incentives 
to participate in the labor force if the benefits of working outweigh the risk of assault. 
Altogether, the results are consistent with Siddique’s (2018) finding on India, where 
 Fear of assault   Changed transport  Neighborhood trust 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 












Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Mean 0.369 0.369  0.092 0.092  0.786 0.786 
N 11865 11689  11767 9494  7152 6934 
R2 0.465 0.476  0.448 0.494  0.591 0.598 
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destitute women living in places with higher reports of sexual assault, participated 
more in the labor market despite their precarious surroundings. 
Ethnographic studies additionally suggest that women from lower socio-
economic classes may be more resilient and less vulnerable to increasing levels of 
violence. The estimates nonetheless show otherwise, that women from poorer 
households still feared assault and took precautionary measures through changing 
transportation routes during violent times. The coefficients for the fear of assault 
are additionally larger than the main results presented, indicating that these women 
were more afraid of rising levels of violence than those who were better off. Taken 
together, the findings demonstrate a trade-off between emotional well-being and 
labor force participation, as women from poorer households were more fearful in 
the midst of higher homicide rates, and yet, were still coerced to work given their 
limited options. Lastly, no effects of violence on poor women’s relative bargaining 
power, the time allocated to work in a week and perceived neighborhood trust are 
observed, suggesting that the main results for these variables were not driven by 
this particular socio-economic group. 
  Municipalities with previous drug cartel presence could also be at higher-
risk of violence, considering President Calderón’s tight crackdown on drug trading 
activities that fuelled violent clashes between the Mexican army and drug lords. In 
order to examine the effect of the rise in homicides on potentially riskier 
municipalities, I use data recorded by Coscia and Rios (2012) on the presence of 
Mexican drug cartels across municipalities. The data shows geographical variation 
across Mexico, where half of the municipalities in the sample had at least one active 
drug cartel between 2000 and 2006. Accordingly, I consider these municipalities to 
be at a ‘high-risk’ of violence as they were more likely to be targets of President 
Calderón’s anti-drug trafficking policy. To examine if women living in areas that 
were at higher-risk of violence were more affected by the drug war than those in 
lower-risk areas, I interact homicide rates with a dichotomous variable equal to one 
if a woman resided in a municipality that had at least one drug cartel present 
between 2000 and 2006, prior to the start of the drug war in 2007. The results are 
presented in Table 4 and show that the effect of violence on employment was 
stronger for women living in high-risk areas than on those who lived in relatively 
less risky municipalities.  
  Compared to the main results in Table 2, the coefficients for employment 
are larger and significant at a 10% level. This suggests that the main results could 
have been driven by women living in more violent municipalities. Specifically, a 
percentage point increase in the homicide rate lowered the probability of 
employment by 6.2 percentage points for women living in riskier municipalities, 
greater than the 4.8 percentage point decline observed in the main results in Table 
2. The impact of homicides on the fear of assault, transportation route changes and 
neighbourhood trust is also evident among this group of women. Overall, the sign 
and significance of estimates are close to those presented in Table 2, other than for 
neighbourhood trust. As expected, perceived neighbourhood trust was lower among 
women living in municipalities at a higher-risk of violence, consistent with various 
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studies that have documented lower community trust levels amidst civil conflict. 
Lastly, the results show that women residing in riskier municipalities were not 
likely to experience differential impacts on their relative decision-making power 
over her children’s goods and services or a time allocated to work in a week, 




The effect of homicide rates (HR) on female welfare outcomes (low vs. high-risk 
municipalities). 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 






Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 11085 10912 10903 
R2 0.463 0.467 0.469 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 












Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194  8.505 8.505 8.505 
N 10997 10902 10803  10997 10902 10803 
R2 0.593 0.605 0.607  0.605 0.617 0.618 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in parentheses. 
All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. Sample contains 
only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p <0.1. 
  
  Finally, the last set of analyses on heterogeneous impacts examines the 
effect of violence on women who had previously been attacked or assaulted. 
Research shows that individuals who had past traumatic experiences are more likely 
to suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSDs), which potentially affects 
their performance and participation in daily activities. Especially during stressful 
times such as the Mexican drug war, symptoms of PTSDs may be elevated. Using 
information on whether a woman had previously been attacked in the MxFLS, I 
interact the homicide rate with a dummy indicating if a woman had been assaulted 
before or not. Table 5 presents the results which show that women who had past 
 Fear of assault   Transport change  Neighborhood trust 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 












Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Mean 0.369 0.369  0.092 0.092  0.786 0.786 
N 12233 12061  12138 9867  7570 7346 
R2 0.457 0.469  0.428 0.469  0.592 0.596 
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experiences of assault experienced significantly lower employment probabilities 
than women who had not been assaulted before. Overall, the coefficients are 
approximately three times larger than those presented in Table 2 and are significant 
at a 10% level. This suggests that higher homicide rates exacerbated female 
employment outcomes particularly more among women who had been harassed in 
the past. Additionally, the results reveal that this group of women took greater 
precaution amidst violent surroundings by changing transportation routes as a 
security measure. Similarly, the estimates are nearly three times larger than the ones 
in Table 2, indicating that women who had previously been assaulted were more 
wary during the drug war and were more likely to change their transportation routes. 
Lastly, no significant differences between women who were attacked before and 
those who were not in terms of the time allocated to work in hours, relative 
bargaining power over their children’s goods and services, current fear of assault 




The effect of homicide rates (HR) on welfare outcomes of women who had previously  
been attacked. 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 






Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 10943 10855 10846 
R2 0.465 0.469 0.470 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 














Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194  8.505 8.505 8.505 
N 10870 10846 10749  10870 10846 10749 
R2 0.602 0.606 0.608  0.616 0.619 0.621 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in parentheses. 
All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. Sample contains 
only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p <0.1. 
 
 Fear of assault   Transport change  Neighborhood trust 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 














Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Mean 0.369 0.369  0.092 0.092  0.786 0.786 
N 12094 12001  12091 9820  7344 7270 
R2 0.468 0.473  0.428 0.469  0.591 0.593 
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V.4 Robustness 
  This section performs a series of robustness tests. First, there may be 
concerns with the explicit division of decision-making questionnaires based on the 
literal definition of a wife’s private goods, a husband’s private goods, household 
consumption goods and children’s goods and services. If the definition of certain 
goods differs for individuals, this could result in measurement errors and potentially 
bias estimates. In some instances, women may group personal goods together with 
household expenditures, which would make bargaining power over these two 
explicit good types correlated in the data. To check if this is a potential issue, I 
perform a standard principal component analysis (PCA) on a woman’s relative 
bargaining power over each of the twelve decision-making questions asked in the 
MxFLS, and subsequently re-estimate equation (1) using the factor components 
from the PCA as outcome variables. PCA is a data technique that simplifies the 
interpretation of coefficients by eliciting the underlying latent components from a 
large set of variables. It draws out the main factor components of each decision-
making category type: Wife’s goods, Husband’s goods, Household consumption 
and Children’s goods and services, by calculating the variance in all twelve 
decisions that are accounted for by each component (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1979). 
The components from the resulting PCA are consistent with existing household 
bargaining literature in that they reflect four different aspects: Factor 1 – Children’s 
goods, Factor 2 – Husband’s goods, Factor 3 – Wife’s goods, and Factor 4 – 
Household and income expenditures.21 The results from the above analysis in Table 
6 show that coefficients are significant at a 1% level and are negative across 
specifications for a woman’s relative decision-making power over her children’s 
goods. The magnitude of the coefficients is about twice as large, indicating a 
stronger negative impact of homicides on a woman’s bargaining power. The 
enlargement of estimates for children’s goods using PCA suggests that decision-
making over goods across different category types are possibly correlated to some 
extent, and that the consequences of violent living conditions on female bargaining 
outcomes and children’s welfare may be more severe after accounting for possible 
heterogeneity in the definition of goods and services across individuals.  
  Another potential concern is that municipalities that experienced sharper 
increases in homicides between 2007 and 2011 drove the main findings. To 
examine the sensitivity of the results to these municipalities, I first order 
municipalities according to the rate of increase in homicides from 2007 to 2011, 
similar to the approach used in section V. Adopting an empirical strategy analogous 
to equation (1), I exclude municipalities with rates of increases above the 75th 
percentile from my sample of analysis. The respective results displayed in Table B9 
of the appendix show that estimates get larger and increase in significance when 
municipalities with high homicide growth rates are omitted, other than for 
employment probabilities. The increase in the magnitude and significance of 
21 Eigenvalues and factor loadings from the PCA are presented in Tables B7 and B8 of the appendix. 
Factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 are retained. 
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estimates, despite the omission of municipalities that experienced high rates of 
increases in homicides, indicates that upward biases of the main estimates are 
unlikely. Coefficients for employment probabilities are additionally no longer 
significant suggesting that women living in municipalities with more rapid 
increases in violence were less likely to participate in the labour force. This finding 
is consistent with the analysis presented in section V where women living in higher-
risk areas experienced lower employment probabilities. 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 
Sample contains only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p <0.1. 
  
  An additional concern relates to differing patterns of drug trading activities 
and hence violence, in municipalities situated along the U.S.- Mexican border. In 
an alternate analysis, I exclude municipalities in three states represented in the 
MxFLS that border the U.S., namely Sonora, Coahuila and Nuevo Leon.22 Table 
B10 of the appendix shows that estimates are significant at levels similar to Table 
2, although coefficients are smaller with the exclusion of the three border states, for 
decision-making, hours allocated to work in a week and the fear of assault. The 
magnitude of the estimates for employment probability, transport route changes and 
neighbourhood trust are larger than those presented in Table 2. Altogether, 
coefficient estimates do not differ to a large extent, indicating that women living in 
municipalities along the U.S. - Mexican border did not particularly influence the 
main results.  
  Lastly, one may be concerned that a coinciding event related to the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis influenced levels of violence across Mexico, other than 
the Mexican Drug War. The main threat to identification would be that 
municipalities which experienced high growth rates in homicides were also the 
most affected by the financial crisis. If this was the case, the effect of homicides on 
female welfare outcomes would be upward biased as they could have been partially 
affected by the economic downturn during the same period. In order to attenuate 
concerns arising from this probable overlap of events, I control for community 
22 Six states in total border the U.S. The states of Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and Baja California North 
are however not represented in my sample of analysis and are therefore not included. 
Table 6 
The effect of homicide rates (HR) on a woman’s decision-making power over children’s 
goods (factor component derived through PCA). 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR  -0.246** 
(0.095) 
   -0.270*** 
(0.097) 
    -0.273*** 
 (0.095) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.694 0.694 0.694 
N 11039 10866 10857 
R2 0.451 0.457 0.460 
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economic conditions provided in the community level questionnaires in the 
MxFLS. A number of studies namely by Brown et al. (2017), Ajzenman et al. 
(2015) and Velásquez (2010) have reaffirmed that differences in the economic 
impact of the global financial crisis were uncorrelated with differences in homicide 
growth rates across municipalities. Additionally, only one individual represented in 
the sample of analysis was interviewed between December 2007 and June 2009, 
which was the official recessionary period according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS, 2012). Notwithstanding, I include in equation (1), the log of the 
local population, three binary indicators denoting if the prices of corn, health 
services and education had increased in the last twelve months, and a dummy equal 
to 1 if job opportunities had decreased over the past year. The results presented in 
Table B11 of the appendix show that coefficients remain significant at a 5 - 10% 
level across specifications, suggesting that the global financial crisis between 2007-




  Exploiting the exogenous rise in homicides across Mexico between 2007 
and 2011, this study is able to elucidate some of the negative consequences of 
violence on various forms of female empowerment. The empirical results suggest 
that violent surroundings lowered a woman’s relative decision-making power over 
her children’s goods, worsened employment outcomes, and increased the fear of 
assault, probability of changing transport routes and neighbourhood distrust. The 
findings on bargaining power can be juxtaposed against an abundance of intra-
household decision-making literature documenting gender differences in 
preferences over the allocation of income resources to children’s consumption 
(Gitter and Barham 2008; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Duflo 2003; Handa 
1996; Hoddinott and Haddad 1994). Considering that females typically prefer 
allocating income resources to children more than males, their bargaining power 
over children’s goods may be more sensitive to changes in the outside option 
characterized by unsafe living conditions. Pre-existing social norms that impel 
women to devote earnings to meet collective household needs including children’s 
rather than individual consumption needs, could additionally explain the sensitivity 
of female bargaining power over children’s goods to external environmental 
changes.23  
  The results also highlight the importance of safety and community trust 
for various facets of female welfare related to employment, mobility and emotional 
and mental well-being. This study demonstrates that higher homicide rates 
stimulate negative behavioural and emotional changes where women are more 
likely to feel afraid and change transport routes as a security measure. These effects 
coupled with the observed decrease in social capital stock proxied by 
23 Children are typically treated as ‘public goods’ in economic literature since both parents are 
assumed to derive utility from their kids (Folbre, 1994). 
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neighbourhood distrust, suggests that women may decrease their work effort and 
hence experience poorer bargaining outcomes over their children’s goods as a result 
of emotional and psychological distress, enhanced wariness and poorer social 
networks.  
The effect of violence is also found to be disproportionately stronger among 
women from poorer households, women living in riskier areas and women who had 
previously been assaulted. While the labor supply of relatively poorer women is 
less reactive to increases in violence, they face a trade-off between emotional and 
mental well-being and income earnings. Given that women from lower socio-
economic classes generally have more incentive to work due to poverty, they may 
be compelled to work despite increasingly violent surroundings to maintain 
household and children’s expenditures, though at an emotional and psychological 
cost. Women experiencing larger declines in employment and neighbourhood trust, 
particularly in municipalities that were more predisposed to violence additionally 
highlights the disproportionate consequences of the drug war on areas where drug 
cartels were more active. Finally, in line with psychological studies that document 
negative impacts of past exposure to traumatic events on labor market outcomes, I 
find that women who had previously been assaulted had considerably lower 
employment probabilities compared to those that had not. This group of women 
were also more likely to exercise greater caution in violent surroundings by 
changing their routes of transport as a safety measure.  
  From a policy perspective, more remains to be done in increasing the 
safety and security of women in public spaces in order to prevent large decreases in 
female labour force participation during volatile times. While some states in 
Mexico like Mexico City have introduced women-only train carriages, this service 
is mostly only offered during rush-hours. The state of Puebla has also introduced 
‘pink taxis’ that only take on female but not male passengers (Brysk, 2018). Such 
gender-specific transport systems however, have not been sufficiently streamlined 
and normalized across the country and the provision of such services remains under-
supplied. The formation of virtual patrol or watch groups is another cost-effective 
method to maintain neighbourhood trust levels in the midst of unstable social 
climates. In the Netherlands for instance, several municipalities have formed 
WhatsApp neighbourhood crime prevention (WNCP) groups to assist police and 
maintain order within neighbourhoods (Pridmore et al., 2018). In an increasingly 
technologically dominated era with high mobile phone penetration rates, mobile 
driven neighbourhood crime prevention methods could greatly benefit communities 
that lack the resources to hire proper physical patrolling services. In this sense, such 
technologically driven crime prevention methods could help to maintain stocks of 
social capital that may help to support female employment.  
Lastly, while this study is able to provide some insights into the relationship 
between violent living conditions and female welfare, it is unable to quantify the 
full causal effects of the drug war on female empowerment. Because intra-
household decision-making dynamics for instance are largely associated with 
behavioural traits that are especially susceptible to changes amidst unstable 
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surroundings, it is likely that a variety of less observable factors lower a woman’s 
bargaining power through homicides. While governments tracking drug trading 
organizations (DTOs) have noticed an increasing number of women participating 
in drug trading businesses over the years, the illicit nature of drug trade implies the 
paucity of data on certain facets of the drug war that potentially affect female 
bargaining outcomes, such as prostitution. This suggests the need for more research 
in conflict stricken or prone areas, where women may be more vulnerable. 
Especially in Latin America where drug trading activities burgeon, more research 





































Appendix A: Figures 
 
 
Figure A1. MxFLS questionnaire on decision-making. Notes: This diagram shows a sample of the 
decision-making questionnaire of the MxFLS survey. In total, twelve decision-making questions (‘A’ 
to ‘L’) are administered to both a woman and her partner. The decision-making questionnaire is the 
same across the two survey waves used in this study.  
          
 
 
Figure A2. The figure plots the coefficients of mean homicide rates 1-6 months prior to a woman’s 
interview date. Estimates are produced from estimating equation (1) with standard errors clustered 
at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence, and including baseline covariates. Coefficients reflect the 











Appendix B: Tables 
 Table B1 
Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables. 
Dependent Variables – Woman’s relative decision-making power over (MxFLS):  
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Household goods and 
services 
0.5 0.9 -3 3 12,240 
Husband’s private goods 
and services  
-1.2 1.3 -3 3 12,240 
Wife’s private goods and 
services 
1.1 1.2 -3 3 12,240 
Children’s goods and 
services  
0.5 1.0 -3 3 11,253 
Dependent Variables – Woman’s relative decision-making power over individual 
decisions over (MxFLS): 
Contraceptive use 0.0 0.3 -1 1 12,240 
Spouse’s work choice -0.6 0.6 -1 1 12,240 
Own work choice 0.2 0.8 -1 1 12,240 
Money given to spouse’s 
family 
-0.2 0.5 -1 1 12,240 
Money given to own 
family  
0.2 0.5 -1 1 12,240 
Large expenditures -0.2 0.6 -1 1 12,240 
Child’s health 0.1 0.4 -1 1 11,239 
Child’s education 0.1 0.4 -1 1 11,223 
Child’s clothes 0.3 0.5 -1 1 11,242 
Spouse’s clothes -0.4 0.8 -1 1 12,240 
Own clothes 0.8 0.5 -1 1 12,240 
Food eaten in the house 0.6 0.6 -1 1 12,240 
Other Dependent Variables (MxFLS):  
Employment  0.2 0.4 0 1 12,240 
Hours worked 8.5 18.0 0 107 12,240 
Fear of assault 0.4 0.5 -1 1 12,240 
Transport route change 0.1 0.2 -1 1 11,147 
Neighborhood trust 0.8 0.4 -1 1 7,894 
Notes: Summary statistics of dependent variables. The number of observations (N) for variables 









 Table B2 
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables. 
Independent Variables (MxFLS):  
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Homicide Rate (HR) 0.5 0.5 0 2.1 12,238 
Controls:       
Individual:       
Indigenous 0.1 0.3 0 1 12,162 
Spouse present during 
interview 
0.1 0.3 0 1 12,137 
Wife’s age 44.2 13.2 15 98 12,175 
Wife’s age squared 2,131.7 1,276.5 225 9,604 12,175 
Wife’s education (in 
years) 
9.6 4.4 0 22 12,224 
Wife’s employment status 0.2 0.4 0 1 12,240 
Household: 
Number of kids below 15 -0.1 1.7 -8.7 1.9 12,116 
Household wealth index 0.4 0.5 0 1 11,694 
Community:      
Price of corn increase 0.5 0.5 0 1 11,694 
Price of healthcare 
increase 
0.3 0.5 0 1 11,694 
Price of education 
increase 
9.6 2.9 0 19 11,694 
Fewer job opportunities 
over past year 
2.9 1.0 0 4 11,694 
Transport development 
index 
0.9 0.1 0 1.4 11,428 
Proportion of houses with 
electricity 
0.1 0.3 0 1 11,196 
Log of population 0.1 0.3 0 1 10,929 
Notes: Summary statistics of independent variables. Differences in the number of observations for 
perceived neighborhood trust result from the fact that only MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 provided 











Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 
Sample contains only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p <0.1. 
Table B3 
The effect of homicide rates (HR) on a woman’s relative decision-making power 
(excluding women who moved). 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR  -0.139** -0.153** -0.161*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 10783 10614 10605    











Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 
Sample contains only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p < 0.1 
 
Table B5 
The effect of homicide rates (HR) on male employment outcomes. 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 












(1.805)    
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean 0.791 0.791 0.791  38.17 38.17 38.17 
N 9713 9487 9402  9711 9485 9400   
R2 0.619 0.645 0.648  0.584 0.603 0.606 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 
Sample contains only married or cohabiting women. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 *p <0.1.  
 
Table B4 
The effect of homicide rates (t+4) on a woman’s relative decision-making power over 
children’s goods. 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR (t+4) -0.088 -0.083  -0.083 
 (0.069) (0.067) (0.068) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 11085 10912 10903 


























Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 
Sample contains only married or cohabiting women. Baseline controls include a wife’s age, age 
squared, indigenous status and an interview dummy indicating the presence of his spouse during the 
interview. Endogenous controls include a woman’s educational attainment, employment status and 















The effect of homicide rates (HR) on a woman’s decision-making power over various 
types of goods and services. 
Panel A. A woman’s decision-making power over household goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR  -0.139 -0.153 -0.161 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.478 0.478 0.478 
N 10783 10614 10605 
R2 0.467 0.471 0.472 
Panel B. A woman’s decision-making power over her husband’s private goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR 0.093 0.108 0.120 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.084) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean -1.190 -1.190 -1.190 
N 12233 12061 12049 
R2 0.412 0.419 0.419 
Panel C. A woman’s decision-making power over her own private goods 
HR -0.081 -0.094 -0.090 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.083) 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 1.119 1.119 1.119 
N 12233 12061 12049 
R2 0.439 0.452 0.457 
 
Table B7 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of all twelve relative decision-making indices. 
 Eigenvalue Proportion of 
Variance 
Cumulative Proportion of 
Variance 
Factor 1  2.463 0.2052 0.2052 
Factor 2 1.815 0.1513 0.3565 
Factor 3 1.244 0.1037 0.4602 
Factor 4 1.078 0.0899 0.5501 
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 Table B8 
 Factor loadings from PCA.  
Relative Decision-Making 









Child’s clothes 0.3853 0.0710 -0.3660 -0.0828 
Spouse’s work choice -0.1311 0.4617 -0.0006 0.0844 
Money to Spouse’s family -0.0993 0.3897 -0.0586 0.6295 
Spouse’s clothing 0.0479 0.4159 -0.1991 -0.3148 
Own work choice 0.2290 -0.0105 0.5626 0.0912 
Money to own family 0.2949 -0.0481 0.4675 -0.3321 
Own clothes 0.3710 -0.3070 -0.0515 0.4106 
Contraceptive use 0.2175 0.1196 0.2616  -0.0259 
Large household 
expenditures 
0.0907 0.4196   0.3740 0.2419 
Food 0.3433 -0.2445 -0.1433 0.3492 
Child’s health 0.4284 0.2301 -0.1599 -0.1046 
Child’s education 0.4338 0.2391 -0.1754 -0.1063 






Outcomes excluding municipalities with homicide rate increases above the 75th percentile. 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR  -0.207***  -0.220*** -0.231*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
Baseline controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 7922 7808 7800 
R2 0.464 0.469 0.471 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 












Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194  8.505 8.505 8.505 
N 7871 7804 7726  7871 7804 7726 
R2 0.592 0.607 0.609  0.613 0.627 0.629 
 Fear of assault   Transport route 
change 
 Neighborhood trust 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 








  -0.114** 
(0.045) 
  -0.118** 
(0.046) 
Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Mean 0.369 0.369  0.092 0.092  0.786 0.786 
N 8778 8655  8708 7191  5436 5272 
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Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 






Outcomes excluding municipalities along the U.S. – Mexican border. 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR  -0.116*  -0.133* -0.140** 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) 
Baseline controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 7401 7315 7307 
R2 0.468 0.472 0.474 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 












Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194  8.505 8.505 8.505 
N 7398 7347 7284  7398 7347 7284 
R2 0.584 0.598 0.599  0.609 0.623 0.624 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 













R2 0.472 0.486  0.432 0.474  0.595 0.602 
 Fear of assault   Transport change  Neighborhood trust 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 








  -0.135*** 
(0.046) 
  -0.134*** 
(0.047) 
Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Mean 0.369 0.369  0.092 0.092  0.786 0.786 
N 8228 8133  8170 6780  5164 5034 




Outcomes including community economic controls. 
Wife’s relative decision-making power over children’s goods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HR  -0.133**  -0.164** -0.176*** 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.065) 
Baseline controls No Yes Yes 
Endogenous controls No No Yes 
Mean 0.477 0.477 0.477 
N 11085 9532 9522 
R2 0.463 0.491 0.493 
 Employment  Time allocated to work (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 












Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Endogenou
s controls 
No No Yes  No No Yes 
Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194  8.505 8.505 8.505 
N 10997 9579 9471  10997 9579 9471 
R2 0.592 0.618 0.620  0.605 0.632 0.634 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the MxFLS1 municipality of residence and reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. 


















 Fear of assault   Transport change  Neighborhood trust 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 








  -0.108*** 
(0.038) 
  -0.099** 
(0.045) 
Controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Mean 0.369 0.369  0.092 0.092  0.786 0.786 
N 12233 10628  8170 6780  7570 6126 
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